



THE 3RD COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OLYMPIAD



AUSTRIA • BULGARIA • CYPRUS • CZECH REPUBLIC • ESTONIA • GERMANY • GREECE
HUNGARY • IRELAND • ITALY • POLAND • PORTUGAL • ROMANIA • SLOVAKIA • SPAIN



THE ARMED FORCES ACADEMY
OF GENERAL MILAN RASTISLAV ŠTEFÁNIK

Liptovský Mikuláš
Slovakia

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Any views or opinions presented in this booklet are solely those of the authors.

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THE 3RD CSDP OLYMPIAD IN LIPTOVSKÝ MIKULÁŠ – A PERFECT EVENT TO INCREASE EUROPEAN INTERCULTURAL COMPETENCES



In November 2008 the European Union Ministers of Defence decided in their Council of the European Union Conclusions on the ESDP – during the 2903rd External Relations Council Meeting – to establish an Implementation Group for the so-called “European Initiative for the exchange of young officers inspired by Erasmus”.

The overall goal of this Implementation Group is to harmonize the European Union Basic Officer Education and to increase interoperability, thus to increase Europe’s security. One of the avenues of approach to fulfil the tasks is to organize the so-called “Common Modules”. Such Common Modules are elaborated on EU-level – considered to be important for all future EU-ropean Officers – and all the EU Member States agreed to their contents.

One of these Common Modules is the “Common Security and Defence Policy Olympiad” – which takes place every 2 years in that country which holds the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The CSDP Olympiad is a knowledge competition of EU-ropean Cadets concerning the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Perfectly prepared and organized, the 3rd CSDP Olympiad took place at the Slovakian Armed Forces Academy of General M. R. Štefánik in Liptovský Mikuláš from 4th - 7th October 2016.

In contrary to previous CSDP Olympiads in Paphos in 2012 and in Athens in 2014, for the evaluation of the essays – which the Cadets had to author prior to the residential phase –

some 33 evaluators explained their willing to assess. On behalf of all persons responsible for the Olympiad, I would like to express my gratitude to them for their valuable services.

Two persons assessed each essay, if the scores differed to a certain extent; a third evaluator scored the papers – which was a very fair system to identify the best ones. The best essays are included in this book, which is a great approach to get knowledge of Cadets' valuable work.

Also a cover page competition took place prior to the residential phase to encourage Cadets' creativity. The winner of the internet voting was a Romanian Cadet and the outcome we can see at the book cover.

During the residential phase, the Armed Forces Academy of General M. R. Štefánik tried hard to give all the participants a feeling of belonging to a big EU-ropean family – which encouraged the Cadets to give their best during the essay presentation and during the team and individual knowledge competitions, which were won by an Irish and a Spanish Cadet. Congratulation to their great success!

However, the main purpose of such events is that Cadets from different EU-ropean countries work together, discuss together, solve problems together and thus, increase their understanding for a "European Security and Defence Culture". As long as – based on events such as the CSDP Olympiad – Cadets increase their understanding that nowadays threats and challenges can only be managed conjointly and increase their "European thinking" – as long the responsible persons can only be satisfied with the outcomes.

The Armed Forces Academy of General M. R. Štefánik in Liptovský Mikuláš organised the 3rd CSDP Olympiad brilliantly – during the residential phase they built an appropriate EU-ropean house which the Cadets just had to enter.

Colonel Harald GELL, PhD, MSc, MSD, MBA
Chairman of the Implementation Group

PREFACE OF THE RECTOR OF THE ARMED FORCES ACADEMY OF GENERAL MILAN RASTISLAV ŠTEFÁNIK



The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union (CSDP) is an inseparable part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. When responding to crisis situations within and outside the European Union (EU) it secures the operational capability using civilian and military means. Under the auspices of the Slovak Presidency of the Council of the European Union, the Armed Forces Academy of General Milan Rastislav Štefánik hosted the 3rd Common Security and Defence Policy Olympiad in Liptovský Mikuláš from 4th to 7th October 2016.

Our Academy welcomed 40 cadets from 15 EU member countries, who showed their knowledge of the following topics: History and context of the European Security and Defence Policy; the European Security Strategy; the Role of the EU Institutions in terms of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Treaty of Lisbon and its implementation to the CFSP or CSDP. The Knowledge Quiz Competition was designed for cadets/students from the Military educational institutions from EU member countries and its aim was to motivate them to study the Common Security and Defence Policy and to exchange their knowledge and experience in this field.

The cadets' level and extent of knowledge were evaluated by an international committee of experts chaired by Mr Dirk Dubois, Head of the European Security Defence College in Brussels

and Colonel Harald Gell, Chairman of the Implementation Group for the European Initiative for the Exchange of Young Officers Inspired by Erasmus. Prior to the Residential Phase 34 experts from 16 EU member countries evaluated 43 essays. 10 authors of essays who achieved the highest score competed individually in the Essay Presentation Competition. They also demonstrated their knowledge in teamwork competition when they were divided into 5 international teams. The members of the best team then competed among each other and the one with the highest score - cadet Joaquin Alfaro Pérez from the Air Forces General Academy in San Javier, Spain - became the winner of the 3rd CSDP Olympiad and apart from the Slovak folk-costume prizes, Pérez received a one-week trip to Slovakia in 2017. The winning logo design created by a Romanian cadet is used as the cover of this booklet.

In their free time the participants had a chance to acquaint themselves with the interesting facts and history of Liptovský Mikuláš and the Liptov region. The *Slovak Museum of Nature Protection and Speleology*, at present one of the most modern and interactive museums in Europe, aroused particular interest.

To conclude, I would like to congratulate not just the winner, but all cadets who visited our Academy and enthusiastically did their best in the competition. Not only did they fulfil the Coubertin's Olympic motto: „The most important thing in the Olympics is not to win but to take part“, but additionally they enjoyed new experiences and made new friends. Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank Mr. Dirk Dubois, Col Harald Gell and Mr. Symeon Zambas, the international committee and all experts who took part in the successful running of the 3rd CSDP Olympiad.

I am very glad that all participants appreciated the highly professional atmosphere of the 3rd CSDP Olympiad and the array of social events. We were also very pleased to receive a letter from the Minister of Defence of the Slovak Republic Mr. Peter Gajdoš, who highlighted the success of this international event and thanked the organizers for their efforts in the excellent representation of Slovak higher education, the Slovak Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic.

I hope you will enjoy reading the contents included in this booklet, and that we will see you again one day in the beautiful Liptov region.

With my best wishes,

Assoc. Prof. Dipl. Eng. Jozef PUTTERA, CSc.

Rector

The Armed Forces Academy of General Milan Rastislav Štefánik, Liptovský Mikuláš

SLOVAKIA

1 OPENING CEREMONY SPEECHES



The 3rd CSDP OLYMPIAD



4th - 7th October 2016
Liptovský Mikuláš, Slovakia



SK EU2016



THE WORDS OF THE STATE SECRETARY



Dear cadets, dear guests,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is my pleasure to welcome all the participants and guests to the Third Common Security and Defence Policy Olympiad, organized for the cadets, i.e. for the students of military academies in the EU countries. The Slovaks are often said to be a hospitable, hearty and friendly nation. Therefore it is my strong belief that, in our capacity as host, we will fulfil these premises and that you will feel at home and most welcome here in the region of Liptov, at the Armed Forces Academy of Milan Rastislav Štefánik.

It is the ambition of the European Union to strengthen its ability, through its Common Security and Defence Policy, to respond to crises in the world, notwithstanding geographical limitations. To achieve this ambition, the EU must be pro-active and coherent. In this respect, Slovak Republic has an enduring interest in participating in the events and key initiatives of the EU Common Defence and Security Policy, with the aim to contribute to the activities of shaping its further development.

I am sure we all agree that security and stability in the world cannot be taken for granted, and nowadays this is unfortunately true also for the countries of the European Union, which has always preserved these traditional values. Due to a variety of factors, to include extremism in any shape and form that is more and more difficult to identify, the world is continually

changing. This makes the work done by soldiers and people operating within the other security forces extremely challenging.

That is why I view the initiative to organize this type of the Olympiad as exceptionally useful. One of its objectives is to provide the cadets with the incentive to explore and address the security issues, to monitor and evaluate development of the international political and security situation and to learn to express and articulate their opinions... At the same time, it creates space for cooperation and healthy competition among the future military leaders of the EU countries. After all, it is quite possible that some of the contestants will be in the near future devising plans aimed at safeguarding peace and security, strengthening democracy and observance of human rights in the world. I am personally convinced that this is the vision of the world in which we all would like to live.

Thank you.

PhDr. Róbert ONDREJSCÁK, PhD.

State Secretary

Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic

SLOVAKIA

CSDP OLYMPIAD 2016



**Dear State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence,
Dear Rector Puttera,
Head of ESDC,
General Directors of the Sections of the Ministry of Defence,
Chief of the Operations Support Staff,
Mayor of town Liptovský Mikuláš,
Director of the Olympiad,
Officers, Cadets, Ladies and Gentlemen,**

Antoine de Saint-Exupéry – a French pilot and author – said some decades ago:

*If you want to construct a ship,
then do NOT drum men up to procure wood,
then do NOT drum men up to issue tasks,
then do NOT drum men up to assign them to a specific work,
but teach them the DESIRE for the faraway and endless sea.*

When we transfer this sentence to the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union – we may say:

If you want to construct the house of a Common Europe,
then do NOT drum men up to complain about excessive bureaucracy,

then do NOT drum men up for nationalism,
then do NOT drum men up to explain them how the things could work better than the European neighbours' ones,
then do NOT drum men up to win the next elections,
but teach them the DESIRE for a safe and secure Europe,
which is able to defend its values,
which is able to work together and
which is able to realize that the new threats and challenges can be managed only when we cooperate.

In the Module Description of the “Common Module CSDP Olympiad” is written – and by the way agreed by all the 28 European Union Member States – that participating Cadets and Students are to reach the following competence:

“Act and cooperate with confidence in a CSDP working environment”

This is exactly what we need for our future elites.

Scientific researches proofed evidence that Cadets' and Students' exchanges – such as the CSDP Olympiad – which is even just a short-term exchange – increase their European intercultural competences. If they will hold important positions in the future and act a truly European leader they may say – that their courses of action had the origin in Liptovsky Mikulas in 2016.

I would like to express my gratitude to the Armed Forces Academy for organising the event – and to all the personnel who prepared the 3rd CSDP Olympiad.

Special thanks goes to Ms. Martina Hyklova who acted as the “working muscle” of the Olympiad. I personally enjoyed the collaboration and cooperation with you. Thank you very much for that.

Addressing the Cadets – I would be glad if you just remember a quotation of the current Dalai Lama – he said:

If we do not cooperate, we will not find any solution for our problems.

I wish you all the best for the 3rd CSDP Olympiad and may the best win!

Colonel Dr. Harald GELL

MSc, MSD, MBA

Head of International Office

Institute for Basic Officer Training at the

Teresan Military Academy

AUSTRIA

THE WORDS OF THE RECTOR OF THE ARMED FORCES ACADEMY OF GENERAL MILAN RASTISLAV ŠTEFÁNIK



**State Secretary,
Head of European Security and Defence College,
Head of Implementation Group, General Directors,
General, Mayor,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Cadets,**

It is my honour to welcome you to the 3rd CSDP Olympiad. As a rector I am proud that our academy has an opportunity to organise the event that is becoming more and more recognized and reputable by military academies and universities in the European Union member states. I am also glad that the CSDP Olympiad is taking place during the Slovak Presidency in the Council of the European Union, which makes this event even more important.

The Armed Forces Academy of General M. R. Štefánik is a state military university responsible for education and training of military officers for the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic. The history of higher military education in Liptovský Mikuláš began in 1973, which means that we have more than 40 years' experience providing education and training to military professionals. Our academy offers four basic study programmes:

National Security and Defence,
Military Communications and Information Systems,
Electronic Weapon Systems,
Machinery Weapon Systems.

Education and research at our academy focuses also on the European Union tasks and missions by analysing the current security situation and the crisis management planning procedures. These activities aim to deal with crises and conflicts and maintain peace and security by means of international crisis management organizations. One of the objectives of our military exercises is handling a crisis situation by means of the modern simulation technologies that our academy is equipped with.

Nowadays the academy cooperates with both civilian and military universities abroad. The cooperation is realized by means of exchange study programmes and the ERASMUS + programme designed both for teachers and students.

We are convinced that the CSDP Olympiad can extend education of our cadets as it is an international competition that will help them understand the CSDP missions and tasks.

In conclusion, I wish all the participants of the CSDP Olympiad a pleasant and enjoyable stay at our academy and in the Liptov region and Slovakia.

Assoc. Prof. Dipl. Eng. Jozef PUTTERA, CSc.

Rector

The Armed Forces Academy of General Milan Rastislav Štefánik, Liptovský Mikuláš

SLOVAKIA

2 MESSAGES



THE 3RD CSDP OLYMPIAD REFLECTIONS BY DIRK DUBOIS, HEAD OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE COLLEGE



In history, few things ever change. Old men want to teach young men what to think, young men refuse to listen! Speaking as an old man: frustrating. Speaking as a young man: way to kick arse! That is why I devoted my life to something else. I do not want to teach young men what to think: I am not an Islamic Salafist imam. I want to teach young men how to think for themselves. One of my favourite quotes comes from a science-fiction novel by Ben Bova: 'all military training is aimed at making a robot out of you. Who else – in his right mind – would run towards somebody who is shooting at him?' I inevitably follow this quote by saying this is exactly the opposite from what I expect an officer to behave like. I first and above all expect that an officer thinks! Frustrating for the mediocre student-officer who only wants to succeed the exams, but life-saving for the soldiers that have to execute the orders of their bosses.

Now what does the above have to do with the 3rd CSDP Olympiad? Everything! I remember still very clearly the time when my Cypriot friend and colleague, major Symeon Zambas, came with the idea of this Olympiad. As an ESDC training manager, I have to admit that I was a bit sceptical. Still, let's give the concept a chance. There is nothing easier in life than to kill an idea, but from time to time.... So together, we worked on the concept. The first edition in Cyprus was a success from the organisational point of view. The knowledge competition and the cover page competition went well. The paper writing competition was OK, but the content

of the papers...? Well, let's just say that in general there was room for improvement. Luckily, the final winner was one of the few exceptions.

The second edition in Athens. I had a different function: I was chair of the Implementation Group and had little to do with the practical arrangements. The concept had evolved just a little: the papers were better, in particular the winning paper and presentation, but we hadn't learned from the knowledge competition. Organisationally perfect and it won the support of many Greek friends, still very useful for the College today. From my point of view, I had a slightly disappointed taste afterwards

Liptovsky Mikulas, third edition. My first – but hopefully not my last – as Head of the College. The local point of contact, Ms Martina Hyklova, really wanted everything to be perfect. She badgered us from day one, so that everything would run smoothly. Thank you, my friendly Lioness, for your magnificent job! From the College side, we challenged the students to learn new things, even last minute! What do you mean, it is not fair that you should study a 50 page document the day before the test? Do you think real life is any different? I took the role of giving the correct answers to the questions and explaining why the wrong answers were exactly that: wrong. Also for me, the text of the Global Strategy was new, but what the heck? The students stepped up to the challenge and three quarters through the competition, I was thinking about what question I should ask if it came to a tie-breaking situation. Luckily, we had made the questions difficult enough to not to come to that.

But everyone can parrot. The real test comes when you have to think for yourself. In this case, write a paper and – even more importantly – defend it in public. Believe me, in my long career I have seen officers fail, even if they had the correct ideas, simply because they couldn't convince their audience. The real orator quiets the crowd by his sheer presence when climbing on a stone. In this case, the Irish winner, John Nevin, of the paper writing competition did exactly that. He wasn't in the first place after his written paper, but made up the difference during his public presentation. He thereby proved that he was more knowledgeable and more skilled in this part of the completion than the others. Point proven again, when he became a close second in the individual knowledge competition.

In all, from my point of view, this edition was extremely successful. I do hope that the quality of this competition continues to increase like it has over the recent years. Now we only have to find a better way to find a good reward for the winner in order to make it a truly magnificent instrument to invest in our future leaders.

Lt Col Dirk DUBOIS

Head of the European Security and Defence College, Brusel

BELGIUM

...FOUR YEARS ALREADY SINCE THE FIRST OLYMPIAD



The experience of directing the first Common Security and Defence Olympiad and the pleasure of attending the second and third make me feel deeply blessed and lucky to have come up with the initial idea.

But coming up with the idea was only a small part of the tremendous work needed to plan and organise such an event in terms of administration and content. Each Olympiad follows the same agreed curriculum but there is always a certain amount of flexibility in how we achieve the set goal, and of course we must implement the lessons we have learned from the past.

Team work and team spirit are essential to organising a successful Olympiad. This time the team worked together perfectly and the workload was shared between many willing and inspired colleagues, including the IG members, the ESDC Secretariat, the evaluators, the jury team, the Academies, the cadets, and last but not least the director with his great support team and the Slovakian Armed Forces Academy of General M. R. Štefánik in Liptovský Mikuláš as a whole.

Many people deserve to be congratulated but there is always somebody who deserves the most praise, and this time it was Martina Hyklova. She was the central contact person for everyone involved; she sent emails, Facebook messages and texts, even on weekends and sometimes after midnight, especially to me and Harald. We are so grateful to her.

In the publication for the first CSDP Olympiad I expressed my wish for each future Olympiad to be even better than the last, and to see more and more Member States endorsing the initiative.

It seems that both parts of my wish are gradually being fulfilled. The Slovakian team organised this Olympiad so well that at the end of the competition the IG members joked that we wouldn't be able to make it better next time. It was really a great event! It is hard to see how the administration and content could be improved. However, there is still room for improvement in the quality of the papers.

As regards the second part of my wish, the number of Member States involved increased from 12 in 2012 and 13 in 2014 to 15 this year, but this is still not sufficient. What I would like is for all the Member States to one day participate in this kind of event and to see in the eyes of our cadets the pride that they take in being European. Our cadets should be proud of their nations but at the same time proud of our Union; proud of its core values and achievements. But to be proud of something you must first know and understand the values that underpin it, and it is essential for our cadets to have the chance to meet, trained together, interact, exchange views and create bonds with each other.

During this Olympiad I felt increased passion and dedication from the IG Members, the organisers and above all from **our** Cadets. I saw only positive thinking and heard no complaints. The moment when the EU anthem played you could see on the faces of all the people in the full auditorium a great respect for and pride in **our** Union and the fact that we have taken another small step forward in creating a Common Security and Defence culture.

Symeon ZAMBAS

Military Training Manager

European Security and Defence College, Brusel

BELGIUM

THE WORDS OF THE WINNER OF THE 3RD CSDP OLYMPIAD



From a personal and professional standpoint, the 3rd CSDP Olympiad was a great opportunity for all the future officers who took part in the event. The activities were scheduled aiming at the integration and the strengthening of links among all the participating cadets. Possible difficulties which working with people from different countries could initially entail were quickly overcome by the willingness to cooperate and the team spirit shown by the students from the very first moment.

I am really proud of being the winner of the competition. Nonetheless, the biggest prize was, without any doubt, having shared this experience with people of such great human and professional qualities and having the chance to keep those valuable relationships in the future.

To conclude, I would like to take advantage of these lines to thank the organisation staff for giving us the pleasure of having enjoyed this wonderful event. I am also deeply grateful to those who trusted me to represent the Spanish Air Force in this competition and, of course, to those who supported me in everything I needed during the preparation for the CSDP Olympiad. I come back to my country as a better person and server of the organisation to which I belong. Finally, I want to express my warm appreciation and gratitude to my family. I will never find the words to thank them for their unfailing support and understanding of the sacrifice involved in the hard but, at the same time, rewarding military career.

This dedication is just a small return for everything I have received from them. THANKS.

Joaquín Alfaro PÉREZ

Air Forces General Academy, San Javier

SPAIN

THE WORDS OF THE WINNER OF THE PAPER COMPETITION




I feel very privileged to be able to discuss my experiences of the 3rd CSDP Olympiad and I am honoured to say that I was part of this wonderful competition. My Olympiad journey began in November 2015 when I was selected to take part along with three fellow cadets of the Irish Defence Forces. Following a swift application process we were soon studying for the initial stage of the process, the Individual Knowledge tests. In preparation for these tests we were given access to an online study portal which opened up our minds to the wide ranging scope of CSDP. The topics covered included diverse areas such as the history of the European Union and European foreign policy which led to the formation of the CSDP we know today. Prior to the Olympiad I would have had a general interest in European affairs, but I realise now from this period of study that the intricacies of European matters require indebt study on a constant basis, especially as a future junior leader in the Irish Defence Forces. The intensive study conducted left us in good shape to pass our tests and we quickly advanced to the next stage, the research paper writing. For this part of the competition we were given a wide range of topics to choose from that encompassed all of the modules studied. I found this part of the competition very enjoyable as it allowed me to extend my research into an area of personal interest. The final part and probably the highlight of the competition came in October 2016 when we attended the residential phase in the Armed Forces Academy of General Milan Rastislav Štefánik, Liptovský Mikuláš, Slovakia. From the moment we stepped off the plane in Bratislava we were treated to wonderful Slovak hospitality which we would enjoy throughout

the event. On our arrival in the Academy we were introduced to our fellow competitors from all corners of Europe and in no time at all we became a cohesive group of international military students. The competition opened the following morning with a presentation from each of the top ten research paper writers. The battle soon began without haste and we were pitted against one another to defend our cherished papers against cross examination from the leading lights in the field of European defence. This experience although nerve wracking would be my lasting memory from the entire Olympiad. It was exhilarating to be able to stand in a room full of the present and future leaders in CSDP and present my arguments to a receptive audience who became engaged in a healthy debate on a topic I found noteworthy. Following the adjudication I was informed that I was the overall winner of the research paper and presentation competition, a fact that is still only sinking in today. I will never forget my time in the CSDP Olympiad, an event that is succeeding in a real fashion to strengthen international relations between European militaries and to develop a unified vision for European defence, now and into the future.

John Michael NEVIN

The Cadet School, Military College, Defence Forces Ireland, Newbridge
IRELAND

THE CSDP OLYMPIAD, AN UNFORGETTABLE EXPERIENCE...



Winner of Cover Page Design Competition



As a cadet in the third year of study at "Nicolae Bălcescu" Land Forces Academy of Sibiu, Romania, and participant in the third edition of the Common Security and Defence Policy Olympiad, I am truly honored to have the opportunity to convey some thoughts about this experience.

If I were to describe the CSDP Olympiad in a few words, these would be: spirit of competition, knowledge, team-work, experience, new friends.

Participation in this event was a real challenge for me because before signing up I did not have too much knowledge about what CSDP meant, but throughout the trials and testing I have gained solid knowledge which will certainly prove to be useful in military career and in mine, in particular.

This exceptional meeting brought together representatives of various military education systems across the European Union, and the fact that this was the third edition, again under the aegis of the European Security and Defence College, was also an important aspect and I believe that this type of events represents good opportunities for us not only to better understand the direction that EU establishes from a military perspective beyond the boundaries we live in, but also to build a more solid bridge between the member states and beyond.

The theme of the Olympiad reflected the increasing importance that the security and defence policies have, at the level of the EU, and this was a good occasion to express our opinions on the current geopolitical issues making me pleased that the solutions we provided were discussed and taken into consideration.

I am amazed at how quickly things progress nowadays in terms of geopolitical issues and we have to be proactive in recognizing the challenges we face globally. The knowledge that we gain from attending events like this makes me realize that this is the response to our preparation.

Quoting Head of the European Security and Defence College, Mr. Dirk Dubois, "Creating the military network" within the European Union is very important to be achieved while still being students. Once formed within the period of study, these networks may extend over the years and remain stable so that schoolmates will be comrades at the same time, participating in the security, defence, and strengthening of the European Union, maintaining its values and facilitating the achievement of the objectives set out in the European Security Strategy.

For the opportunity you offered me, I would like to thank, not only to the ARMED FORCES ACADEMY OF GENERAL MILAN RASTISLAV ŠTEFÁNIK in Liptovský Mikuláš, Slovakia, which has contributed to the realization of the third edition of the CSDP Olympiad, but also to all the participants for their commitment and interest they showed in preparing for tests, essays, as well as for the residential knowledge phase.

I think that all European students, civilian or military, should get involved in such activities since they lead to win-win outcomes for the organizers and participants, as well as for the European Union as a major global actor.

Sebastian Ionuț ENACHE

Cadet of "Nicolae Bălcescu" Land Forces Academy in Sibiu

ROMANIA

MESSAGE FROM THE ESTONIAN DELEGATION



The Estonian delegation, comprising of a singular cadet from the class 18 of Estonian National Defense College Officers' School Land Forces Basic Course, arrived in The Slovak Armed Forces Academy through Vienna. This small aspect, just a detail, proved most fortunate for the cadet. During the wait for the buss to arrive, the cadet had the sense to reflect on the experiences that led up to the residential phase of the 3rd CSDP Olympiad.

In fact the Internet-Based Distance Learning (IDL) course proved to be vital for success in the Olympiad. Although the written material was anything but an easy read. Going over the questions several times did clarify some rather complicated issues in the workings of the European Union. However the biggest hurdle to overcome on the path to Slovakia was definitely the essay writing. Looking back one would advise any future participants to definitely read the requirements before starting to write. Also combining other homework assignments in the college with the essay was a good idea in regards to saving scarce time.

A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy arrived in the participants' mailbox just the night before. The time in the airport allowed for reading through about two thirds of the material. This was crucial as apparently $\frac{1}{3}$ of the question in the Olympiad were drawn from this document. Furthermore any time spent studying during the residential phase would have had to been sliced from socializing. A very important aspect of the whole event because a professional network was being built, cultural differences discovered and mutual understanding generated in evenings spent in the local pub or on the

town. The cultural tour was also enlightening and a Facebook group was established in the geology and natural history museum, where there was access to free Wi-Fi.

Most importantly, the Knowledge Competition itself was very well organized. In the teams phase obviously teamwork played a crucial role for success, but also communication, distribution of duties, respect and trust for each other. The board had a good setup as well, questions were presented, points calculated and answers explained with professionalism. In the individual competition, the race was exiting till the end and both knowledge and strategy played a role.

In the end the Estonian delegation came away from the event with a better understanding of EU, international military cooperation, knowledge of the political and cultural differences of EU countries and a very satisfactory 3rd place.

Junior-sergeant Haldo-Rait HARRO

Estonian National Defense, College Officers' School, Tartu

ESTONIA

OUR EXPERIENCES FROM 3RD CSDP OLYMPIAD



In late December 2015, shortly before Christmas, we were informed by our Academy about the 3rd CSDP Olympiad, which would take place in Liptovský Mikuláš, Slovakia. As we learned the “CSDP OLYMPIAD” module consists of three main parts, an Internet – based Distance Learning Course “IDL”, drafting and submitting a paper on a CSDP - related topic and a residential Knowledge Competition. The selection of Cadets was based on specific criteria. We were very glad we were selected from among many candidates and almost immediately began our preparation for the “Olympics”.

During Christmas’ days off, we had in our minds the organization in Slovakia and at the same time we started to study the proposed topics in order to choose the one for our essay. While time passed, along with the writing, necessary for our participation in the final phase of the Olympiad was to study 4 basic Autonomous Knowledge Units online. The issues had to do with the history and content of the CSPD, the European security strategy, the role of European institutions in the field of CSDP and the Lisbon Treaty. The study was very constructive and interesting, as we understood the EU’s possible operation in security and defence matters.

As we completed the essay and sent it to the organizing authority in early May a waiting period was launched. Initially, for the results to be published then for the final residential phase at the Armed Forces Academy in Slovakia. Finally, it was time for us to depart from Athens airport and we were full of enthusiasm for our participation. Our arrival in the evening at the Academy rewarded our impatience, as at the icebreaker dinner we had the first meeting with the other cadets and got very good first impression about the Olympiad. The second day began with the opening ceremony, continued with the presentation of 10 best essays and the evaluation of them. The second day started with the team competition on CSDP matters, and followed with the individual competition. Upon completion of the quiz, we visited the beautiful centre of Liptovský Mikuláš, the local museum and sights.

Certainly both the writing of the essay and the quiz greatly benefited us, but equally important was our association with our colleagues from other European academies and the friendships we made there. Through our acquaintance, we found much in common not only in the operation of the military academies, but also in the interests, experiences and behaviour. The last and return day marked the closing ceremony and the farewell at the airport. The whole event was a total success and is characterized by the excellent hospitality of the Slovak Armed Forces Academy.

Our impression of the organization of the Olympiad in the Armed Forces Academy of General Milan Rastislav Stefanik was the best and the experiences that we gained there will last for a lifetime. The high level of benefits that were offered to us, the pedantry that the organizers had shown for every detail of our program and the warm climate formation among participants gave throughout the organization a prestige and glamour analogue to the character of the institutions, which were represented.

The topics, which were represented and discussed during both the presentation of the work and our quiz, made us to consider the main defence policy issues that Europe is facing now. The discussions we had at every opportunity we were given, with the students from other countries were very constructive and through them we exchanged useful knowledge but also broadened the prism through which we see the world around us.

As is evident our common wish for the Olympics is to take several days in order to go further in the defence and security of Europe and to come even closer as peoples and countries. Certainly, we do not lose our optimism and hope to again give us such an opportunity and continue our pleasant cooperation.

Written by

Fotios SKENTO, Hellenic Military (Army) Academy, Varinas/Athens, GREECE

Athanasios LYKOS, Hellenic Military (Army) Academy, Varinas/Athens, GREECE

Nikolaos ANGELAKIS, Hellenic Naval Academy, Athens, GREECE

Vasileios KOLIOS, Hellenic Air Force Academy, Athens, GREECE

Giorgos KARAVIAS, Academy, Acharnai, Attica, CYPRUS

Spyros DIMITRIADIS, Military (Army) Academy, Athens, GREECE/CYPRUS

Petros VARNAVA, Hellenic Naval Academy, Athens, GREECE/CYPRUS

HUNGARIAN EXPERIENCE WITH THE 3RD CSDP OLYMPIAD



Our experience with the 3rd CSDP Olympiad which took place in Liptovský Mikuláš in early October-was definitely an incredible one.

We had expected something less interactive and it was more than a relief that it was not only an international competition but a great and unforgettable 3 days as well.

Two out of the three members of the Hungarian team were civilians. It was quite funny to find out that the two of us were the only ones without uniform. We had taken part in similar competitions before but there was always a difference between the soldiers and us - it might have been just over-analyzing but we did feel that way. But this time, there was no such thing. We learnt much in Slovakia but if there's one thing we'll always remember then it's the fact that the strength of your voice is not dependent on the clothes and badges you're wearing.

People, who we met there, knew that. We could talk like equals with similar values and the vision that one day we all change the world from one aspect or another.

We met great people; we got a sight of the incredible Slovak culture with all the friendly and helpful mentors we got.

And for last but not least, we learnt a lot - it wasn't only about the EU, but also about the significance of public speaking.

We feel lucky to have taken part in this competition and also to have met all these incredibly talented people we hope will meet at some points in our lives.

Kind regards,

Asoum AL-AGHA, Luca GÉCZI, Bence GÖBLYÖS

National University Public of Service, Budapest

HUNGARY

BULGARIAN EXPERIENCE WITH THE 3RD CSDP OLYMPIAD



On behalf of the Bulgarian delegation, I want to thank you for your warm reception and gracious hospitality on our stay in Slovakia. It was a great honour and pleasure to be part of the 3rd CSDP Olympiad, hosted by The Armed Forces Academy of General Milan Rastislav Štefánik.

We received the necessary learning materials just on time, which were very detailed and well structured. The information was synthesized very clearly and easy to understand. The essay topics were quite interesting and diversified. The regulations were set very specifically.

The organization of the residential phase was on point. From the moment of our arrival to our leaving, everything was perfect. The decorations were marvellous, the food superb, and the company fabulous. We were able to discuss numerous political and personal topics with our colleagues from the EU. We acquired knowledge about the CSDP's essence and its dimension regarding the modern world. We developed our skills in writing and last but not least we had the opportunity to make new friends from other countries. We hope that we will continue to cooperate in the future.

Not to mention that we saw the lovely landmarks of Liptovský Mikuláš and we gazed upon the beauty of Slovakia's nature. We were able to grasp some of the ancient and gorgeous Slovak culture and customs.

Thank you once again for the opportunity you provided us, and for your generous hospitality.

Written by

Stanislava Valentinova BALCHEVA, Alexander Ivanov MONOV, Petar PETROV

National Military University Aviation Faculty, Dolna Mitropolia

BULGARIA

3RD CSDP OLYMPIAD FROM POLISH POINT OF VIEW



Both of us were tasked to write an essay on a topic of our choice. We decided to write about “Challenges and opportunities for the EU in a changing global environment” and “Operational capability of the EU Battle groups”. The essay writing itself was challenging and demanding, as we had to do a lot of research to make our articles credible. Writing about EU Battle groups made me visit Polish Mechanized Brigade which was part of EU Battle group twice and talked both with the brigade commander and the press officer about the challenges, opportunities and operational capabilities of EU Battle groups. Later on we were invited to the beautiful Liptovský Mikuláš in Slovakia where the residential phase took place. As soon as we arrived we were greeted with great hospitality and given warm welcome both from the cadets and staff of The Armed Forces Academy of General Milan Rastislav Štefánik. After a very stunning opening ceremony with traditional Slovak folk dances and singing following days were filled with lectures, presentation of ten best essay writing papers and knowledge competition. First in international teams then the winning team competed against each other. Other Polish cadet, Daniel Popławski and his team won the team knowledge competition and mine team was third. Afterwards there was an individual knowledge competition which won our dear friend from Spain, Joaquín Alfaro Pérez. The organizing team showed us also the beautiful city of Liptovský Mikuláš where we had opportunity to have a guided tour of the city and visit to the Slovak Museum of Nature

Protection and Speleology. The whole CSDP Olympiad experience was outstanding and even though the weather at the beginning of October greeted us with snow and cold night it was compensated by warm welcome and hospitality of the hosts.

Written by

Piotr ROSIŃSKI, Daniel POPLAWSKI

General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military Academy of Land Forces, Wrocław

POLAND

THE MESSAGE OF THE SLOVAK DELEGATION

On behalf of the Slovak delegation we would like to express that it was an honour to cooperate in preparing, organizing and participating in the 3rd CSDP Olympiad which took place at our alma mater, the Armed Forces Academy of General Milan Rastislav Štefánik in Liptovský Mikuláš.

At first we would like to thank all the foreign participants for their visit, friendly approach, new relationships which we have established during their short stay in Liptov region. The very same relationships create the key element of such events. They show us that in the future, as young military officers, we will be able to collaborate and communication will be easier and much better. We also consider appropriate to state, that the level of preparedness of the foreign cadets was on a solid level and we made an effort to keep pace with their knowledge.

The teamwork has shown us that it was a great contribution to have views, opinions and thoughts of foreign armed forces members at hand. We believe that we were able to prove that the teamwork may be a key aspect of solving simple or more complicated problems. We also appreciate very accurate notes and remarks made by Mr. Dirk Dubois, the Head of ESDC during both the Essay Presentation and the Knowledge Competitions. We are pleased that new relationships that formed at the beginning of the 3rd CSDP Olympiad strengthened not only during our free time but also during the social and cultural activities carried out within the official programme of the Olympiad.

Many thanks belong to members of the Department of Science and Foreign Affairs, for their approach, willingness and maximum effort they took while creating outstanding conditions for this event.

We believe that in our future military career, either in deployment in the International Crisis Management operations or elsewhere, we will have the opportunity to improve the relationships we formed here.

In conclusion, we would like to express the pleasure, that efforts like these are a contribution to deeper and more complex integration and cooperation within the European Union on both military and civilian level. We are deeply convinced that the 3rd CSDP Olympiad, as a part of

events within the Slovak Presidency of the Council of the European Union represented the Slovak Republic with dignity and contributed in creating and spreading abroad a good reputation of our country.

Written by

pvt. Martin ROŠ, pvt. Alexander BOTOŠ, pvt. Monika SÝKOROVÁ, pvt. Marcel ŠIMON

The Armed Forces Academy of General Milan Rastislav Štefánik, Liptovský Mikuláš


SLOVAKIA

3 TEN BEST ESSAYS



Petros VARNAVA

The Hellenic Naval Academy, Athens, CYPRUS



Cyber defence as a new dimension of European security

ABSTRACT

Cyberspace, a common misunderstood term that is increasingly used today in political debates and agreements. Today more and more humans are using the internet to communicate through information systems and as long as the technology and demand rises so are the risks and issues of cyberspace. But with this new era and the wide spreading use of cyberspace, military had to take advantage of the technology. At that time cyber security and cyber defensive-offensive capabilities were born. EU-CSDP after a serious hit of Estonia's public services at 2007, understood that EU was in serious threat and that it was vulnerable. So CSDP took action and finally on 18 November 2014, the Council of the European Union adopted the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework. This was the work the whole EU, specifically following a proposal from the High Representative, the Commission and the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European External Action Service (EEAS) together with the Commission services and the EDA provided input for this non-legislative document. However in a competitive and unforgiving world, with economic and geopolitical interest, if we want to dream about peace in cyberspace we have to have a better management of inner and outer cyber issues and all Member States to cooperate with CSDP and each other, and to seek for agreement and cooperation with Nato.

- 1) Cyber defence capabilities
- 2) EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework
- 3) The gap between internal and external aspects of cyber security
- 4) Cooperation with NATO
- 5) The human being -most precious cyber defence asset

1 PREFACE

In a radical technology-changing world with a vast range of use of the cyberspace, more and more cyber security issues comes to foreground. Cyberspace, a common misunderstood and unspecified term, is to describe "*a time-dependent set of interconnected information systems*

and the human users that interact with these systems”¹. This means that cyberspace as an imaginary world, is the place that combines the network of hardware, software and data and also depends on time and human beings to establish its complexity. Nowadays the complexity of cyberspace combined with the increasing number and sophistication of cyber offensive weapons makes cyberspace as the new 'fifth' domain of warfare. Today, common malware and distributed denial of service (DDoS) are targeting political-economical-military critical infrastructures to sabotage enemy governments and make them malfunction in their own systems. These tactics are now widely used in cyber war, exemplary the first cyber attacks used in warfare were : in 2007, DDoS attacks targeted the public services of Estonian government, in 2008 Russian–Georgian war, hackers attacked media and government websites in Georgia, in 2010 US targeted with 'Stuxnet' malware Iran's Natanz nuclear site. Moreover today these tactics are even more frequently used from criminals 'hacktivists' and governments, so most of the countries to counter these threats are now developing offensive and defensive weapons, mechanisms and policies. Consequently a race for sovereignty in cyberspace has began. Many of the big governments that are technological advanced and sophisticated in the field such as US, Russia, UK, France, China are already developing doctrines with a comprehensive approach and resilience in their systems. That is the reason is so important for Europe's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) to make cyber defense and cyber security a priority and support progress toward a more consistent level of cyber defense capability across the EU. I personally want to forward the security issues that have been brought from cyberspace and the necessity of taking measures to deal with them, beginning using more funds and specialized personnel, making Europe number one in cyber collaboration and security with all member states independently.

¹ 1 Cf.: Rain Ottis, Peeter Lorents 2010 Cyberspace: Definition and Implication P.1
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallinn, Estonia

2 INTRODUCTION

In modern times, in a world of information many business, governments and private citizens face the risks and issues of cyber crime and cyber war. Only the economic costs alone were estimated between US\$300 billion - US\$1 trillion worldwide. If we add to that the destruction of data, sabotage of services and critical infrastructures, military espionage, theft of intellectual property, electronic exploitation and violence we can see the effects of cyberspace issues over the world. Consequently these problems are now subject of political, economic, diplomatic and military negotiations among countries at international and national level. Now we use terms like cyber security, cyber terrorism, cyber warfare, cyber attack, cyber defense but they are hard to define, making the use of them prohibitive in debates and agreements among nations. Despite that an easy way to understand these terms is to see the incentives and motives of each body. Criminals will seek for illegal revenue so they hijack systems of companies etc, intelligence agencies seek for useful information so they target and attack to get access to that information. Military or governments seek to disrupt the operations of the enemy, so they attack the sensor, logistics, communications and control systems in enemy cyberspace. These conflicts goes on and on , and with the continuous increasing use of cyberspace it seems harder to keep up. So 'we' as a European team, to counter that we have to establish common rules and laws among member states that will bring a comprehensive approach to many upcoming issues regarding cyberspace. This means that at first we have the need for constant patrolling and reconnaissance and after we have to develop cyber-defense capabilities and technologies to ensure our cyber defense. Another crucial aspect that has to be analyzed is the need for collaboration with other states outside of Europe such as US, China, Russia ,NATO etc that will bring a pool of information to use and hopefully brings the necessary level of cyber-resilience in Europe. Moreover EU's experts in the field combined with all Europe's institutions and CSDP shall create a doctrine to be applied that will make a totalitarian approach to cyberspace.

In opposition of all that, experts widely disagree on how cyber threats will develop in the future, but the only thing for sure is that until today there wasn't any cyber attack that directly cost a human life (opposed to regular armed warfare) and large scale or 'systemic' cyber-risks are unpredictable and incalculable due to the uncertainty surrounding them. Another element

that supports this, is the complexity and the struggles to identify the most important threat and who should get the resources to counter it while there is at least proof and experience of cyber crime and cyber espionage. These 'truths' about cyber threats make us think that we misjudge the whole topic but the complexity and uncertainty (time dependence) of the socio-technical environment will make only one thing clear: the necessity of resilience.

3 CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH

In the past few years, rapid changes have been made in methodology and approach of the cyber security issues, policies and technologies between groups of governments, companies and individuals. This includes the research behind each major or minor incident associated with targeted cyber attacks, cyber warfare, cyber violence. Until the first "real" cyber attack in 2007, which brought mass attention to Europe's leaders, the EU's approach to cyber-security was framed mainly as sub-category and side issue. However this 'defiance' for cyber security was the same all over the world. Nobody thought until then that a single targeted cyber attack will bring such chaos as the 2007 attack of Estonia's public services, by targeted DDoS. After that the European Commission promoted the importance and the significance of treating cyber issues as a main factor of Europe's security and started building up a body of directives and regulations with bearing on cyber issues. In 2013 the European Commission released its own cyber security strategy with the NIS Directive, entitled "An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace" as an attempt to provide a more catholic and comprehensive approach to cyber security management. Nevertheless this was already late, almost every country was in the cyber game and strategies like this were already put in use. But CSDP didn't know that all this straining for developing cyber security would bring us with mathematical precision to a constant loop where each country is trying to increase the defensive and offensive cyber strategies, mechanisms and weapons as a counter measure to the other governments cyber security advances. The conclusion from this "infinite loop" of cyber domination is that it is completely clear to Europe's security leaders that no more strain will be tolerated. Europe is in immediate need for measures that will bring resilience to cyber security strategies, cooperation with major powers such as Nato and a doctrine that will be based on a more futuristic view of cyber security and peace. If Europe succeeds to unify powers and create bonds in cyberspace security in a way of leadership guided by peace and common trust of the

Member States and the whole world, it will be a truly remarkable outcome. But for us to really know where to begin we have to know what we have until today and how Europe responds to cyber attacks. According to Dr. Myriam Dunn Cavelty Head of Risk & Resilience Research Group Center for Security Studies "There are a variety of bodies working in the field of cyber security, such as the European Network and Information Security Varnava Cyberspace as new dimension of European security.

Agency (ENISA), the European Public–Private Partnership for Resilience (EP3R) the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) for EU institutions, or the EU Cybercrime Centre within Europol." and she assure us that " Still, despite a relatively fragmented policy set-up, the EU's strategy for internal cyber-resilience cannot be criticized for its fundamentals"² I definitely agree that the fundamentals for internal cyber-resilience are right, however we have to predict the future cyber game to make the right decisions if we want to pioneer. It's like a chess game where you have to know how the opponent will react to every decision we make. But for the today cyber issues it is generally accepted and I personally agree that we have to be pragmatic and within our capabilities and powers. Again according to Dr. Myriam Dunn Cavelty " A rather pragmatic, level-headed approach has emerged over the years, in which two principal policy areas can be distinguished. First, there are measures to ensure 'Network and Information Security' (NIS) to support Critical Infrastructure Protection. These measures are mainly about standardizing risk management, but there are serious considerations to establish a broad security incident reporting mechanism in the NIS Directive. Second, there are measures intended to combat cyber-attacks of all sorts, including large scale ones, with a main focus on cyber-crime activities. Here, the main thrust in the spirit of the Budapest Convention is the harmonization of cyber-law in Member states, the improvement of operational law enforcement cooperation as well as political cooperation and coordination among Member States, i.e. in the field of information exchange. There is a third potential focus on military aspects of cyber-security, but while the EU has a nascent cyber-defence concept for 'Common Defence and Security Policy' missions and the European Defence

² Cf.: Dr. Myriam Dunn Cavelty 2013 P.3-5 A resilient Europe for an open, safe and secure cyberspace Zurich Switzerland

Agency (EDA) is developing cyber-defence capabilities and technologies, cyberdefence at the EU level is not a priority (Simon 2010; Klimburg and Tirmaa-Klaar ,even though that aspect has been strengthened in the new Cybersecurity Strategy (European Commission 2013a: 11). The EU is also striving to intensify cooperation with NATO in cyber-security in coming years." [2] Conclusively we understand that cyber resilience, support of the whole union and member states, peace and cooperation with external powers it's really hard to obtain, still Europe has to succeed for the safety of the whole union and world.

4 RESEARCH GAP

Significant is the gap between internal and external aspects of cyber security as European Parliament stated in 2014 "cyber defence should become an active capability of CSDP and reiterated the need to bridge the gap between internal and external aspects of cyber security"³. Because of the complexity between the enormous amount of information, the socio-technical environment, the composition of the bodies that are responsible and the tools that are used for internal and external aspects of cyber security, its hard and almost impossible to measure, manage, understand and deal the cyber-issues and cyber-attacks before it's too late. It is extremely necessary for CSDP to contribute more actively in cyber defense. Firstly CSDP has to manage and control every internal and external cyber related operation and activity. Secondly CSDP has to put the right resources and personnel (trained experts in cyber-defence) to promote a more organized and comprehensive system with resilience in external cyber issues.

5 RESEARCH QUESTION

How is it possible for Europe to manage complex information through cyberspace, and how we can unify all powers for an open, safe, comprehensive, resilient and secure cyberspace for the member states, the companies, the individuals and the whole globe. More specifically how CSDP can bridge the gap between internal and external aspects of cyber security and make a completely new doctrine that covers every aspect of cyber security. Last but not least, how

³ Cf.: Carmen-Cristina Cirliu 2014 P.9 Cyber defence in the EU Preparing for cyber warfare? European parliamentary research service

we want to advance in cyberspace and security worldwide, so peace and security be our guideway values and move forward to a new era.

6 METHODOLOGY

It's clear that a completely reorganization of Europe's cyber security has to be achieved. If we start from the fundamentals, understand how cyberspace works today, emphasize on an overall contribution of all member states, collect, analyze data that already exist, we can make a doctrine about cyberspace. For a safe European Union without any prejudices, dissensions, disputes on cyberspace related issues. In the end Europe has to make laws, policies that any member state can tolerate and obey, aiming world peace and collaboration. Consequently a new framework, with new ideas and new perspectives has to be set in order for Europe's security moves forward with confidence. Varnava Cyberspace as new dimension of European security.

7 RESEARCH AND RESULTS OF RESEARCH

7.1 Basics

Starting we have to learn some fundamentals of Europe and cyberspace security. Cyberspace is a relative new term and cyber security is now a major security aspect of Europe (from 2007 till now). But Europe came a little earlier as an economical and geopolitical alliance, between major-central powers that wanted superiority against bigger and more technological advanced powers. But with the great values that were put to guide them Europe grew larger and larger. Even though some of the primary reasons for the craft of a European union were off after some years, the union had great acceptance and course over the years. Combine this course of Europe's "search for values" with the new coming issue of cyberspace and security, let to today's need for a comprehensive, resilient, open, safe and secure cyberspace in Europe inwards and outwards. But this need is really hard to obtain if we understand the complexity and the enormity of cyberspace information. With the vast use of cyberspace in our modern lives, from emails, personal data, social media and network, info exchange to just simple source of knowledge, we understand that we are surrounded from cyberspace and depend from it. Also we understand that from all this volume is really hard to spot, measure and deal with any malicious act to protect the individuals, the companies and the member states.

Consequently a general effort from everybody has to be achieved in order to be open, safe and secure.

7.2 Nowadays efforts of Member States and the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework

Today many Member States have already adopted a national cyber security system in cooperation with EU'S bodies (institutions and agencies). The cyber security policies and practices vary among MS but lately most of them add a more militarized perspective in their national approaches, however just a few admit to invest in cyber weapons or the use of offensive techniques.

Greece: The Office of Computer Warfare was created in 1999 and from then they started to invest in cyber warfare capabilities. Today, the director of cyber defence is under direct supervision of the Chief of Defence.

UK: In 2011 UK developed a cyber security strategy that characterizes cyber attacks as a national security threat, and aims to defending national infrastructure such as the ministry of defence. The UK announced in 2013 its intention to incorporate cyber warfare as part of future military operations and to develop a cyber strike force, investing in total 800 million to future cyber capabilities.

Germany: In 2011 Germany conducted a National Cyber Security Council and a National Cyber Response Centre to manage cyber policy in areas of vulnerability protection and incident response. The German military's Strategic Reconnaissance Unit is apparently a specialized cyber group trained in offensive cyber capabilities.

France: In 2011 France develop 'Information Systems Defence and Security' strategy that aimed in superiority in cyber defence, strengthening cyber security of critical infrastructure, protection of vulnerable information and securing cyberspace. Also France is developing cyber offensive weapons and cyber intelligence capabilities and uses the French Network and Information Security Agency (ANSSI, set up in 2009), to detect and respond to cyber attacks, supporting R&D and providing information to other governmental bodies. The total investing in cyber defence is over 1 billion Euros.

Italy: Has set up a military electronic warfare unit responsible for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance. Its cyber policy is based on 'National Strategic Framework for Cyberspace Security', the 'National Plan for cyber protection and information security' and the defence directives on cyberspace. Italy is developing cyber intelligence and cyber defence capabilities.

Lithuania: In 2011 adopted a program for the development of electronic information security and in 2015 established a national cyber security centre for cyber defensive capabilities.

Denmark: Agreed to develop in defence from 2013 to 2017 a center for cyber defence under the control of the ministry of defence, and strengthen military cyber capabilities using a computer network operations to conduct cyber defensive and offensive capabilities. Varnava

Estonia: In 2008 Estonia conducted a cyber security strategy that reorganized and using their ministry of defence manage their cyber security issues and with the Defence League's Cyber Unit are developing cyber defensive capabilities.

Netherlands: In 2012 adopted a Defence Cyber Strategy that establishes six priorities: adopting a comprehensive approach, strengthening cyber-defence capabilities, developing cyber-offensive military capabilities, strengthening intelligence capabilities in cyberspace, encouraging innovation and recruitment of qualified personnel, and intensifying cooperation at national and international level. In 2014 a joint Defence Cyber Command was launched with the responsibility for the development of cyber capabilities.

Finland: In 2011 invested in the development of cyber-defence weapons. Its 2013 national cyber security strategy states that the Finnish Defence Forces 'will create a comprehensive cyber-defence capability', which will comprise cyber intelligence, cyber warfare and protection capabilities. A cyber defence unit to specialise in cyber warfare will be operational in 2015.

Other Member States (**Austria, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Spain**) have also integrated a defence component in their cyber strategies.

Following a proposal from the High Representative, the Commission and the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European External Action Service (EEAS) together with the Commission services and the EDA provided input to develop a framework, and on 18

November 2014, the Council of the European Union adopted the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework. According to Dr. **Lorena Trinberg**, NATO CCD COE. "It serves as groundwork for countering threats arising from cyberspace. The document's objectives are twofold: it provides a framework to the European Council and Council conclusions and to the cyber defence aspects of the EU Cyber Security Strategy. Besides clarifying the roles of the different European actors, it specifies five priority areas for CSDP cyber defence:

1. Supporting the development of Member States' cyber defence capabilities related to CSDP;
2. Enhancing the protection of CSDP communication networks used by EU entities;
3. Promotion of civil-military cooperation and synergies with wider EU cyber policies, relevant EU institutions and agencies as well as with the private sector;
4. Improve training, education and joint exercise opportunities; and
5. Enhancing cooperation with relevant international partners, particularly NATO.

For each area, the document proposes several concrete actions which are framed in more than forty proposals. Actions include:

- *the intention to enhance cooperation between military CERTs of the Member States on a voluntary basis to improve the prevention and handling of incidents;*
- *the plan to promote real-time cyber threat information sharing between Member States and relevant EU entities by developing information sharing mechanisms and trust-building measures;*
- *enhancing further cooperation in developing a working mechanism to exchange best practice on exercise, training and other areas of possible civilian-military synergy;*
- *involving international partners such as NATO or OSCE once the EU has developed a CSDP cyber defence exercise; and*

- *reinforcing cooperation between the CERT-EU and relevant EU cyber defence bodies and and the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC).''⁴*

7.3 Results

From all the evidence, data, facts that were collected and presented, we are now to a point that we can have a clear view of the whole EU-CSDP contemporary cyber defence strategy and policy. All MS in cooperation with the EU-CSDP are now strengthening their cyber defensive capabilities, sharing information through real time information sharing mechanisms (pooling and sharing), improving training and education programs, promote military and civilian cooperation with the enhancing use of EU's institutions, tools and agencies. Another important fact is that the EU-CSDP is striving to collect and utilize experts in cyber defence and to build centers across the EU, specialized in developing cyber defensive capabilities and mechanisms that will help manage the internal and external aspects of cyber security so the gap between the two will be bridged. Also EU and specifically CSDP is enhancing their network protection, strengthening intelligence and incident response capabilities, creating a culture of cyber-security, and reinforcing links between NATO and the EU. Another crucial sector is the application, adjustment and upgrading of the cyberspace international laws. Because of the 'fluid composition' of cyberspace where the 'game roles' can change so fast, EU-CSDP experts are now in a constant research and observe of all the international events, programs and agreements to be in vigilance and to conduct new laws about cyberspace having as basis the Tallinn Manual on the International law applicable to cyber warfare, 2013. Consequently, MS in cooperation with EU-CSDP have now achieved a high level of cyber defense in national and international level and succeed to control the internal and external aspects of cyberspace.

⁴ Cf.: Dr. Lorena Trinberg NATO CCD COE 2015 URL: <https://ccdcoe.org/eu-cyber-defence-policy-framework-presents-more-40-action-measures.html>

8 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (PROS AND CONS) AND PERSONAL CONCLUSIONS

Although EU-CSDP and all MS are striving for the development of cyber defence strategies and policies that will have a comprehensive and resilient approach with the creation of an open, safe and secure cyberspace, how can EU know it's enough and how ready is CSDP for a real cyber threat? What are the technologies that the opponent has and what cyber weapon does already own? Can we really be secure and safe? Can we really stop this race for cyberspace domination and superiority, be futuristic and bring peace into cyberspace once and for all?

I strongly believe that it is imperative for CSDP to achieve and provide a written treaty or agreement for cooperation with NATO for cyber defence as soon as possible. We have to provide some trust building measures with NATO and other leading powers in cyberspace such as China and Russia. If we ever succeed, we can hope for peace in cyberspace, but I know that it's almost impossible if we consider economic, geopolitical and national interests and conflicts.

However if we focus on pros, we immediately understand the magnitude of the achievements that have been implemented in a relatively short period. We definitely know that our protection from almost zero (before 2007) is in constant increase and has reached a very good level. Also it's really constructive to see that all MS cooperate in a good level and this promotes trust between them and specialists from different MS work together for a safe and secure European cyberspace. For sure EU-CSDP is walking the right path and is taking all the correct actions and is doing the right efforts in relation to the conditions. Today CSDP has an active role in cyber security and manages to coordinate MS to contribute bridging the gap between external and internal factors of cyberspace. Another aspect that will make us more positive and more confident in the current level of EU cyber defence capabilities, is that behind every cyber-attack is an astute mind, but a human mind. If we consider this for a moment we can understand that if we continue growing and retaining sufficient high quality cyber trained people in our armed forces we will be as good as anybody.

Concluding, I will quote something Wolfgang Röhrig and Wing Commander J P R Smeaton CEng BEng (Hons) MIET RAF wrote "the human being is, and will continue to be, our most precious cyber defence asset. The knowledge and expertise of our people is a fundamental

requirement for a European Cyber Defence culture and to enable acceptable operational capability in today's technological epoch.¹⁵ From the fundamentals of cyberspace to EU-CSDP and the human being - the simple citizen, united we can provide a secure and safe cyberspace worldwide.

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⁵ Cf.: Wolfgang Röhrig, Programme Manager Cyber Defence at EDA and Wg Cdr Rob Smeaton, Cyber Defence Staff Officer at EUMS CIS Directorate. 2016 Cyber Security Review URL: <http://www.cybersecurity-review.com/articles/cyber-security-and-cyber-defence-in-the-european-union>

6 Authors note: **Disclaimer:** This is an independent view of the author about cyberspace as new dimension of European Security. It represents neither the opinions nor policies of the Hellenic Naval Academy nor of the EU-CSDP common module 3rd Olympiad Varnava Cyberspace as new dimension of European security

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The role of CSDP in the EU's comprehensive approach

ABSTRACT

In 2013 the necessity of action regarding the crisis management of the EU was recognized. Accordingly, the leaders of the EU member states decided to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of CSDP. In the scientific debate the CSDP and the comprehensive approach have been handled as elements of a comprehensive crisis management. Nevertheless specification about the question which role the CSDP have in the EU's comprehensive approach does not exist at all. So this paper examines the question which role the CSDP have in the EU's comprehensive approach.

In order to analyze the role of the CSDP in the EU's comprehensive approach, qualitative survey methods were applied. It was made use of two case studies of EU missions and literature analysis in order to collect data about the implementation of the comprehensive approach and the role of the CSDP. Therefore, the whole research design was based on the role theory of Erwin Goffman.

The preliminary results show that the role of CSDP is rather determined by the role taking as by role expectations of the comprehensive approach itself. The comprehensive approach is more than just a mere guideline or method of CSDP missions. Rather, it can be described as a set of values, which provides not only role expectations and standard specifications to the CSDP, but to the EU as a whole and its institutions and member states. This set of values does not include a certain role for the CSDP, but serves as a superior EU directive for all its actions. So the conclusion can be drawn that the CSDP has no special role in regard to the implementation of the EU's comprehensive approach. This does not mean that the CSDP lose its potency. To operate efficiently in the future and be able to ensure its mission, the CSDP has to deal and reconsider its role taking in conjunction with the cooperation between civil and military elements and the related ethical questions.

Keywords: CSDP, Comprehensive Approach, Role, Role Taking, Civil-Military Cooperation

1 INTRODUCTION

In the light of the current geopolitical situation, the EU and in particular the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union is facing new and already well-known challenges. In 2013 the necessity of action regarding the crisis management of the EU was recognized. Accordingly the leaders of the EU member states decided to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of CSDP. In this context the importance of the comprehensive approach of the EU was highlighted. So the European Parliament and the European Council published a joint communication on the subject of the comprehensive approach and its implications for crisis management.¹ In this debate, however, the role of the CSDP in the EU's comprehensive approach remains to this day largely ignored.

This can be initially attributed to a lack of definition what role expectations the comprehensive approach have for the CSDP. Because to date, there is no clear definition of the implications of the comprehensive approach for the CSDP. In the Council conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach the impact of CSDP missions in a broader European strategy is clearly mentioned.² On the other hand there are expressions that the CSDP is the main element for the implementation of the comprehensive approach. This is the reason why there is a need to (re-)define the role of the CSDP in the EU's comprehensive approach. In order to increase the effectiveness and the visibility of the CSDP the relationship of the CSDP and the comprehensive approach needs clarification.

This seems especially important since both CSDP and the comprehensive approach been handled in the scientific debate as elements of a comprehensive crisis management. Therefore, in the context of this work the following specific research question should be answered differentiated, critical and comprehensively: Which role does the CSDP have in the EU's comprehensive approach?

¹ Cf.: European Commission (2013). Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises.

² Cf.: Council of the European Union (2014). Council conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach. Brussels. P. 4.

This research question is primarily scientifically relevant. This not only because it contributes to the scientific debate regarding the CSDP, but also because it is relevant for the CSDP and its influence on the international relations itself. Based on the current state of research (see Chapter 4) and the role theory it can be considered that the CSDP only can be relevant in future by (re-) defining its role. In addition, of course there is the question which role the CSDP have in the EU's comprehensive approach. Thus, the research question receives its impulse not only from the empirical background, but can simultaneously be understood as guided by theory.

Further, the research question is socially relevant. Current global crises and conflicts show the need of an effective CSDP. To this end, it would be mainly relevant for the EU institutions to make use of an effective CSDP and to strengthen the cooperation in order to provide long-term solutions. Therefore it is essential for the CSDP to (re-) define its role in the EU's comprehensive approach in order to fulfill this role properly.

To answer the question this paper will make use of two case studies, which are intended firstly to show which role the CSDP plays in the EU's comprehensive approach. These case studies are two CSDP missions in the same region - one which is a civilian mission with a high influence of multilevel partners (EUCAP NESTOR), whereas the other is a military mission (EUTM Somalia). On the basis of the role theory of the civilian power this paper will take a look at the current role taking of the CSDP. Does the CSDP adhere to the concept in those missions or are there other factors which have to be mentioned regarding the role taking of the CSDP. Secondly it is necessary to analyze which role expectations the comprehensive approach have for the CSDP. On the one hand this requires an analysis of all relevant documents in regard to role-specific demands of the EU's comprehensive approach. On the other hand it is necessary to show, which role expectations the CSDP is even able to fulfill, so which role is suitable for the CSDP regarding the implementation of the EU's comprehensive approach.³

³ Author's note: Conclusions based on the author's argument so far.

2 PREFACE

“So far, we are moving in Europe but rather in crisis mode: A humanitarian crisis - because people are still drowning in the Mediterranean. A EU crisis - because the Schengen agreement threatens to disintegrate, [...]. But the biggest crisis is of moral nature: The solidarity among EU Member States is threatened by erosion.”⁴

Given the crises and conflicts that affect both the external borders as well as inside the European Union (EU), the EU is facing enormous challenges in 2016. This was not only raised by Ursula von der Leyen as Defence Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany in her speech at the opening of the 52nd Munich Security Conference (MSC). As a platform for security policy issues and challenges in the world the Munich Security Conference already turned in their curriculum attention to internal and external erosion of the EU, which have been reinforced by global crises and conflicts.⁵

Being a part of the MSC-Staff in 2015 and 2016 my attention for the importance of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been attracted. Considering the number of operations that have been initiated by the CSDP, it is clear that the challenges and global crises have increased in recent years. Security is a commodity that is highly valuable. In addressing the issue of security at the Munich Security Conference 2016 I noted that security can be necessarily ensured only with a comprehensive approach.

During a visit to the 1 German-Netherlands Corps (1 GNC) I realized that the implementation of the comprehensive approach provides more than just one challenge. So it is important to promote the implementation of the comprehensive approach not only on the institutional level of the EU, but especially on a implementable level for the soldiers. Therefore it is necessary to (re-)define the role of the CSDP in the EU's comprehensive approach.

⁴ Homepage of the German Ministry of Defense. Page Speech by the Federal Minister of Defense at the Opening of the 52nd Munich Security Conference. URL: http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYvBCslwEET_aDdRQfTWUg_izYvWi6TNEhaapKzb evHjTQ6dgQfDY_CFpcmtHJxyTm7CJ_Yjn4cvDHENEDnxR0l4ieBJ3tsGIU8JH_XuCcacSCuVknJhEKdZY M6iUzWLSdHAHntju9ZYs8X-muP-cjvs7Km7tnecY2z-UZ1Oag!!/. [01-03-16].

⁵ Cf.: Homepage of the Munich Security Conference. Page The Conference at a Glance. URL: <https://www.securityconference.de/de/aktivitaeten/munich-security-conference/msc-2016/die-konferenz-im-ueberblick/>. [01-03-16].

3 CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH

Basically, the CSDP has been extensively researched in political science. To this end, there are not only a variety of descriptive presentations of CSDP and its development. Above all, there are also works which show the challenges of the CSDP, not only in its institutional setting, but also in terms of their relevance and importance to the EU. In this regard, especially a great contribution has been made by the political foundations work and think tanks.⁶

In regard to the comprehensive approach of the EU, however, there is not existing such a comprehensive literature. This is due to the fact that only in 2013 the European Commission has drawn up a joint communication with respect to the comprehensive approach and has therefore initiated a discussion regarding the importance of the comprehensive approach for the EU. Nevertheless in this connection there is access mainly to central EU documents that specify the comprehensive approach closer: The European Security Strategy, the Progress Report 2008 as well as additional documentation on civil-military cooperation within the EU and the Council conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach in 2014.⁷

This makes it clear that in this work a broad base of literature and sources can be used. At the same time, however, it points out, that in view of the interdependencies of the CSDP and the comprehensive approach a research gap is existent, which need to be filled. Thus it is explained in the literature and in the sources that the comprehensive approach is essential for the EU and for the CSDP missions. Nevertheless specification about the question which role the CSDP have in the EU's comprehensive approach does not exist at all. So it is striking that, although the Council of the European Union mentioned the need of cooperation to multilevel partners, no clarification is brought forward what the comprehensive approach really expects

⁶ Cf.: International Security Policy Working Group (2012). A Compass for the CSDP. In: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (eds.). International Policy Analysis. Berlin.

Cf.: Overhaus, Marco (2010). Civil-military cooperation in EU security and defence policy: operative experiences, deficits, development possibilities. In: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (eds.): SWP-Study, Berlin.

⁷ Cf.: Council of the European Union (2003). European security strategy. A secure Europe in a better world. Brussels.

Cf.: European Union (2008). Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World. Brussels.

from the CSDP. To this end, Herman van Rompuy stated as follows: *"Here's the way I see it: defence cooperation is not about the management of decline, no, quite the opposite, it's the way to ensure we remain cutting-edge and fully play our role in the future!"*⁸ Van Rompuy shows that defense cooperation and therefore especially cooperation in military missions of the CSDP is strongly necessary to implement peace and security.

As a key researcher on the subject of the CSDP and the comprehensive approach, on which this paper is based, may Sven Biscop be called as a member of the Executive Academic Board of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). He published not only numerous standard works on CSDP, but faces especially strategic considerations and the further development of the CSDP. In summary, it should be noted that works on CSDP and comprehensive approach have appeared in the European context, especially through the European institutions. But they analyze these two topics separately from particular political science perspective and partly from a historical perspective and are based primarily on the theoretical approach of the European integration.⁹

As far as the state of research is mentioned nowadays there is no research accessible which outlines the role of the CSDP in the EU's comprehensive approach. Therefore it is first of all necessary to analyze in which way the comprehensive approach is implemented in the EU missions.

4 RESEARCH GAP

The research gap of this paper is mainly included in the role of the CSDP in the EU's comprehensive approach. On the basis of the role theory the CSDP is only able to stay relevant and to fulfill its role by defining it. Thus, the work is a response to the Council conclusions on

⁸ Van Rompuy, Herman (2013): Defence in Europe: Pragmatically Forward. Speech by President of the European Council at the annual conference of the European Defence Agency „European Defence Matters“. Brussels. P. 5.

⁹ Biscop, Sven/ Coelmont, Jo/ Drent, Margriet/ Zandee, Dick (2015). European Strategy, European Defence, and the CSDP, The Hague.

the EU's comprehensive approach.¹⁰ The following figure shows the importance to answer the question how to implement the comprehensive approach (see figure 1). Therefore, it is necessary to show in applying the role theory, which role expectations the EU's comprehensive approach have and which role the CSDP is even able to fulfill regarding the implementation of the comprehensive approach. Thus, the research gap is particularly located in the fields of sociology and international relations. By applying the role theory and especially the theory of the civilian power to the subject it is possible to provide a clear actor centered perspective in order to contribute to the scientific debate.




Figure 1: The EU's comprehensive approach.¹¹

5 RESEARCH QUESTION

Basically, for the detailed answer to the research question it is necessary to divide the matter into several sub-questions. The subject which role the CSDP have in the EU's comprehensive approach includes several questions that must be answered before.

¹⁰ Cf.: Council of the European Union (2014). Council conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach. Brussels.

¹¹ Adapted from concept study for CPPB evaluation by ADE with ECDPM et al. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/2010/1277_vol1_en.pdf. [06-04-16].

The first part of the research question, however, must be closer analyzed, initially based on two case studies. These must focus on the problem how the CSDP implements the comprehensive approach in EU missions. Does the CSDP adhere to the concept of the civilian power in those missions or are there other factors which have to be mentioned regarding the role taking of the CSDP. Only on this basis it is reasonable to analyze, which role expectations the EU's comprehensive approach have and which role the CSDP is able to fulfill regarding the implementation of the comprehensive approach.




Figure 2: The research question and its sub-questions.¹²

6 METHODOLOGY

In order to analyze the role of CSDP in the EU's comprehensive approach, qualitative survey methods must be applied. This method should allow a more detailed description of the role of CSDP in regard to the implementation of the comprehensive approach. However, precisely for the present subject matter of the work itself a qualitative research design with a small number of cases is useful, since the work based on the previous researches initially wants to answer the question of the role of the CSDP in the EU's comprehensive approach. In light of the problem that specific research is only very marginally present on the role of the CSDP in the EU's comprehensive approach, a qualitative approach at this point allows more substantive and methodological flexibility and a precise and in-depth analysis.

¹² Figure created by the author.

To answer the question the paper will make use of an x-centered research design. Only with this, it is possible to comprehensively analyze the effect of an independent variable, here the effect of the comprehensive approach, on the dependent variable, here on the CSDP. The whole research design is based on the role theory of Erwin Goffman and its aim to redefine the role of the CSDP in the EU's comprehensive approach.




Figure 3: The research design.¹³

7 RESEARCH AND RESULTS OF RESEARCH

7.1 EUTM Somalia/ EUCAP Nestor and the implementation of the EU's comprehensive approach

The first question that arises with regard to the role of CSDP within the comprehensive approach is how the the EU's comprehensive approach is implemented in current missions. All in all, there are in four basic types of EU missions: stabilization operations, substitution operations, strengthening missions, monitoring and mentoring missions. The two chosen CSDP missions are almost in the same region - one which is a civilian mission with a high

¹³ Figure created by the author.

influence of multilevel partners (EUCAP NESTOR), whereas the other is a military mission (EUTM Somalia). Run by the European Union EUCAP Nestor is a non-executive, civilian mission with military expertise to build maritime capabilities in the Horn of Africa. Among other things, it contributes to the fight against piracy off the Somali coast. EUTM Somalia is a multinational advisory and training mission of the European Union in the Somali capital Mogadishu, in advising the Somali Ministry of Defence and training soldiers. The aim of the mission is to strengthen the Somali armed forces, to help stabilize the country and curb the influence of radical Islamists.¹⁴

Regarding the mission EUTM Somalia at least the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) interprets the CSDP contribution as successful implementation of the comprehensive approach of the EU.¹⁵ The interesting thing over all is, what elements were applied according to the EEAS in respect of the implementation of the comprehensive approach. To this end, it seems that not only the support of institutions in Somalia are important, but also the cooperation with the government in order to improve the living conditions of the population. In addition, at least one aspect of this comprehensive approach through the cooperation with international partners seems to be implemented. "In addition, EU development aid (as e.g. education, job creation programmes) supports alternative livelihoods, thus contributing to deter piracy recruitment."¹⁶ It still remains questionable at this point if this list shows all the elements of the comprehensive approach and if this mainly influences the role of CSDP within the EU's comprehensive approach.

The same can also be observed in the study of mission EUCAP Nestor. In this context, although a much wider range of elements of the comprehensive approach is demonstrated,

¹⁴ Cf.: Homepage of the European Union External Action Service. Page EUTM Somalia. URL: <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-somalia/>. [22-03-16].

Cf.: Homepage of the European Union External Action Service. Page EUCAP Nestor. URL: <https://www.eucap-nestor.eu/>. [22-03-16].

¹⁵ Cf.: European Union External Action Service (2015). Common Security and Defence Policy. European Union Training Mission – Somalia. URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-somalia/docs/factsheet_eutm_somalia_en.pdf. [22-03-16].

¹⁶ European Union External Action Service (2015): Common Security and Defence Policy. European Union Training Mission – Somalia. URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-somalia/docs/factsheet_eutm_somalia_en.pdf. [22-03-16].

nevertheless, no reference is made to what this ultimately means for the role of CSDP in the EU's comprehensive approach. So a use of diplomatic, political means and inserts for security and human development is mentioned. However, this does not contribute to the role specification of the CSDP.¹⁷ To this end, it is clear that both missions do not contribute to a role specification for the CSDP in the EU's comprehensive approach. On the one hand this can be located in the fact that no common definition of the comprehensive approach is present. It is also problematic that even in official documents as in the Council Conclusion on the Horn of Africa substantial aspects are addressed, but no statements are made, regarding the responsibility taken for this implementation of the line.¹⁸ Against this background, it seems crucial to initially deal with the role which the comprehensive approach intends for the CSDP and what role the CSDP can meet at all.

7.2 The role of CSDP in the EU's comprehensive approach

At this point it is important to answer the second part of the research question and to clarify, what role is assigned by the comprehensive approach for the CSDP. Therefore, it is important to deal with the question, to what extent the comprehensive approach is regulated and what statements this applies in relation to the CSDP. So a concept specification of comprehensive approach is made in order to develop the key elements for the CSDP. A detailed definition of the comprehensive approach of the EU does not exist. But at least the Action Plan 2015 by the Commission provides a first orientation by giving a description of the concept: „[...] *the comprehensive approach is about working better together, and enhancing the coherence, effectiveness and impact of the EU's policy and action, in particular in relation to conflict prevention and crisis resolution.*“¹⁹ The Action Plan however rejects to provide concrete elements of the comprehensive approach. This is caused on the one hand by the fact that it is not possible to provide guidelines and concrete measures for specific countries or regions

¹⁷ Cf.: Homepage European Union External Action Service . Page What is EUCAP Nestor? URL: https://www.eucap-nestor.eu/en/mission/general_overview/what_is_eucap_nestor_online [22-03-16].

¹⁸ Cf.: Council of the European Union (2011). Council conclusions on the Horn of Africa. Brussels.

¹⁹ European Commission (2015). Joint Staff Working Document. Taking forward the EU's Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises Action Plan 2015. Brussels. P. 2.

because every crisis and every country differs from each other. What appears rather important is actually to consider the circumstances of individual regions and to determine a suitable solution. Against this background, the comprehensive approach can be described as an approach in order to try to mention all aspects relating to the safety and security cover.²⁰

Fundamentally the elements of the comprehensive approach however must be taken from EU documents. A consistent and unitary definition by the EU does not exist. So different EU documents are examined for their significance in terms of the elements of the EU's comprehensive approach. The implementation of the comprehensive approach can be measured by the following factors: the formulation of a common strategy, the emphasis on prevention, the mobilization of various EU resources, working in partnership, the co-operation with civil, military and governmental actors as well as the deployment of forces at local, national and international level.²¹ To this end, the indicators are weighted equally, because each element is central to the comprehensive approach.

The question, however, is just how these indicators influence the role of CSDP in regard to the implementation of comprehensive approach. Therefore it can be made use of the role theory of Gofman. This states that role-making must precede for role-taking: *"The idea of role-taking shifts emphasis away from the simple process of enacting a prescribed role to devising a performance in the basis of an imputed other-role."*²² It is interesting to mind that a role can not be taken only by one actor. Transferred to the CSDP this could mean that the role of CSDP in regard to the implementation of the comprehensive approach is varied, as other players may be able to fulfill these roles. On this basis, one can not speak of a single role of CSDP in the EU's comprehensive approach. Rather, the CSDP has a whole role-set. The adoption of different roles is eventually reflected in standardized behaviors to solve specific problems. Therefore, it is not only necessary to show what role expectations the comprehensive

²⁰ Cf.: European Commission (2015). Joint Staff Working Document. Taking forward the EU's Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises Action Plan 2015. Brussels. P. 2-3.

²¹ Cf.: European Commission (2013). Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises. Brussels.

²² Turner, Ralph H. (2009). Role Taking: Process Versus Conformity. In: Brisset, Dennis/ Edgley, Charles: Life as Theatre. A Dramaturgical Sourcebook. New Jersey. P. 87.

approach provides for the CSDP, but also to show what appropriate and efficient means the CSDP has evolved to perceive these roles accordingly.

This shows that not every role expectation of the comprehensive approach needs to be addressed to the CSDP. Following this arguments, the indicators mentioned above can serve as first indicators for the role of the CSDP in the EU's comprehensive approach. To this end, the comprehensive approach provides the expectation for the CSDP to formulate a common strategy, to take preventive steps, to mobilize different EU ressources, to work in partnership, to seek and promote cooperation with civil, military and state forces and implement on this basis the own mission. But perhaps at this point the first problem canbe identified: the lack of precision of the comprehensive approach, the lack of implementation recommendations makes the role taking difficult, since it is not absolutely clear, what role expectations and how these can be implemented accurately. On this basis, one have to clarify in which way the CSDP is able to meet the role expectations at all and what problem arise. It has become clear: The comprehensive approach provides not only role expectations of CSDP, but can be understood as a value approach that the EU should conduct in the performance of work as an institution.

7.3 The role-taking of the CSDP

At this point, it can already made use of the research results relating to the CSDP missions EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor. There a use of diplomatic, political means and inserts for security and human development is mentioned. However, it is less important what the CSDP is able to achieve, but rather the problems and difficulties that occur in fulfilling the role expectations of the comprehensive approach. In other words: Which role is the CSDP not able to adopt? Above all, the parallel use of military and civil and state actors can be noted. Thus, the cooperation of civil, military and governmental actors appears to provide new challenges for the CSDP in the implementation of the comprehensive approach.²³ In early 2003 it was clear that the civil and military elements can lead to security and peace only together. In the European Security Strategy of 2003, the special link between security and development and peace revealed. Without security there is no development, but without development there is

²³ Cf.: Adebahr, Cornelius (2011). The Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management in a Concerted Weimar Effort. Genshagener Papers. P. 5-6.

no lasting security.²⁴ This fact shows the necessity to create a better cooperation between EU actors. In particular, the establishment of the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) marked an important step in intensifying military and civilian cooperation. However, particular criticism suggested that either the military or the civilian side could dominate the cooperation. This can still be regarded a striking problem, that must be solved primarily by the CSDP.

So far, therefore, the civil-military cooperation is a major challenge for the CSDP. Although lots of work has been already done to strengthen the cooperation, a cooperation between civil and military partners is still difficult. This can be located on the one hand in the fact that already a cooperation between the armies and the civilian actors is difficult in many EU member states themselves. So it is even more difficult to implement such cooperations on EU level. Joint exercises are therefore a rarity. To this end, the CSDP does not meet the role expectations of the comprehensive approach, as appropriate initiatives for civil-military cooperations are already missing by the member countries.²⁵ As an example for this problem Germany can be mentioned. As very strong economic power in the European Union, the Federal Republic is not able to conduct military training and exercises in cooperation with German non-governmental organizations. A failure may be localized at the micro level, especially in the different role-takings of the actors. So maybe a non governmental organization (NGO) does the role-taking in another way than other actors for example the military. Especially the different values and sets of norms have to be mentioned in this context. So role-taking is also linked with an ethical background.

For this reason one can say that the biggest challenge the CSDP is currently facing, is probably the establishment of civil-military cooperation at the state level. This is the condition in order to finally be able to also implement this aspect of the comprehensive approach at the EU level. To this end, the CSDP has not only to deal with political, military and civilian needs, but pay particular attention to the different mindsets and role taking. For this purpose it is essential to integrate the ethical foundation of the various organizations, to consider civil,

²⁴ Cf.: Council of the European Union (2003). European security strategy. A secure Europe in a better world. Brussels.

²⁵ Cf.: Hynek, Nik (2011). EU Crisis Management After the Lisbon Treaty: Civil Military Coordination and the Future of the EU OHQ. In: European Security. 20:1. P. 92-93.

governmental and non-governmental organizations. This represents a much greater challenge as the mobilization of necessary resources. Rather it is important to question how the independence of NGOs such as Médecins Sans Frontières can be safeguarded without limits and they may cooperate with the various armies of the European member states simultaneously, to carry out joint exercises and missions in order to strengthen the role of CSDP in the comprehensive approach in this way.²⁶

So if you raises the question of what role the CSDP is able at all to take with regard to the implementation of the comprehensive approach it must be said that the problem of precise specifications less restricts the CSDP, but rather the role taking. To sum up, role expectations of the comprehensive approach are perceived differently, thereby surely also arises the problem that the concept per se has little significance.

8 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

The study shows conclusively that the role of the CSDP in the EU's comprehensive approach is unclear. The missions EUCAP Nestor and EUTM Somalia make it clear that the CSDP applies the principles of the comprehensive approach. Nevertheless, new conceptions of the CSDP in regard to the implementation of the comprehensive approach appears to occur in the different missions repeatedly. On the one hand this may be rooted in the fact that the EU's comprehensive approach is not uniformly defined. Furthermore, there are no uniform EU regulations on the implementation of the comprehensive approach, because the EU itself questions the practicality of such statements in. This becomes obvious in regard to the already mentioned CSDP missions which exhibit a not fundamentally different understanding of the comprehensive approach, however still different interpretations. This also leads to the realization that the comprehensive approach is more than just a mere guideline or method of CSDP missions. Rather, it can be described as values set, which provides not only role expectations and standard specifications to the CSDP, but to the EU as a whole and its institutions and member states. Against this background, it is all the more important to deal with it, to situate the role of CSDP within the new comprehensive approach. This is crucial in

²⁶ Author's note: Conclusions based on the author's argument so far.

order to ensure on this basis an efficient and targeted CSDP. In this context it is also noted that the role of CSDP is rather determined by the role taking as by role expectations of the comprehensive approach. The fact that this can be described as a set of values, it does not provide a certain role for the CSDP, but serves as a superior EU directive for all its actions. Therefore, the indicators, which makes the comprehensive approach empirically measurable, are not based solely on the CSDP. Therefore, it is necessary rather to concentrate how the CSDP does the role taking and what problems ensue.²⁷

One important aspect should be mentioned at this point: the CSDP has no special role regarding the implementation of the EU's comprehensive approach. Following this approach, all EU institutions and member states must work the same way inside as well as outside in the framework of EU missions comprehensively. This does not mean that the CSDP lose its potency, but that the same importance belongs to the implementation of the comprehensive approach as to the EU. The peculiarity of the CSDP can be certainly situated in the fact that the missions at the borders of the EU and abroad bring greater challenges in terms of implementation. Nevertheless, we must not forget at this point that sometimes the implementation of the comprehensive approach already fails in preparation for overseas missions, in preparation for future cooperation within the CSDP missions, in the individual EU member states. Especially joint exercises together with civil, military and governmental actors, are very rare. On the one hand this can be located in the fact that in particular many NGOs the fear for their independence exists and they therefore refuse to participate in joint exercises with the military of the EU member states. On the other hand, this can also be located surely in the fact that the comprehensive approach and the own role taking of the various actors is different. This means that in particular on the basis of variable value sets and their own summaries and lessons learned from already existing missions the comprehensive approach is interpreted differently and is also implemented differently. Thus, the problem exists in the member states, which are not able to implement the comprehensive approach in their own states. Against this background, it is fundamental in the future, to concentrate less on the institutional level of the EU, but rather on the level of EU member states. Because it is

²⁷ Author's note: Conclusions based on the author's argument so far.

difficult to strengthen the role of CSDP in the comprehensive approach, if it already fails in the EU member states. In this context it needs to be questioned, as it is possible to preserve the independence of the various NGOs, while allowing a cooperation with the military side of the EU member states at the same time. At this point, the 1 German-Netherlands Corps (1 GNC) can serve as a role model which encourage and implement the cooperation with civil actors step by step.²⁸

Furthermore, it must be especially noted what the CSDP is not to be able to implement in terms of the comprehensive approach than what it can achieve. As it has already been pointed out, the indicators of the comprehensive approach can all be considered equal. This means that all elements need to be implemented equally. To this end - as already indicated - the civil-military cooperation seems still very problematic. To continue to play a leading role in the implementation of the comprehensive approach, it is therefore necessary to raise this cooperation to a new level in the future. This means to facilitate greater cooperation as a first step at EU member states level. Based on this, it is only possible to ensure an efficient, equitable cooperation. This means above all to deal with the question of ethical compatibility of the cooperation between the military and civilian side and question how the values of the EU armies and the individual NGOs, aid agencies and civil actors are compatible and how to allow cooperation on an equal footing, without compromising the independence of NGOs.²⁹

In summary, this paper has shown: the CSDP as well as all EU institutions and policies play a crucial role in the implementation of the comprehensive approach. However, to operate efficiently in the future and to be able to ensure its mission, the CSDP has to deal and reconsider their role taking in conjunction with the co-operation between civil and military elements and the related ethical questions. One thing is very clear: *"We will not enjoy security without development, we will not enjoy development without security, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights."*³⁰ This also means that a parallel use of civil and

²⁸ Cf.: Homepage of the 1 German/ Netherlands Corps – 1 GNC. Page Common Effort 2015. URL: <http://1gnc.org/common-effort-community-established/> [06-04-16].

²⁹ Author's note: Conclusions based on the author's argument so far.

³⁰ United Nations General Assembly (2005). In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights For All. Report of the Secretary General. A/59/2005. New York. P. 6.

military forces in the missions will not be affected by long-term success. Rather it is necessary, to implement the comprehensive approach in the CSDP. Only then it will stay relevant in the future.

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
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Cyber defence as a new dimension of European security

ABSTRACT

Is cyber defence a new dimension of European security? The answer is a categorical yes. Since the Estonian attacks of 2007 cyber warfare has acquired an unimaginable importance becoming a strategic state weapon. Nevertheless, it is not so clear how states can practise their right to self-defence against cyber-attacks. When is a cyber-attack an act of war? It is therefore vital to create a framework such as the Geneva and Hague treaties did in order to defend ourselves more efficiently and with a moral and legal support.

In this essay I will try to answer the question above and, more specifically, I would like to obtain some principles that could guide us in the making of future policies. I am also worried about the applicability of Article 5 of NATO's treaty.

The way I have addressed these problems was through intense investigation and analysis of recent and past cyber conflicts, trying to understand their circumstances and extract valuable lessons from them. I researched various experts' opinions on these affairs and used the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare as a guideline. By means of this research I have formed my opinion and made up my proposal.

After my research I do firmly believe that the key to giving better responses to these conflicts is AEP principles, that is, authorship determination, effects of the cyber-attack on different areas and the proportionality principle.

The implications of this work are unlikely to be a disclosure but I hope that they will open up the debate.

Keywords: cyber-attack, Tallinn Manual, armed attack, use of force, NATO.

1 PREFACE

I first got in touch with computers when I was barely six years old. Since the very beginning they caught my attention and awoke my curiosity. I had the feeling that such a great invention would have a lot to say in the future.

Now, fifteen years later not only do I know that I was not wrong but that reality has hugely surpassed my expectations. The spread and development of the Internet has meant a turning point in the way we perform our daily tasks; nevertheless, this is just the tip of the iceberg.

The truth is that these new technologies make up an unsuspected big part of our lives; they have an essential impact in many different areas such as economy, science, industry or even social relationships. From the most trivial search on Google to the formation of a cloud computing network to make progress in protein codification, the Internet plays a major role.

Moreover, Internet has truly created an alternative world where all kinds of exchanges and relationships take place. Nowadays who does not use a social network? Who does not book a flight online? What enterprises do not share information throughout databases?

Nonetheless, all that glitters is not gold and new possibilities also involve new threats. New and way more subtle techniques than a gun and a war cry can be used as a weapon. We as individuals have interests in the network as well as larger groups or organizations. As a matter of fact, Spanish armed forces created two years ago a joint cyber defence command in order to ensure the free use of the net by our army.

It is a fact that a new dimension of security has been born. Cyber defence is here to stay.

2 INTRODUCTION

“A three-week wave of massive cyber-attacks on the small Baltic country of Estonia, the first known incidence of such an assault on a state, is causing alarm across the western alliance, with Nato [sic] urgently examining the offensive and its implications.”¹

The attacks mentioned before took place in 2007 amid the conflict between Russia and Estonia regarding the relocation of a grave marker, the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn. According to experts, the magnitude of these attacks exceeded the capabilities of an individual or even a well-organized group and everything pointed to Russia, but no conclusive evidence were found.

¹ U. a. (2007). Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia.
[<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia>]

This conflict brought the importance of network security to the forefront and NATO's response did not wait. In April and May of that year several meetings were held in Brussels in order to tackle this issue. It became fairly evident that there was a big flaw in our common defence policies as it was not clear how NATO should react to this kind of attacks.

Cyber defence was again in the limelight in 2008 during the war between Georgia and Russia.

"Weeks before bombs started falling on *Georgia*, a security researcher in suburban Massachusetts was watching an attack against the country in cyberspace. Jose Nazario of Arbor Networks in Lexington noticed a stream of data directed at Georgian government sites containing the message: "win+love+in+Russia." [...] As it turns out, the July attack may have been a dress rehearsal for an all-out cyberwar once the shooting started between Georgia and *Russia*. "²

As reported by Internet experts, this is the first time in history that a conventional warfare coincides with cyberattacks; nevertheless, these actions did not involve casualties and were rather a shame for the government than a serious threat.

What has this conflict to do with NATO? The truth is that once again, after the Estonian attacks, cyber warfare has proved to be a real and capable strategic instrument and a major potential harm. The year 2010 set a milestone as a summit was held in Lisbon laying the foundations for the development of a deep and integral cyber defence policy.

Even though many measures and actions have been carried out, the quandary persists when facing this type of conflicts. The problem lies in NATO's article 5, what are the circumstances under which we could apply it? Should the legal framework go under revision? Why are cyberattacks so difficult to categorize? When is a cyber-attack an act of war? Is cyber defence a new dimension of European security?

"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party

² John Markoff. (2008). Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks.
[http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html?_r=0]

or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”³

This essay is a humble attempt to shed light on these issues making use of the existing law and previous conflict resolutions, as well as suggesting other lines of action.

3 CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH

In 1899 the Hague Convention made the first formal statements of law regulations. Later in 1949 the Geneva Convention took the plunge in the laws of war with a series of four treaties aiming to standardizing the laws applied to International Armed Conflicts and Non-International Armed Conflicts. These Conventions were a revolution and brought order and tidiness to such a thorny topic as war is. Although the Hague and Geneva treaties are still in force they do not cover our main topic, cyber war.

When it comes to addressing the laws of cyber warfare there are two well defined positions.⁴ On the one hand, a group of experts was asked to carry an investigation on different legal postures that could be adopted. This project was under the auspice of NATO and lead by Michael Schmitt, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College. They based their investigation in the above-mentioned treaties and their main premise was that online war is, as its name suggests, still war. So, under this assumption would it be legitimate to bomb a military base as a self-defence response to a previous cyber-attack? According to these experts, the answer is yes but only if this cyber-attack was lethal (e.g.: the disable of energy supply of a hospital with the resulting deaths of patients). The result of the three year project carried out by this panel was the *Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare*. This is the most comprehensive text to be found on this topic and it deals with two different situations. The first part of the manual deals with the right of self-defence of States against cyber-attacks. It addresses the principles of necessity, proportionality, imminence and

³ (1949). The North Atlantic Treaty Article 5. Washington D.C.

⁴ Cf.: Jason Healey. (2013). Reason finally gets a voice: The Tallinn Manual on cyber war and international law. [<http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/reason-finally-gets-a-voice-the-tallinn-manual-on-cyber-war-and-international-law>]

immediacy as well as the legal responsibility of States and the use of force. The second part is about the rules that apply to cyber conflicts: attacks against objects, attacks against persons, means and methods of warfare, conduct of attacks, precautions, perfidy, improper use or espionage among others.

On the other hand there is the school of thought which states that new law has to be created for such a brand new concept as cyber warfare. They stand for shedding new light on these regulations arguing that Hague and Geneva Conventions and other international legal texts do not fulfil the current necessities. China and Russia are the main members of this group. They made a cyber proposal in 2011 that utterly differs from the Tallinn Manual.

China's draft on cyber security legislation is an aggressive approach when understanding cyberspace. It fully recognizes its existence and considers it a part of the nation. The main principle that is underneath this regulation is national sovereignty. It focuses primarily on how governments can combat cybersecurity threats instead of trying to establish international regulations. Opposed to Tallinn Manual's standpoint about cyberspace, China's draft considers that every state should respect other national laws when interacting with Internet based entities just as if they were a piece of land. The ultimate consequences of this could be, as some experts point out⁵, reaching a point where Twitter or Facebook could be classified as weapons if by using them you violated national laws; this is, as you will have yet figured out, in opposition to Tallinn's Manual meaning of existence, which is to build an international and common legal framework.

Further research about this matter is to be released in the second half of 2016. I am talking about Tallinn 2.0, once again under the auspice of NATO and facilitated by NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. The project is also chaired by Michael Schmitt, professor at the U.S. Naval War College.

⁵ Cf.: Timothy Farnsworth. (2011). China and Russia submit cyber proposal. Arms control association. [https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_11/China_and_Russia_Submit_Cyber_Proposal]

4 RESEARCH GAP

Since 2002 and especially after 2007 a lot of progress has been done in the cyber defence field. NATO has endeavoured to develop a strategic plan for this vital matter. The most valuable output is the Tallinn Manual, a fully comprehensive guideline for policy makers to set the rules of the cyber warfare game.

Although the international community applauded the Tallinn Manual and it was thought that uncertainty had banished, the truth is that the quandary of the applicability of article 5 persists. A good example of this situation was the SONY cyber-attacks in 2014, when a group of hackers called GOP stole valuable data from the American enterprise. Even though it was clear for the US that North Korea sponsored this group, determining the magnitude of their response was, once again, a major headache as it was not clear how to classify and manage these cyber-attacks. The truth is that uncertainty persists and further work is needed to be done. Even Professor Michael Schmitt, leader of the Tallinn Manual, recognizes it.

“The follow-on “Tallinn 2.0” project explores the law governing cyber operations that are not at the level of severity of those addressed in the original Tallinn Manual. This work bears directly on the Sony incident and most other malicious cyber operations mounted by states as well as non-state groups.”⁶

NATO’s response and role in this conflict was not either clear. Again, ambiguity is the main constant.

“Reducing the uncertainty - that is to say, determining the threshold for when a cyber-attack would constitute an armed attack - has become an even more important undertaking after the Article 5 incorporation. However, for the broader context of peace and security in which Article 5 is located, arriving at some kind of international agreement with respect to the regulation of cyber conflict must remain the premier objective.”⁷


⁶ Michael Schmitt. (2015). Tallinn Manual follow-up more relevant than ever. [<https://ccdcoe.org/tallinn-manual-follow-more-relevant-ever.html>]

⁷ Kristin Bergtora Sandvik. (2014). New NATO cyber defence policy: unclear on key issues. [<http://www.ui.se/eng/blog/blog/2014/10/14/new-nato-cyber-defense-policy-unclear-on-key-issues.aspx>]

5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- When can NATO's article 5 be applied regarding cyber conflicts?
 - How can we efficiently classify cyber-attacks?
 - When is a cyber-attack an act of war?
 - Which should be the reach of our response?

6 METHODOLOGY



Graph 1: Sequence of work⁸

My point of departure is the previous knowledge I have acquired by reading legal texts and other sources of cyber conflict info. My route of research is described in the graph above.


⁸ Graph created by the author using [www.draw.io]

I am going to use the classic scientific method, which is observing cyber conflicts, ask myself questions and analyse previous solutions in order to formulate subsequent hypothetical resolutions.

7 RESEARCH AND RESULT OF RESEARCH

7.1 Saudi Aramco attacks

These attacks were perpetrated by an independent group possibly sponsored by Iran in 2012 and left the Saudi oil company completely offline. Saudi Aramco was at that time responsible for 10% of the world's oil supply, "9.4 million barrels a day"⁹. Oil supply was in great danger for 5 months (the time it took Saudi Aramco to go back online) but the company managed to keep things going and no major losses were regretted. The price of an oil barrel was at that time around 120\$. The potential loss was huge, as a vital State structure was jeopardized, let alone all the economic and industrial links oil production has; to put things into perspective, let's compare this impact with current war conflicts.



Graph 2: Comparison of economic and human costs of different conflicts¹⁰

⁹ Fahmida Y. Rashid. (2015). Inside the aftermath of the Saudi Aramco Breach. [<http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/inside-the-aftermath-of-the-saudi-aramco-breach/d/d-id/1321676>]

¹⁰ Graph created by the author using data from the US Energy Information Administration and [<http://niebladeguerra.blogspot.com.es/>]

As we can see in the graph, the costs of this single one-day action against Saudi Aramco could have had an economic impact equivalent to half of the US costs in the 20-years-long Vietnam war. Nevertheless, there were no casualties. Could this have been classified as an act of war?

According to the Tallinn Manual the answer is no, Because *“The mere fact that a cyber operation has been launched or otherwise originates from governmental cyber infrastructure is not sufficient evidence for attributing the operation to that State but is an indication that the State in question is associated with the operation.”*¹¹

In the same line of argument *“The fact that a cyber operation has been routed via the cyber infrastructure located in a State is not sufficient evidence for attributing the operation to that State.”*¹²

So this leaves a potential harm of half a 20 year war with no legal consequences and, as a matter of fact, no legal actions were taken by Saudi Arabia.

The applicability of this article, if this attack had been directed against a NATO member, would not have been legitimate as this was not considered an armed attack. So, is it imperative that kinetic actions are involved to consider an attack an armed one? Why do not have cyber-attacks the same consideration as an ordinary attack if its potential to do harm is equal to conventional weapons?

7.2 Sony Pictures Entertainment attacks

In 2012 the US company was target of a brutal attack that left tons of data under hacker's control, as well as ability to delete it. The FBI stated that there was evidence of North Korea being behind these attacks. In the words of the Secretary of Homeland Security, it was an attack on our freedom of expression and way of life.

Nevertheless it was classified as an act of cyber-vandalism instead of cyber warfare. *“The North Korean cyberattack wasn't an act of war because no violence was inflicted and*

¹¹ Michael Schmitt. (2013). Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. Cambridge University Press.

¹² Ibid.

Americans' physical security wasn't in danger by Sony having its computer systems attacked and emails leaked, national security experts said."¹³

In words of Bill French, a policy analyst at the National Security Network in the US, *"At least in the Western tradition ... war and acts of war have to involve violent acts that are designed to compel enemies to accept your will"*. What it is important is that Sony accepted not to release the film *The interview* in order for the attacks to cease.

We can find almost the same statement as the aforementioned in the context of the Charlie Hebdo attacks. Many claimed that it was an attack against our right of expression. Nonetheless we cannot deny that it was way more serious as human deaths were involved.

The Tallinn Manual considers attacks against persons and objects but not against legal rights such as the freedom of expression.

Maybe the thoughts of Voltaire could be the answer. *"I do not agree with what you have to say, but I'll defend to the death your right to say it."*¹⁴

Moreover, these actions may have ended in big losses for one of the biggest companies of the US. This means that an impact on a specific sector of economy could have taken place. In the medieval times it was considered an act of war when states conducted naval blockades. This kind of sabotage did not involve casualties (just as cyber-attacks) and they affected primarily the economy of the country. Why are these actions different? Again, it seems that the lack of a kinetic aggression automatically dismisses the possibility of taking a more serious measure than a pair of sanctions and diplomatic talks.

7.3 Stuxnet attacks to Iran

In 2010 the Natanz's uranium enrichment plant centrifuges were not working as they should. The causes were a mystery and the number of centrifuges (machinery needed in the uranium enrichment process) working drop from 4,592 to 3,936. It was later discovered that Stuxnet,

¹³ Howard Koplowitz. (2014). Is the North Korea attack on Sony an act of war? [<http://www.ibtimes.com/north-korea-cyberattack-sony-act-war-1764992>]

¹⁴ Evelyn Beatrice Hall. (1906). The Friends of Voltaire. Great Britain

a malicious cyber worm, was the cause of this series of malfunctions. As some anonymous US officials say it was a joint project of both Israel and the US.

“The officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity to describe the classified effort code-named Olympic Games, said it was first developed during the George W. Bush administration and was geared toward damaging Iran’s nuclear capability gradually while sowing confusion among Iranian scientists about the cause of mishaps at a nuclear plant.”¹⁵

It cannot be denied that nuclear power supply is a core structure of a State. If a country bombed a nuclear power plant or other nuclear facilities nobody would doubt that the use of force in self-defence would be legitimate, nevertheless, this case did not meet the requirements to be qualified as an armed attack. According to the Tallinn Manual *“Acts that kill or injure persons or destroy or damage objects are unambiguously uses of force”¹⁶* Thus, it was an act of force but not an armed attack. We see that the results of a bombing and the use of cyber weapons can be the same, the damage of objects but international community refuses to classify these means as identical. Even the experts of the Tallinn Manual were doubtful when qualifying the Stuxnet attack. *“The 20 experts who produced the study were unanimous that Stuxnet was an act of force, but were less clear about whether the cyber sabotage against Iran’s nuclear program constituted an armed attack”¹⁷*

7.4 Iran’s attack on US

In 2012 many of the largest banks in the US went offline because of massive Internet traffic requests; this is known as a DDoS attack (Denial-of-service). In plain words, hackers use remote web servers to flood the targeted ones with massive requests for which they are not

¹⁵ Ellen Nakashima and Joby Warrick. (2012). Stuxnet was work of U.S. and Israeli experts, officials say. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/stuxnet-was-work-of-us-and-israeli-experts-officials-say/2012/06/01/gJQAlnEy6U_story.html]

¹⁶ Michael Schmitt. (2013). Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. Cambridge

¹⁷ Kim Zetter. (2013). Legal Experts: Stuxnet Attack on Iran Was Illegal ‘Act of Force’. [<https://www.wired.com/2013/03/stuxnet-act-of-force/>]

hardware-prepared, resulting in these servers going down. JPMorgan or even the Bank of America was affected and they spent “tens of millions of dollars”¹⁸ solving the issue.

Once again, the way of facing the problem was rather unclear even though there was evidence of Iran being behind the attacks, probably as a revenge for Stuxnet and recent economic sanctions. The way US sorted out the affair was definitely surprising, they called for support from around 120 countries.

Throughout intense collaboration they managed to stop the attacks, a true act of collective defence. The US chose this option because of its low-profile. It was the least aggressive of the ones that were being weighed. One of the alternatives was directly hacking Iran’s network but it was dismissed for the reason already mentioned.


According to the principle of proportionality the US could perfectly have taken more serious actions against Iran; nevertheless, they decided to adopt a more defensive posture that neither was free of controversy: “administration officials were unsure that the action could be so precise and expressed concern that affecting a server in Iran — even if in self-defense — would represent a violation of its sovereignty.”¹⁹

8 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND PERSONAL CONCLUSIONS

When analysing the real cases in the previous section I have realized that they share things in common regarding government’s response. The following graph specifies this:

¹⁸ Ellen Nakashima. (2014). U.S. rallied multinational response to 2012 cyberattack on American banks. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-rallied-multi-nation-response-to-2012-cyberattack-on-american-banks/2014/04/11/7c1fbb12-b45c-11e3-8cb6-284052554d74_story.html]

¹⁹ Ibid.



Graph 3: Common flow of events after a cyber-attack²⁰

8.1 Determining authorship

The first problem we encounter is to determine the authorship of the attacks. It is not that we cannot know who did the attacks but that the methods used are classified and presenting them as evidence in a trial could be counter-productive. In other situations the authorship is known by other ways e.g.: Stuxnet's case. Here the challenge is to determine the fidelity of the sources.

²⁰ Graph created by the author using [<http://www.draw.io>]

To cut a long story short, states will have to build up systems and develop criteria in order to know when a source is trustworthy. The alternative is to reveal processes to identify authors or modifying legislation with the aim to protecting vital information in trials.

8.2 Effects on different areas

When developing an appropriate response to cyber-attacks it is essential to know how much damage was done. It is only by accurately determining the magnitude of the attack that we will be able to effectively know if we are facing a use of force or an armed attack.

“A cyber operation constitutes a use of force when its scale and effects are comparable to non-cyber operations rising to the level of a use of force.”²¹

We should also note that *“In Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice found that arming and training a guerrilla force that is engaged in hostilities against another State qualified as a use of force. Therefore, providing an organized group with malware and the training necessary to use it to carry out cyber-attacks against another State would also qualify”²²*


If hostilities using conventional weaponry were put on the same level as those using malware or other kinds of cyber-weapons, why are not the latter ones classified as a use of force? And what is more, if they are both a use of force and the first ones reach the level of an armed attack, why would not the other ones reach that level as well? It seems that there is an implicit rule that refuses to consider an armed attack everything that does not involve a kinetic action.

On the basis of considering cyber-weapons conventional weapons I would propose qualifying uses of force as armed attacks basing our decision just on the effects encountered.

A possible classification could be the one below:

²¹ Michael Schmitt. (2013). Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. Cambridge University Press.

²² Ibid.



Graph 4: Effects classification²³

Read and orange levels would actually constitute an armed attack if done by usual means. From my point of view cyber-attacks causing the effects just mentioned (e.g.: Saudi Aramco attacks) could be perfectly classified as armed attacks as can be derived from the quotations in the previous page. In that case *“A cyber operation that qualifies as an ‘armed attack’ triggers the right of individual or collective self-defence (Rule 13)”*²⁴

²³ Graph created by the author using ConceptDraw. C.f.:
[<http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/08/how-respond-state-sponsored-cyber-attack/119771/>]

²⁴ Michael Schmitt. (2013). Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. Cambridge University Press.

8.3 Proportionality principle

Once the authorship is determined and the effects are properly classified the next step is deciding how we are going to react. For each level of the effects classification a response level in the same range is associated. E.g.: For the green ones states should not surpass international condemnation of the action and other minor demarches.²⁵ For the red level an army operation (cybernetic or kinetic) would be legitimate. It is obvious that states will have to choose from the maximum response for that level to minor response depending on their situation. Diplomacy here may vary between states and, above all, depending on their power.

8.4 Conclusions

When facing a cyber-attack a good rule of thumb would be to follow the previous three steps, this is the AEP principles (authorship determination, effects, proportionality principle). This methodology could potentially be useful to shed some light on the issue. I am concerned that reality is different from what legal text say and most states decide to treat cyber-conflicts as domestic affairs because no human casualties are involved. Each state will know what response suits better his diplomatic style and interests.

After the AEP process, we will probably have a more clear vision of the nature of the cyber-attack. Therefore we will be able to know if we can trigger the international response (article 5) in order to effectively set up our cyber defence, an undeniable new dimension of European security.

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²⁵ Cf.: Tobias Feakin. (2015). How To Respond To a State-Sponsored Cyber Attack. [<http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/08/how-respond-state-sponsored-cyber-attack/119771/>]

2. (1949). The North Atlantic Treaty Article 5. Washington D.C.
3. <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/08/how-respond-state-sponsored-cyberattack/119771/>
4. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-rallied-multi-nation-response-to-2012-cyberattack-on-american-banks/2014/04/11/7c1fbb12-b45c-11e3-8cb6-284052554d74_story.html
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14. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html?_r=0
15. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia>

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Cyberspace as a new dimension of European security

ABSTRACT

My essay is about the European Union's (hereinafter: the EU) complex knowledge about cybersecurity as a new dimension and a new source of issues. The essay includes both past and current state of research furthermore it attempts to offer new questions and solutions with personal researches and opinions.

In the first part of my paper (*Introduction*) I would like to present the basic definitions about the topic (for instance *cyberspace*, *cyber security*, *cyberwarfare*, *cybercrime*) and after that I would like to summarize the period of progression of cyber strategy since 2001. I think this part is really important for a stable foundation and consistent continuity.

After the introduction I would like to display the current state of research since the Cyber Security Strategy from 2013. I will present the substance of the Strategy, considering the main defects in the cyberspace, the paper's principles and priorities and the gathered points for the solution.

Comparing and contrasting the facts above, I would like to point out the deficiency of the European Cyber Strategy in the third chapter. Starting from the research gap, I am going to highlight a huge issue in Europe: terrorism. According to the recent tragedies on the continent, I am confident that terrorism acts not only can happen in cities and in the material world, but also in the cyberspace, that is why I would like to find and get to know the important parts of the nations' cyber strategies and the work of the EDA to scrutinize how they are dealing with the cyber terrorism.

Besides the Cyber Security Strategy, I'm also going to investigate a national cyber security strategy, the Cyber Defence Policy Framework and the latest European Defence Matters magazine to find more information about the topic and my research gap.

In my opinion, one of the most important thing, is a streamlined, simple and user-friendly cyber security system which includes both the hardware and server (software) defense, and naturally, the second important thing is the appropriate information network for users. If the users cannot hear about the latest news, technologies and laws about cyber security, they will be mistrustful about it.

Keywords: European Union, European Cyber Security Strategy, European Defense Agency, Cyber Security Policy Framework, cybersecurity, cybercrime, cyber terrorism

1 PREFACE

My first experience about cybercrime was a problem that I had on my computer. Somebody cracked all of my social media accounts and my email system, thus all of my data was erased from my computer. Unfortunately, it is a typical problem and this issue was my first motivation to start reading more about the topic.

Since I started my university studies on international security- and defense policy, beside my other courses, I could learn more and more about cybersecurity. I really enjoy everything about the topic (especially the technical and policy background), and after I noticed this unique opportunity, there was no reason why I should not write an essay about cybersecurity.

Nowadays, in my opinion, the theme that I chose is the one of the most important issue in the public administration, because the presence of cyberspace is indisputable. The public and private sector use the cyberspace everyday that is why we have to protect our systems from different attacks. We can use antivirus-systems, but it is not enough for adequate security, especially when it comes from a hostile military power or a terrorist organization.

The cyberspace is the fastest growing infrastructure in the world, and nation states cannot defend their infrastructure all by themselves. The key of the solution is in supranational organizations, like the EU or the NATO that is why members of these organizations have to help each other to create a complex strategy regarding cybersecurity.

As you can read in my paper later on, the main motivation to create this essay is the passionate desire for knowledge that I have regarding the topic. I really want to understand the coherence between the different parts of cybersecurity, and after I acquire the important parts, I want to create new ideas and investigate deeper, the latest issues in the future.

I would like to recommend the essay for the jury and everybody who is interested in cybersecurity.

I wish to thank those people who helped me with this essay, most importantly my preparatory teacher and my groupmates. I think if they did not give me strength and useful advices, I could not write the paper in the deadline. Furthermore, I wish to thank the opportunity for the European Security and Defense College.

2 INTRODUCTION

2.1 Definitions

Cyberspace: „Cyberspace is a time-dependent set of interconnected information systems and the human users that interact with these systems”.¹

Cybersecurity: Cybersecurity, as an important goal for an uninterrupted functioning both in the private and public sectors, it includes the hardware, software and the information network as a whole, and those protection in cyberspace. The typical threats that the cybersecurity systems try to fend off are the physical sabotaging, hacker and cracker penetrating, phishing and others. The U.S. Department of Defense made their own criteria about the meaning of cybersecurity named Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria which consist of a seven-party-scale with the key features.²

Cyberwarfare: „Leveraging the Internet for political, military and economic espionage activities” – according to McAfee 2008 Virtual Criminology Report.³

Cybercrime: The type of crime includes two aspects: The advanced cybercrime and the cyber-enabled crime. The first one means the sophisticated attacks on the computer's hardware and

¹ Rain Ottis & Peeter Lorents (2010) (PDF). Cyberspace: Definition and Implications. Page: 267. URL: <http://search.proquest.com/openview/11c3f4f3a7ca044eeb3a18a4929dc5ff/1?pq-origsite=gscholar> [18.03.16.]

² Morie Gasser (1988) (PDF). Building a secure computer system. Page: 3-4. URL: <https://ece.uwaterloo.ca/~vganesh/TEACHING/S2014/ECE458/building-secure-systems.pdf> [18.03.16]

³ Jeffrey Carr (2009)(Book). Inside Cyber Warfare: Mapping the Cyber Underworld. Page 1.

software (like the cyberwarfare), and the second means the „traditional” crimes (for instance child pornography, financial crimes, etc.) except for the platform of crime.⁴

2.2 Historical background

The first important step in the development was the Budapest Convention of Cybercrime that signed in 2001 November. This document was the first that collected the main issues (*illegal access, illegal interception, data- and system interference, misuse of device*), crime-types in the cyberspace (computer-related forgery, computer-related fraud, child pornography, offences related to infringements of copyright and related rights) and it lay the main legislative and jurisdiction receivables. In Chapter III., the Parties lay the joint co-operation’s important aspects and detail the contents of co-operation.⁵




Figure 1: Memberstates of Budapest Convention

⁴ Homepage of Interpol. URL: <http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Cybercrime/Cybercrime> [18.03.16]

⁵ Council of Europe (2001) (PDF). Budapest Convention on Cybercrime. URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/libe/dv/7_conv_budapest/_7_conv_budapest_en.pdf [19.03.16]

After the Budapest Convention, in 2004, the European Commission released an announcement about the protection of critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks. It mentions things as communication and information technology infrastructure, along with the threats posed by terrorist organizations. Furthermore, the announcement draws attention, both for the growing number of attacks and the necessary protection against the threats; moreover, it provides solutions in Chapter 5.⁶

In 2009, the European Commission released an announcement again, but it was more specialised and detailed than the previous one. This document deals only with critical information infrastructure and protection from the large scale cyber-attacks and disruptions. In this time, we can speak about concrete policy context and concrete issues, because the EU was concerned with cyberattacks (in 2007, Estonia suffered an attack by Russia). Moreover, the document highlights the importance of co-operation between the members of EU, and the CERT's development urgency.⁷

3 CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH

3.1 Cyber Security Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace

In 2013, Federica Mogherini, the head of the European Defence Agency and the high representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the EU, released an announcement that would be the main directive regarding cybersecurity⁸. There is no member state in the European Union which can afford to ignore it, because it includes many of proposals and claims that they have to do for a democratic and secure Internet, balanced co-operation with the other member states and institutions.

⁶ Council of Europe (2004) (PDF). Critical Infrastructure Protection in the fight against terrorism. URL: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0702:FIN:EN:PDF> [19.03.06]

⁷ Council of Europe (2009) (PDF). Protecting Europe from large scale cyber-attacks and disruptions: enhancing preparedness, security and resilience. URL: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0149:FIN:EN:PDF> [20.03.16.]

⁸ European Commission (2013) (PDF). Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union. URL: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013JC0001&from=HU> [25.03.16.]

The 20 paged document summarizes the most important priorities, defects and highlights the possible solutions.

3.1.1 The main defects

Despite the fact that the EU has made a lot of proposals for a safer cyberspace, nowadays, it is not enough. Over the last two decades information technology was the fastest developing sector worldwide, that is why the related issues are developing rapidly.

The biggest issues with the cyber security are:

- Since the Arab Spring, the possibility for a cyber attack has increased rapidly.
- 10% of inhabitants are mistrustful about using the banking and shopping services, because the phishing.
- The cooperation between the public and private sector is inadequate. The private sector has no incentive or imposition for cooperation.
- The current protection in the member's policy is underdeveloped.
- The child pornography abuse is still a problem.
- 1 million inhabitants worldwide are victims of cybercrime each day.

3.1.2 Principles and Priorities

In the first part of document, the Commission expound the most important principles for the strategy:

- The EU's core values concerning both for the physical and the cyber space. The EU guaranteed the freedom of expression, personal data and privacy, because, without the individuals' rights, the EU cannot protect its inhabitants.
- The EU would like to utilize all the Internet's advantages
- The digital world is not controlled by a single entity or the governance that is why the cooperation between the different sectors is essential
- The dependency on cyberspace is increasing
- The member states should create their own strategy of cyber security.

The EU vision presented in this strategy is articulated in five strategic priorities, which address the challenges highlighted above:

- Achieving cyber resilience
- Drastically reducing cybercrime
- Developing cyber defence policy and capabilities related to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
- Develop the industrial and technological resources for cybersecurity
- Establish a coherent international cyberspace policy for the European Union and promote core EU values⁹.

3.1.3 Possible solutions

The Commission drew up its plans and the most important steps for solution. For instance the Commission will:

- Promise the necessary cooperation with CERT¹⁰-s, the EDA¹¹, the Europol¹², the Eurojust¹³, Cpol, EC3 and the NATO,
- Support the scientific connection and the information sharing between the private and public sectors,
- Organize preventions and events (for example: championships) for university students,
- Support with money the industry's work,
- Support the recently launched European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) as the
- European focal point in the fight against cybercrime,
- Build on recent legislation to continue strengthening the EU's efforts to tackle child sexual abuse online,
- Promote dialogue and coordination between civilian and military actors in the EU, and other organizations.

⁹ Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union. Page 4-5

¹⁰ Computer Emergency Response Team

¹¹ European Defense Agency

¹² An international police-supporting organization

¹³ The European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit

Unfortunately, I could not highlight the full of proposals of the Commission, but in the following pages, I am going to mention other relevant parts.

4 RESEARCH GAP

In the previous pages, I investigated the most important documents and their content, and in my opinion, the Cyber Security Strategy is an extensive and accurate document and it could represent the main parts of related issues. However, the document was made three years ago, that is why we have to research about effects the strategy caused.

Nowadays, when the following strategy is work in progress, we cannot ignore the fact that global terrorism is still a major issue on a global scale, especially in Europe. After the French, Turkish and the Belgian cyberattacks, the EU must protect their citizens from terrorist organizations both in the material- and cyberspace.

The Strategy did not deal with the cyberterrorism in detail, only tangentially, that is why I would like to research the capability of cyber protection against terrorism. It does not concentrating exclusively on penetration attacks from terrorist organizations, but also includes the means and possibilities that terrorists use to promote their own organizations.

Summarizing the gaps, I would like to explore the connection between social media and terrorist organizations and the citizens' attitude towards the connection itself.

5 QUESTIONS REGARDING CYBER SECURITY

I would like to find answers for these questions:

- Did the Member States create our cyber strategy, and if they did, does it include solutions for the cyber terrorism?
- Which devices are available to observe terrorism organizations on social media platforms
- Did the EDA deal with cyber terrorism?
- Was there any cyber terrorist attack in the recent times?
- What do the inhabitants think about the protection against cyber terrorism?

6 METHODOLOGY

In the following pages, I am going to use as a source material the Cyber Security Strategy, the EU Cyber Defense Policy Framework, the Austrian Cyber Security Strategy and the European Defence Matters.

Unfortunately, I did not have enough space for my questions in the chapter 8, this is why I have to use the 9th chapter for the exposition.

7 RESEARCH AND RESULTS OF RESEARCH

7.1 The Austrian example

According to the Cyber Security Strategy, besides a lot of guidelines and advices, the Strategy highlighted the importance of creating the national strategies and harmonizing them with the EU-s' strategy. Most of the member states heeded the advice, but there was a country that started to create their own strategy before the announcement: it was Austria. The Austrian Government started the research project in 2010 for the Ministry of Defence's initiative, and one year later, they started to create their own Information and Communication Technology Strategy. In 2013 (in the same year with the European Cyber Security Strategy), the completed strategy was passed by the Cabinet, and after that it has been accepted and initiated.




Figure 2: Components of the Austrian Cyber Security Strategy

The Austrian Cyber Security Strategy¹⁴ (hereinafter: The ACSS) includes the main parts of the complete cyber defence. For instance, in the paper, there are independent chapters for:

- Governance
- Cooperation
- Protection of the Critical Infrastructure,
- Awareness raising and training,
- Research and development, and the
- International cooperation.

We can declare the fact that these parts are important, essential and should not be missing from any strategy in the field of cybersecurity – but in the Austrian strategy we can find a lot of peculiarities:

¹⁴ Republic Österreich (2013) (PDF). Austrian Cyber Security Strategy. URL: <https://www.bka.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=50999> [29.03.16.]

- The ACSS is shorter than other strategies, but includes the most important parts of the topic,
- Common interest of the key stakeholders, is to work closely together, nevertheless competition for resources must be present,
- Close cooperation of all stakeholders, etc.

The country collaborates effectively with another organizations and their strategies and conventions, and they successfully included them in their own strategy. A few examples for the collaboration:

- Austria made a substantial contribution to the development and implementation of EU Cyber Security Strategy. It will fully participate in the strategic and operational work of the EU13.
- The competent ministries will take the necessary measures to implement and to take full advantage of the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe.
- Austria advocates a free Internet at international level. The free exercise of all human rights must be guaranteed in virtual space, and particularly the right of freedom of expression, information must not be restricted unduly in the Internet. This is the position Austria will adopt in international forums. Hence, Austria will participate actively in developing and establishing a transnational code for governance in cyber space, which will include measures to build confidence and security.
- Austria will continue its bilateral cooperation which has been initiated in the framework of the NATO Partnership for Peace and actively support the preparation of a list of confidence- and security-building measures in the OSCE.
- Austria participates actively in planning and implementing transnational cyber exercises. The experience gained will be used as a direct input for planning and further developing operational cooperation.
- Foreign policy measures relevant for cyber security are coordinated by the Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs. Where appropriate, the conclusion of bilateral or international agreements will be taken into consideration.

7.2 The EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework

In 20th of December 2013, the European Council summarized the experiences and results about the latest strategy in the EU Security Summit.¹⁵



Figure 3: EU Security Summit, December 19, 2013 (photo: EU)

In this event, the Council announced that the CSDP will start to create a new, more complex document regarding cyber security: This is the Cyber Defence Policy Framework¹⁶. The Framework has been adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council in November 2014, and after a six monthly progress, the Council presented it in June 2015.

The Cyber Defence Policy Framework includes 5 priorities that follows:

1. Supporting the development of Member States cyber defence capabilities related to CSDP

The first priority focuses on the main capability-building that the sector needs for a more effective and developed infrastructure. This part uses the EU Defence Capability Development

¹⁵ Atlantic Council Homepage (2013) (Article). Key Conclusions from EU Security Summit. URL: <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/key-conclusions-from-eu-security-summit> [01.04.16.]

¹⁶ Council of the European Union (2014) (PDF). EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework. URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/sede/dv/sede160315eucyberdefencepolicyframework/_sede160315eucyberdefencepolicyframework_en.pdf [01.04.16.]

Plan's basic requirements¹⁷ (for instance: monitoring; situational awareness, prevention, detection, protection, info sharing, forensic analysis) creating a foundation for the later work. Furthermore, the support also expand for Pooling and Sharing projects in the military sector, cooperation between military CERTS and Member States or the minimum-level defining and training programmes.

2. Enhancing the protection of CSDP communication networks used by EU entities

The next part of the Framework emphasises the importance of the developing both in the EEAS IT security capability and common IT security policy, guidelines and technical requirement. The MRD, EUMS, CMPD and CPP, in cooperation with INTCEN gave promises for the common protection of CSDP communication networks, over and above, they promote the real-time cyber threat information sharing between Member States and relevant EU entities and support the strategic level planning for CSDP missions and operations.

3. Promotion of civil-military cooperation and synergies with wider EU cyber policies, relevant EU institutions and agencies as well as with the private sector

Nowadays, when the public and private sector has the technological background and capabilities in cyberspace, the cooperation is essential.

That is why the EDA, the European Network and Information Security Agency, the European Cybercrime Center, together with the relevant EU agencies enhanced their cooperation:

- developing of common cyber security and defence competence profiles and civilian-military relationships,
- adopting public sector cyber security organisational and technical standards for use in the defence and security sector,
- supporting both to build on the ongoing work of ENISA and EDA research in cooperation with the private sector and academia and
- sharing cybersecurity agendas among EU institutions and agencies with coordinated roadmaps and actions.

¹⁷ European Defence Agency. (PDF). FUTURE TRENDS FROM THE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN. URL:

Furthermore, the Framework also includes suggestions to facilitate the civilian-military cooperation in cyber defence.

4. Improve training, education and exercises opportunities

If the Framework wants to achieve the expected effect, it has to implement the knowledge in practise. Recognizing this fact, the CSDP provided a lot of cyber defence training opportunities in cooperation with the other institutions. Based on a need-analysis, the EDA established the CSDP Training and Education for different audiences, including EEAS, personnel from CSDP missions and operations and Member States' officials.

The EDA proposed an establishment of a cyber defence dialogue for the Member States, EU institutes, third countries other international organizations, and of course, for the private sector for creating the standard certifications, criterias and requirements for the cyber security education. It would be a stable base for creating new or developing the existing cyber courses in the EU and create synergies with the training programmes of other stakeholders such as the ENISA, Europol, European Cybercrime Training and Education Group (ECTEG) and the European Police College (CEPOL).

5. Enhancing cooperation with relevant international partners

As we know, in 2014, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (moreover: the NATO) started to open for the EU, and this opening was mutual. In the last priority in the Framework, the NATO-EU collaboration is emphasized.

The fifth priority includes:

- The exchanges of the best practises between the two organizations,
- The cyber defence capability requirement both in short and long term,
- The concept-making measures for education,
- The strengthening of cooperation with other international organisations and EU relevant international partners.

7.3 The European Defence Agency

The European Defence Agency (hereinafter: the EDA) is an agency whose main priority is the promotion of common European protection. The EDA was formed in 2004 and the Headquarters is in Brussels, Belgium. 27 Member States of the EU are taking part in the common work (except Denmark) and taking Administrative Arrangements with Norway, Serbia and Switzerland.

As we can see, the Agency includes three main branches. The Capability, Armament+ & Technology branch deals with Cyber Defence, specifically with military parts and education.

The biggest issue that is connecting with cyber defence is the critical infrastructure protection. Critical functions and infrastructures become highly dependent both in cyber domains and military




Figure 4: Structure of the EDA

sector, furthermore, new threats and developments appear every day, so we have to protect our infrastructures intensively.

In the previous year, on 23-th of December, the Ukrainian blackout¹⁸ shocked both the people and experts, because of the means that the hackers used. Ukraine is a neighbour-state of Europe, and after the critical-infrastructure attack, the prevention and protection are more urgent than ever.

¹⁸ Hanna Kozłowska (2016) (Article) US Suspects Russian Hackers in Unprecedented Ukraine Blackout. URL: http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/01/us-suspects-russian-hackers-unprecedented-ukraine-blackout/124939/?oref=search_Blackout [08.04.16]

In 2015, a magazine of EDA, called European Defence Matters¹⁹ published five articles from five experts of the theme, which summarises the basic knowledge of cyber security, furthermore, it includes the present projects and programmes from the EDA, the European Small and Medium Sized Enterprises, the cooperation between the EDA and the NATO and the basic trends in the European security and defence market.

In the first interview *“Bricks to build a cyber shield”*²⁰, the expert, Michael Sieber, who is the Head of the Information Superiority Unit within the Capability Armament & Technology Directorate, described the most important things that we can associated, for instance definitions, strategic point of view, the cyber space’s presence in everyday life (“gone so cyber” phenomenon), and the main focus areas for the EDA regarding cyber defence: technology and skills development, trainings and exercises, etc.

The next article²¹ of the European Defence Matters was written by Wolfgang Röhrig who has been a project officer on cyber defence at the European Defence Agency since early 2014, explains researches from the landscaping studies in 2011 for the presence. The article mentions the EDA’s important contribution both for Cyber Security Strategy and Cyber Defence Policy Framework.

Christian Fredrikson, the President & Chief Executive of the F-Secure Corporation since 2012, highlights²² the European companies to confront cyber challenges in the third part of the column. In this part, he displays the growth of cyber defense market, the role of SME-s, and the work of his Europe-based enterprise, the F-Secure.

The fourth article deals with the cooperative work between the NATO and the EDA and EU, and with its symbol, the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn,

¹⁹ European Defence Agency – European Defence Matters. (2015.) (Magazine) URL: <http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-magazine/edm9downloadopt140.pdf> [08.04.16.]

²⁰ page 10-11

²¹ page 12 - 14

²² page 15

Estonia²³. Siim Alatalu, the head and Liisa Past, the spokesperson of the Centre talk about the main works and priorities of the community.

The last chapter of the article series²⁴ talks about the importance of the public-private partnership, qualities of a typical cyber security industry in a viewpoint of Luigi Rebuffy, the EOS Chief Executive Officer, furthermore, he shows his industry and the industry's promote researches and cooperation between the industry and the EU.

8 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (PROS AND CONS) AND PERSONAL CONCLUSION

In this part, I would like to ask my questions and find the answers for them, moreover, I'm going to contrast the pros and contrast with my personal opinion and conclusion.

8.1 Questions and answers

1) *What is terrorism and cyber terrorism?*

The basic definition of terrorism is:

*The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objective.*²⁵

²³ page 16 -17

²⁴ page 18 - 19

²⁵ NATO (2005) (Annex A): NATO's military concept for defence against terrorism. URL: <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism-annex.htm> [12.04.16.]



Figure 5: The homepage of the Miklós Radnóti Secondary School and a picture from a Youtube video

The main elements are:

- violence against individuals or property
- intimidation and coercion
- political, religious or ideological objective.

In cyberspace, terrorism could appear in every platform that the citizens use, for instance in Facebook, Twitter or Youtube. And it is quite usual. Everybody remembers videos that the terrorist organization ISIS shared on Youtube. In Annexes, I am going to link one of them.

In addition, ISIS hacked a lot of websites too:

- In 2015, ISIS hacked a Hungarian secondary schools' website. The penetrator was a hacker who uses nickname Phenomene Dz.²⁶

²⁶ Hungary Today (2015) (Article): ISIS SUPPORTER HACKS HUNGARIAN SECONDARY SCHOOL'S WEBSITE. URL: <http://hungarytoday.hu/news/isis-supporter-hacks-hungarian-secondary-schools-website-75907> [12.04.16.]

- ISIS also hacked the French TV station TV5Monde²⁷
- The British Government ministers' emails were hacked by ISIS in a Jihadi plot to assassinate politicians and royals uncovered by GCHQ²⁸

2) Does the Cyber Security Strategy include solutions for cyber terrorism?

Yes, it includes on the page 16:

In cooperation with the Member States, the Commission and the High Representative will [...]

- *Engage with international partners and organisations, the private sector and civil society to support global capacity-building in third countries to improve access to information and to an open Internet, to prevent and counter cyber threats, including accidental events, cybercrime and cyber terrorism, and to develop donor coordination for steering capacity-building efforts [...]*²⁹

3) Did the Member States create their own cyber strategy, and if they did, does it include solutions for cyber terrorism?

In the first part of 8th chapter, I investigated the ACSS that is an excellent example for successfulness of the 5th priority in Cyber Security Strategy.

However, the Strategy does not deal with cyber terrorism enough. It is mentioned in Annex 3, but it is just a definition, not a concrete step for the solution.

4) Does the Cyber Security Policy Framework include solutions for the cyber terrorism?

²⁷ Daily Mail Online (2015) (Article): French TV station TV5Monde hit by Islamic State hack. URL: www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3031644/French-TV5Monde-hit-pro-Islamic-State-hackers.html [12.04.16]

²⁸ Daily Mail Online (2015) (Article): Government ministers' emails were hacked by ISIS in Jihadi plot to assassinate politicians and royals uncovered by GCHQ. URL: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3231740/Government-ministers-emails-hacked-ISIS-Jihadis-plot-assassinate-politicians-royals-uncovered-GCHQ.html> [12.04.06]

²⁹ Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union. Page: 16

Absolutely not. Despite the fact that the Framework deals with cyber warfare, it is still not cyber terrorism.

5) Did the EDA deal with cyber terrorism?

In Tuesday 23 October 2012, the European Commission organized a workshop called *Innovation and R&D for Cyber Defence and Cyber Crime* in partnership with European Space Agency and EDA.³⁰

The Workshop highlighted the compromised areas that a terrorist attacks could destroy: the critical infrastructures and citizens. The Commission started financing some research project in the context of Directorate-General Enterprise and Industry, in collaboration with European Space Agency, European Defence Agency and EUROPOL under the future European Cybercrime Center (EC3).

8.2 Personal statement

In my opinion, the protection against cyber terrorism is not enough. The defence against terrorism is quite hard in also in material space, because this type of attack occurs suddenly, and unfortunately, the culprits are usually unknown, especially in cyberspace. The following chart is so talkative: In 2014, 774 individuals were arrested for terrorism related offences in 16 EU Member States. This was a 43% increase compared to 2013 (535 arrests). Most arrests were reported by France (238), Spain (145) and the United Kingdom (132). The number of arrests for religiously inspired terrorism continued to rise, a trend that has been observed since 2011, whereas arrests for separatist terrorism continued to decrease.³¹

However, all of strategies and announcements can be appropriate for terrorism-defence function. These documents are detailed, useful and made by experts that is why they are an excellent base for expansion.

³⁰ European Commission (2012) (PDF): REPORT of the Innovation and R&D for Cyber Defence and Cyber Crime Joint Workshop of EC, ESA and EDA . URL: file:///C:/Users/PC/Downloads/Report_Cyber_Crime_Workshop_v1_7713.pdf [15.04.16]

³¹ EUROPOL (2015) (PDF): European Union Terrorism Trends Report 2015. URL: file:///C:/Users/PC/Downloads/p_europol_tsat15_09jun15_low-rev.pdf [16.04.16.]

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The role of CSDP in EU's Comprehensive Approach

ABSTRACT

This essay will concentrate on the security and the interests of the Union. The Comprehensive Approach and the CSDP are two really important aspects of discussing the European Union. In this essay, I will try to introduce them, provide a short history of them, reveal the linking between these, and through an example taken from the life, I will grant a more plastic view of the CSDP and the Comprehensive Approach.

In the first part of the essay, I will introduce the basic definitions of expressions commonly used in my essay. CSDP, Comprehensive Approach will be explained here, and some other expressions in connection with them, I will summarize their development since the very early stage of the European integration.

In the second part, I will enlighten the pure connection between CSDP and Comprehensive Approach, concentrating on the major goals of them. There were several changes in the institution system of the European Union, which helped improving its external policies as well, and I will collect and introduce them.

In the next chapter, I will present the CSDP's role in EU's Comprehensive Approach through the example of its most successful operation so far, the EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, which aims providing security for trading vessels and the work of the WFP's aiding activity in Somalia.

Lastly, I will summarize the findings and the known facts regarding the relation of CSDP and Comprehensive Approach.

Keywords: European Union, ESDP, CSDP, Comprehensive Approach, Somalia

1 PREFACE

Hearing the crisis of Somalia made me think about how we could react to this problem. I, as a future military officer, feel my own responsibility to be clear about the situation in our world, and the struggle of Somalia made me clear in these cases, it is vital for EU and NATO to help, not only because of humanitarian motives and chivalry but also because these problem can easily spread and its effects can harm our society, economy and other parts of our own security.

Since I am a student of National University of Public Service, my need for a wider knowledge about our world, its mechanisms is more or less satisfied. Here, I have learnt a lot of NATO and EU and now I know that both have the tools for effective crisis-management, and we can prevent these problems getting inside of these two organizations' borders.

Initially, I was really curious about the EU's policies regarding the problems occurred far outside of its borders. Now, I have a passionate desire for knowledge regarding the topic of CSDP and Comprehensive Approach. Unfortunately I do not have the time I wish to have for this topic because of my other activities due to the university and mainly the Hungarian Defence Forces, but I hope that someday, I will have opportunity to deepen my knowledge about the European Union and its activities.

I would like to recommend the essay for all the participants of the competition. I know, it is not a good tactics, but I feel sorry because of the fact that because I had to elaborate and compose this essay in a shorter period of time than needed, due to taking part in Hungary's border-protection operations at the Hungarian-Serbian border. I also have to thank the opportunity for some educators of the university, who appointed me to participate in this conference.

2 INTRODUCTION

Firstly, I will explain the meaning of the two most important expressions mentioned in this essay.

2.1 Definitions

- **CSDP:** CSDP means Common Safety and Defence Policy. Its elements were set at the very early stage of European integration, and now, this is one of the European Union's most important policies.
- **Comprehensive Approach:** Comprehensive Approach is about all EU institutions and Member States shall work together to create a common strategy in order too become even more effective, strong and coherent in the Union's external relations. Global challenges continue to rise in number and become more and more complex; therefore the call for a comprehensive approach is louder and louder.

2.2 Historical background

After the Second World War, it was clear to everyone, that our collective security hangs somewhere between dependence and autonomy. Numerous initiatives were set with the aim of increasing the European security. The main part of the history of CSDP was written after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but it did not start at that time. The integration of Europe and common defence go hand in hand.¹ The main milestones in creating the CSDP were the Franco-British Treaty of Dunkirk (1947), the plans for the Western-European Union (1947-48), the Brussels Treaty (1948), the European Defence Community (1950-1954), the Fouchet Plan (1962) and the relaunch of the Western European Union (1973). In order to avoid any further armed conflicts in the continent, the strategic resources were taken under a supranational authority, when the European Coal and Steel Community was created in 1951. The Brussels Treaty's Article IV (then, in the modified Brussels Treaty, Article V) declares:

*'If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.'*²

In the essay, I will try to show the connection between CSDP and the European Union's Comprehensive Approach, by introducing the Union' most successful operation so far, the EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

3 CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH

The European Union forming in 1993 is based on the principle pillars: community affairs, common foreign and security policy, and justice and home affairs. We can feel now the importance of the need of a common security policy, as EU declares that it is one of its most important principles. The process of creating a common security policy, of course, is an

¹ Howorth, J. (2014). Security and Defence Policy in the European Union. Basingstoke. Palgrave MacMillan. 2nd edition

² Webpage of The Avalon Project. Page Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-defense (Brussels Treaty), March 17, 1948. URL: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/we001.asp#art4. [21-04-16]

intergovernmental issue, as we have regional and global problems. After the Cold War era, EU needed to assume its responsibilities in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. The Cologne European Council in 1999 reaffirmed the willingness to develop a set of strong capabilities granted by a credible military background. The Lisbon Treaty, came into force in December 2009, was a cornerstone in the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).³ Treaty of Lisbon took the most content of the Constitutional Treaty, except for some semantic terms. The Treaty changed the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP- by the Petersberg Tasks) to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the High Representative was renamed to High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is the Vice-President of the European Commission and is responsible for the Commission's external relations. Instead of Structured Cooperation, the Lisbon Treaty created the Permanent Structured Cooperation. From the Treaty came into force, the European Union is being a legal person, therefore it can apply for membership of international organizations. In this century, more than 30 civilian and military missions and operations were executed under the flag of CSDP. In the beginnings, CSDP was only a 'junior partner' of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by the 1991 Treaty of Maastricht. It was developed in the treaties signed in Amsterdam and Nice. CSDP aims to deal with three main policies: crisis management, armaments policy and collective defence.⁴

Crisis management

According to Article 1-41 (1): peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the United Nations Charter.⁵ The first crisis management operations of the EU took place in 2003. In order to execute these missions, there is an idea born in 1999, on the Helsinki European Council meeting with the aim of creating a common, single EU military force called European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). In

³ Merlingen, M. (2012). EU Security Policy. London. Lynne Rienner Publishers p. 27-41

⁴ Trybus, M., White, N. D. (2007) European Security Law. Oxford. Oxford University Press p. 45

⁵ Cf.: Ibid p. 46

reality, this initiative is not more than some headquarters arrangements and a list of possibly available national forces. Since 2007, 60 000 soldiers have been available for a possible ERRF.⁶

Armaments policy

This is conducted through the European Defence Agency. The goal was to create a ‘common approach to the planning, production and procurement of weapons, ammunitions, and other war material’⁷, including research and development of new armaments and the preservation of the European armaments market. This policy is independent of the Constitutional Treaty.

Collective Defence

This aspect is maybe the most important of the three, as this is a major innovation of the Constitutional Treaty. Since the failure of EDC, collective defence was the cornerstone of NATO and WEU. According to the Constitutional Treaty:

If a Member State is the victim of an armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.⁸

It is clear, that this clause is similar to Article 5 of the 1954 Modified Brussels Treaty of WEU and to the NATO’s Treaty’s Article 5 of 1949 signed in Washington.

4 RESEARCH GAP

Above I described the development the European Union’s efforts made in the past decades regarding CSDP and Comprehensive Approach. I am highly motivated to introduce the working of these, and to conduct a research examining their role in actual operations. My chosen EU-operation is the EUNAVFOR ATALANTA conducted in Somalia against the piracy and establishing the opportunities to tackle off the root of the problem and create a stabile, good-

⁶ Blockmans, S. (2008) The European Union and crisis management. Hague. T.M.C. Asser Instituut (Hague)

⁷ Cf.: Trybus, M., White N. D. (2007) Op. cit. p. 53

⁸ Cf.: Ibid p. 54

working country in order to put the region back on the track of a longer-lasting, sustainable, developing manner. I think that this operation is a great example to a good-working CSDP-operation, and I can introduce the role of the CSDP in the Union's Comprehensive Approach.

5 QUESTIONS ON CSDP'S ROLE IN THE EU'S COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

I would like to find the answers of these questions:

- What does comprehensiveness mean in EU's operation EUNAVFOR ATALANTA?
- How is CSDP related to the Comprehensive Approach in this operation?
- What is the strength of this CSDP mission?
- Why is the Union interested in a crisis so far of its borders?
- How can the European Union improve its policies to deal even more effectively these crises?

6 METHODOLOGY

In the following pages, I am going to use In the following pages, I am going to use several printed sources discussing the European Integration, studies conducted in the topic of CSDP and Comprehensive Approach, the success of them so far. In order to provide to most up-to-date information, possible, I will use online sources as well, mostly in the topic of the Operation EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

I think that for the easier understanding, it's vital to present the CSDP and Comprehensive Approach and the historical background of the operations itself even more, so in the next chapter I will provide some information.

7 RESEARCH AND RESULTS OF RESEARCH

The Treaty of Lisbon set out some principles the EU has to consider in connection with its external actions and policies. The institutional changes introduced above, the EU increased its potential and ambition to make its external efforts more consistent and effective. The idea of a comprehensive approach is far from new. It was applied in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and

the Great Lakes. However, systematically, the principles, goals, regarding the European Union's external actions are now clarified.

Now, I will reveal the connection between CSDP and the Union's Comprehensive Approach.

The connection between CSDP and Comprehensive Approach

Nowadays we have to face a new generation of security threats. They became well more complex, and they call for multiple types of solution: military, administrative, developmental, humanitarian and civilian policies are needed as well. It is quite clear, that the challenges that EU can face with, need a comprehensive approach in the actual meaning of the expression. In other words, the European Union faces some challenges, and it has to find a solution through its common policy on security and defence backed by the member states' contribution and look for a commonly approved solution in a multidimensional scale, as the problems are interlinked and demand a comprehensive approach. CSDP is far from satisfying the needs of the Comprehensive Approach. On its own, CSDP is only a small (but important) part of the comprehensive approach. These operations become comprehensive as the other tools for the EU's external policy are used by the Union. These other policies – covering development and diplomacy – are needed to earn a sustainable, effective, long-lasting result, which stabilize the situation. To convince the reader, in the next part of the essay I will introduce the difficulties, the solutions and the methods – underlining the Comprehensive Approach's role – in a CSDP-operation, namely the EU Naval Operation Somalia (EUNAVFOR ATALANTA) started in 2008, which is known as the most successful operation in the history of the European Union and the CSDP.⁹

EUNAVFOR ATALANTA

In the next chapter I will purely concentrate on the CSDP's effective affect on the Comprehensive Approach in the Operation EUNAVFOR ATALANTA. However, there are many more approaches and policies EU has to follow in order to settle the situation regarding piracy,

⁹ Matlary, J. H. (2013) European Union Security Dynamics. Basingstoke. Palgrave MacMillan p. 202-204

and we can learn a lot of this operation. Maybe this is the most successful, but there are always room to learn new methods and ways to manage these types of problems.

This operation is maybe the most significant action of the CSDP so far. It is the first ever naval operation implemented in the name of the CSDP. It was started in order to deal with the Somali crisis and piracy. Somalia is a fallen state, as the country is left without legitimate, unifying government since 1991, after a two-decade-long dictatorial rule. The root of all problems is the lack of a common agreement on the way the political system should be structurized. Nowadays, the terrorist group, Al-Shabaab is present in the country, and has many followers fighting against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which tries to keep the country's unity and backed internationally. Otherwise, in Somalia there are regional differences, for example, in the north-west, the Republic of Somaliland declared its independence in 1991, but it is not recognized by the TFG and by international organizations. The Puntland State is a federal state established in 1998. Puntland did not get external support, but it succeeded to establish a more or less stable political structure. They face some quite serious problems, such as high number of criminal actions, kidnappings, clashes between clans, and increasing activity of Al-Shabaab.

In the last years, inner fights and violent conflicts were common in throughout Somalia. This unstable situation and poverty is favorable for the prosperous piracy, which can be really gainful.¹⁰ The local fishing industry was seriously threatened by illegal presence of foreign vessels in the country's territorial waters. This frustration lead to piracy and then transformed to a flourishing, highly profitable business. Due to Somalia's geographic position, its coasts are inevitable on the route to the Gulf of Aden, where the global trade's 20 percent passes through making the route between Somalia and Yemen a strategic place. Since the start of the operation, handfuls of anti-piracy efforts have been made in the region in order to provide safety to the ships. This threat was so serious, even the United States deployed warships in order to execute patrolling tasks. Shortly, every countries, who are strongly interested in the

¹⁰ Webpage Oceans beyond piracy. The EU and Somalia: Counter-Piracy and the Question of a Comprehensive Approach. URL:
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/Ehrhart_Petretto_EUandSomalia_2012_fin.pdf [07-05-16]

area deployed warships, such as China and Russia, and the EU had efforts as well in order to stabilize the situation. In September, 2008 the Union took a decision and established the EU Naval Coordination Cell, which supports the surveillance and protection activities conducted by the member states in connection with the piracy off the Somali coast. Three months later, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, the first ever CSDP naval operation was launched in order to deter the pirates and to provide armed prevention.

The highlights of the mission's mandate are summarized by Damien Helly:

- *"To provide protection to vessels chartered by the World Food Programme for Somalia*
- *To provide protection, based on case-by-case evaluation of needs, to merchant vessels cruising in the areas where it is deployed*
- *To keep watch over areas off the Somali coast, including Somalia's territorial waters*
- *To take necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery*
- *In view of prosecutions potentially being brought by states respecting EU human rights standards, to arrest, detain and transfer suspected pirates*
- *To liaise with other actors working to combat acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast."*¹¹

This operation is joint or comprehensive from the military view of point as well: not only naval force, but also air power executes tasks as well. This operation was launched mainly because of the prevention of the European Union, but not militarily, much more economically, as 95 percent of sea-based trade conducted by the Member States passes through the Gulf of Aden. Humanitarian aspects were the second to be considered. The efforts are even more comprehensive if we consider that EU worked tirelessly to strengthen the state and government of Somalia, as they struggle against Islamic insurgents, who are accused to be supported by Al-Qaeda. The situation is not better in the neighboring countries, neither. They face with the problem of many Somali migrants and refugees flowing in their countries. Since Ethiopian intervention in 2007, Al Shabaab, a terrorist group arose and is very effective in the

¹¹ Grevi, G., Helly, D., Keohane, D. (2009) European Security and Defence Policy- The first 10 years (1999-2009). Paris. European Union Institute for Security Studies p. 391

torn-apart country. In addition, in Italy, Spain and France the fishing trade plays an important role in the nations' economy, making this problem not only military, humanitarian, terrorism or security issue, but economic as well, not only regional, but global and the solution has to be reached through Comprehensive Approach. EU's activity in Somalia consists of several pillars. Beside the military operations, humanitarian aid, development cooperation, political dialogue and classic crisis management was included proving the comprehensiveness of this operation.

The humanitarian pillar is a key in solving the situation, because Somalia is struck by the most serious humanitarian struggle in the world. European Commission has been funding the humanitarian aid by more than 100 million Euros total in the last ten years due to natural disasters, droughts and the conflicts themselves. These aids cover food, healthcare, shelters, water sanitation and hygiene promotion.

The development pillar's goal is to alleviate poverty and to build a democratic, peaceful society. This pillar highlights the pure connection between security and development.

In the crisis, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) asked the EU to help them dealing with piracy. Firstly, EU created the European Naval Coordination Cell (EU NAVCO), with the task of supporting surveillance and protection measures lead by EU member states nearby Somalia. As NAVCO did not have any military assets, it was a kind of contact point between the contributing nations and vessels and the civilian vessels trading in the area. The long-term goal is to contribute to improved maritime security in the region and get to a longer lasting solution. We have to stress that suppressing piracy by force seems to be a utopia, but we have to underline again that these methods are just a part of the wider-scale comprehensive approach. The mandate of Operation Atalanta is prolonged until December 2016. Showing the success of the operation and the presence, in January 2011, there were 32 ships captured by pirates, holding 736 hostages in the hope of a ransom (in the majority of the cases, not in vain), but by December 2014 the number of hostages held dropped to 30, and no ships was captured. Not only the Member States contribute to this operation, but also Norway, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine New Zealand as well. The patrolling strength is about 1 200 personnel with 4-6 combat vessels and 2-3 patrolling aircrafts at a time.

The operation can proudly enlist some achievements earned. As I mentioned before, the effectiveness in the aspect of the number of the vessels and hostages held, can be counted. According to the reports, since the start of the operations, no WFP vessels delivering aid for the poor in Somalia were taken by pirates. Numerous vulnerable ships were protected through the coordination with NAVCO, and the fleet successfully deterred pirates, and prevented many attacks against vessels and armed robbery.¹²

Through the example, we can see that the CSDP only one of the Comprehensive Approach's many contributors. However, it is very important to create a secure, peaceful atmosphere in the crisis-struck countries; otherwise, all the other aspects of the Comprehensive Approach could not work at this efficiency.

8 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (PROS AND CONS) AND PERSONAL CONCLUSION

8.1 Questions and answers

- *What does comprehensiveness mean in EU's operation EUNAVFOR ATALANTA?*

Comprehensiveness is the key to the success in this case. This crisis has many aspects, and simple answers to these widespread problems can not solve them. Comprehensiveness means that only interlinking, strong policies, methods can lead to success, because Somalia's struggle with the piracy is not only meant in the military way that can be suppressed by force. This is the whole regions' problem and maybe the causes and results in connection with this crisis can spread to the neighbouring countries, or even to the Union's interests as well.

- *How is CSDP related to the Comprehensive Approach in this operation?*

CSDP is one of the most important aspects of the Comprehensive Approach in Somalia. European Union's tool of CSDP can ease the tensions in the region, and a key policy in building and maintaining the peace using its crisis-management tools.

- *What is the strength of this CSDP mission?*

¹² Webpage Eunavfor. Mission. URL: <http://eunavfor.eu/mission> [06-05-16]

Of course, mainly the Member States contribute to this operation, but also Norway, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine New Zealand as well. The patrolling strength is about 1 200 personnel with 4-6 combat vessels and 2-3 patrolling aircrafts at a time.

- *Why is the Union interested in a crisis so far of its borders?*

In our globalized world, every threat can spread very fast, and Europe would have to face very serious hazard if it did not try to cure them outside of its borders. Piracy is a problem everybody easily can feel in a very short period of time. We have trading connection with the area, or at least a vital trading route was endangered by the pirates in the Gulf of Aden. During my researches I found out that the world's global trading's 20 percent flew through the Gulf. We can feel what an enormous problem is the piracy. On the other hand, humanitarian motives are also present, as the famine in Somalia is very strong and painful. Making the situation even harder, one of the pirates most attacked kind of vessels were the World Food Program's vessels trying to bring some help exactly to Somalia.

- *How can the European Union improve its policies to deal even more effectively these crises?*

In my opinion, European Union has to conduct an even more effective Comprehensive Approach. We have to be more alert in the question of security, as I feel that Europe is threatened in many ways nowadays. Even bigger problem is that the majority of people do not even feel that. This operation is a good sign, comparing to the operations in the past that were a bit improvised and ad-hoc.

8.2 Conclusion

In the essay, I tried to sum up the importance of CSDP. This is the answer of the European Union for our global problems, seeking for a common, united strategic view among its Member States in order to solve our common, global problems, with the tools of the European Union. Then, I introduced comprehensive approach, describing its complexity and the idea behind it. In the next chapter, I revealed the connection between the CSDP and the comprehensive approach, underlining that CSDP is just one of the many answers given by the Union to its external affairs. Through the example of the most successful operations of the EU

and its comprehensive approach, the Operation Atalanta, I proved the importance of the Comprehensive Approach and the CSDP. I think, in the future the Union will have to face with other problems (such as migration) needing even more comprehensive view and the future of the CSDP is being written now, as we have to prepare for the tomorrow's challenges today.

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"Pooling & Sharing" as the Answer to Europe's Capability Shortfalls

ABSTRACT

From the European Union's earliest days as a fledgling supranational entity its existence as a whole has depended upon cooperation. The coming together of European countries for their overall benefit is in itself something rooted in cooperation and the Union's history. As all states enter into the overarching pact that is a European Union, all give, and all benefit in some way shape or form. Essentially the Union's member states pool and share resources, whether economic or agricultural, in order to meet the shortcomings of themselves as individual countries. It is that very trait of cooperation at the heart of Union's existence that can give the European Union the capability to meet its defence and security aims and objectives. The European Union has shown that it is somewhat capable of the conduct of military operations of various types and sizes. As this essay will discuss, the Union has carried out Peace Support Operations and currently trains and maintains active Battlegroups for the purposes of military humanitarian intervention around the world. However, the security and defence ambitions of the union extend much farther than such capabilities. Some of the world's most capable military powers are members of the European Union. The ambitions of the Union cannot be met by these individual powers alone, and they certainly cannot be met by the Union's smaller and less militarily capable powers. What makes it possible for the European Union to conduct the military operations that it does, is the Pooling and Sharing of resources, skills and equipment. This essay will set out examples of this, and argue that the same spirit and implementation of cooperation and mutual support found in the Union's current and past military operations may be the solution to the shortfalls that the Union faces with its current defence and security ambitions. This essay will set out some key questions on the matter that were given rise to by research, and attempt to answer them. And this essay will also examine how a lack of the aforementioned spirit and actions has at times hampered the Union's defence and security activities in the past, and seeks to point out the fragility of the future of Pooling and Sharing.

Keywords: Pooling and Sharing, Ghent Initiative, European Defence Agency, EUFOR, Common Security and Defence Policy.

1 PREFACE

As a member of the Irish Defence Forces the main theme of this essay is particularly relevant to me. The Irish military has a proud history of involvement in International Peace Support Operations. Throughout the history of Irish Peace Support Operations around the world we have relied for the most part on the support of other nations, logistical or otherwise, in order to make our involvement feasible. Although most nations deploy in national contingents to Peace Support Operations, at the strategic level their deployment is dependent on the sharing of resources and the cooperation of other nations. As a member of the Irish Defence Forces I felt this essay topic an obvious one to address given the relevance of the suggestion that in order for the European Union to address its defence and security capability shortfalls it may need to rely on Pooling and Sharing of resources and capabilities. The suggestion simply matches what must be done for individual small states like Ireland to conduct military operations for their own peace and security agenda, but on a much larger scale. Ireland can conduct its Peace Support Operations that it is so committed to because of Pooling and Sharing of resources and capabilities. Research was difficult as a huge amount of sources available were provided by think tanks and government bodies as opposed to academic suggestive sources. However, this did provide me with a space to form a more genuine and personal narrative on the matter. It is my hope that this piece will provide a provocative springboard for further thought and research on the matter, and provide you the reader with an interesting expansion on the 'Pooling and Sharing' idea. I would like extend my gratitude for the help and support provided to me in conducting my research and drafting of this essay by my colleagues and friends.

2 INTRODUCTION

The Ghent Initiative produced in 2010 opens by explaining the wider context of European Union member state budgets falling, while the European Union itself was pushing to meet its capability goals for defence.¹ The European Union depends on the willingness of its member states to contribute and to cooperate with its over all goals and agenda. As defence is an issue

¹ Pooling and Sharing - German Swedish Initiative. (2010). Berlin and Stockholm. P.1

viewed by different member states with varying levels of concern and interest, in order for the European Union to have any credible defence plan and capability a strong commitment and agreement for cooperation by its member states is necessary. The Ghent Initiative suggests that member states systematically and accurately analyse their military and support capabilities.² The ‘food for thought’ document produced as part of the Ghent Initiative suggests six main areas for cooperation under which the European Union and its member states could make improvements. Harmonisation of Military Requirements, Research and Development, Acquisition, Training and Exercises, Command Structure and Procedures, and Operational Costs are all highlighted as the areas where the EU could make improvements in cooperation.³ The document suggests a possible way forward for the European Union by suggesting political action to set out timelines, for member states to conduct analysis on their own capabilities, for individual member states to themselves consider potential member states with which they could cooperate in order to fill the gaps in their defence capability standing, and for European institutions such as the EDA to facilitate these actions.⁴

The following year in November 2012, European defence ministers adopted a proposed list of eleven priorities for Pooling and Sharing compiled by the EDA.⁵ Among these initiatives were projects and specific areas for cooperation such as a Helicopter Training Programme, Maritime Surveillance improvements, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance cooperation, and Air-to-Air fueling, to name a few.⁶ Later in 2012 the EDA published its Code of Conduct for Pooling and Sharing. This code of conduct essentially sets out the priority areas that the EDA will encourage member states to participate in, namely; Pooling and Sharing and investment, and highlights its commitment to ongoing assessment of Pooling and Sharing occurring

² Ibid.

³ Ibid. Pp. 2 - 3

⁴ Ibid. P. 3

⁵ Pooling and Sharing Page of EDA Website, URL: <http://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/eda-priorities/pooling-and-sharing> [15-04-16].

⁶ EDA’s Pooling and Sharing. (2011). Brussels. European Defence Agency. Fact Sheet. Pp. 2 – 3

between member states.⁷ Pooling and Sharing as its suggested attempts to provide a solution to capability short falls of EU member states in defence and military capabilities. As explained by the EDA it is essentially a concept to be encouraged by the European Union in order to facilitate the Union's military and defence needs. However, questions remain open on the sustainability and practicality of Pooling and Sharing as a potential solution to the Union's shortfalls, and indeed what results it has yielded so far.

3 CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH

Given the nature of the subject, a large amount of the research available on Pooling and Sharing has been conducted by think tanks. This research mostly focuses on major issues with Pooling and Sharing and the problems associated with it for member states trying to participate. For example, in June 2012 the German Institute for International and Security Affairs published 'Pooling and Sharing in the EU and NATO'.⁸ This piece which was authored by Christian Mölling expresses a necessity for political commitment as opposed to "Technocratic sollutions".⁹ Mölling highlights some of the key areas which make Pooling and Sharing somewhat problematic for states to get fully involved and for the real benefits of it to be noticed. One of the issues highlighted by Mölling which could be quite damaging to Pooling and Sharing as a practical solution to Europe's capability shortfalls is the presence of trust issues between states involved in Pooling and Sharing, and national interests prevailing.¹⁰ As presented in Mölling's work, a barrier to Pooling and Sharing being effective is the tendency for states to want to maintain unilateral control of their military activities. States involved in Pooling and Sharing, according to Mölling's research, are overly keen to cling onto their own sovereignty in the form of total control of what their forces do, and where.¹¹ Mölling suggests that a 'Capability Chart' be drawn for the capabilities of individual EU member states in order

⁷ Code of Conduct for Pooling and Sharing. (2012). Brussels. European Defence Agency.

⁸ Mölling, C. (2012). Pooling and Sharing in the EU and NATO. German Institute for International and Secuiry Affairs. Berlin. Research Study.

⁹ Ibid. P. 1

¹⁰ Ibid. Pp. 3 - 4

¹¹ Ibid. P. 3

to make it easier for the Union to decide which capabilities need to be scaled down and which ones ought to be built up, and to make it easier for member states to trust each other and be knowledgeable of each other's capabilities.¹²

Peer reviewed research exists on the matter, much of which focuses on the economic aspects of Pooling and Sharing. Thomas Overhage published 'Pool It, Share it, or Lose It: An Economical View of Pooling and Sharing European Military Capabilities' in 2013 in *Defense & Security Analysis*, in which he delivers an argument to suggest that Pooling and Sharing is a real viable solution to Europe's military shortfalls.¹³ In May 2012 the Centre for European Policy Studies published a Special Report on the EU's necessity to make pooling and sharing work. 'The EU Between Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defence: Making A Virtue of Necessity' presents research and opinions on the sheer necessity of capability solutions for the EU in times of austerity.¹⁴ In this piece the authors suggest that an element of optimism for the future of Pooling and Sharing is justified, given the necessity for it to work and the existence of more recent factors which make Pooling and Sharing all the more plausible a solution to Europe's defence short falls.¹⁵

3.1 Methodology and Other Research

The methodology visible in most research on the matter is that of the careful collection of facts and figures, and the presentation of opinions on the matter, usually relative to the scope of individual think tanks or researchers, and their interests. As seen in the Centre for European Policy Studies' piece 'The EU Between Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defence: Making A Virtue of Necessity', the authors present numerical figures and statistics sourced from another think tank, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, on military expenditure in Europe in order to solidify their argument.¹⁶ Alternative to research directly focused on Pooling and

¹² Ibid. P. 4

¹³ Overhage, T. (2013). Pool It, Share it, or Lose It: An Economical View of Pooling and Sharing European Military Capabilities. *Defense & Security Analysis*, 12/2013, Volume 29, Issue 4.

¹⁴ Faleg, G. & Giovannini, A. (2012). The EU Between Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defence: Making A Virtue of Necessity. Centre for European Policy Studies. Brussels. Research Study.

¹⁵ Ibid. P. 5

¹⁶ Ibid. P. 6

Sharing, a large amount of research exists on other subjects, such as research on individual European military operations or activities. This non-directly related research offers insights into key information on the prospects of Pooling and Sharing.

4 RESEARCH GAP

A gap in research on the matter does exist. As a lot of research focuses on the financial implications for a failing of Pooling and Sharing and the benefits of it as a way for EU member states to achieve their defence goals at the strategic level, there seems to be an absence of research that focuses on the micro level effectiveness of EU military operations that specifically ties in Pooling and Sharing as a reason for that effectiveness or lack of effectiveness. A research based argument for Pooling and Sharing as a solution to the EU's capability shortfalls based on evidence for Pooling and Sharing being effective at ground level in the past has not yet been fully presented.

5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The questions that research on Pooling and Sharing gives rise to are generally open ended. They by their nature are questions with no real *definite* answer. However, it is possible to answer them with a degree of confidence and probable accuracy. There are three main questions that come to the forefront of thought after conducting research on the matter. The first, a more obvious question to consider, is has the EU and have EU member states already successfully engaged in Pooling and Sharing before it was even a considered paradigm of meeting defence capabilities for the Union? The second and probably a more important question, is do member states actually have a true interest in engaging in Pooling and Sharing? And the last, which is the *most* pertinent question to this essay, what can be expected for the future of Pooling and Sharing?

6 METHODOLOGY

For the purposes of research and quality of results yielded it was important to consider varying types of sources of both empirical and opinion orientated information. Given the nature of the subject a large amount of opinionated sources based on empirical facts and figures were

available from sources such as think tanks and government publications. Peer reviewed sources were considered significantly important because of the critical nature of their content, however they did not provide the majority of information for this essay. Other secondary sources such as books, reports and other documents were valued hugely. All sources were read and considered and key facts were extracted in order to attempt to answer the questions that research on Pooling and Sharing gave rise to. After the collecting of information and when the majority of research had been conducted, the key questions that needed to be answered were identified. Afterwards all research and information gathered was considered again in light of these questions. Once the relative information had been identified in order to attempt to answer these questions and answers were realised, the writing of the essay proper could begin.

7 RESEARCH AND RESEARCH RESULTS

This chapter will highlight the key research findings and their relevance to the questions brought up during the research process. Research can be divided into separate lines of information relative to the research questions; information pertaining to the presence of Pooling and Sharing before the Ghent Initiative, and information relative the political will and general success of Pooling and Sharing to date.

7.1 Pooling and Sharing Before Ghent

It became evident through research that before the Ghent Initiative in 2010 Pooling and Sharing as a general way of conducting operations had already been something engaged in by the EU and member states. There are many examples of EU member states working together on operations but two main examples stand out as pertinent to this essay. EUFOR TChad/RCA, an EU led Peace Support Operation which was mandated by both the EU and the UN in 2007 displayed both a significant ability for member states to engage in Pooling and Sharing in order to meet military capability shortfalls, and a failing of other member states to engage with the

concept.^{17 18} EUFOR TChad/RCA was essentially a military operation to provide a deterrence to the targeting of internally displaced persons in Chad and the Central African Republic by armed rebel groups.¹⁹ The mission itself was an exercise in cooperation and Pooling and Sharing of resources and capabilities under adverse conditions. The mission was led by France which provided the largest contingent of troops, along with Ireland and Poland being the other major contributors to boots on the ground.²⁰ The mission highlighted two major facts that are particularly pertinent to Pooling and Sharing. The first is the lack of airlift capabilities within the EU's capabilities. The second is a hint at a lack of interest from member states to actually provide assets when Pooling and Sharing was needed most. The sheer logistical challenge of the mission highlighted the EU's lack of an airlift capabilities to deploy troops and assets globally. Even though France had provided the majority of boots on the ground for the mission and stands out as the largest military contributor, France and the EU fell so short of being able to contribute their own airlift capabilities that Russian and Ukrainian helicopters had to be contracted in order for the mission to become operational.^{21 22} The mission faced serious issues in its Force Generation phase. The EU struggled to generate asset and troop contributors, to the extent that the mission was delayed. A total of 6 months was wasted between when the EU declared its operational intent, and when the contributors actually stepped up to the mark and provided the forces and assets that they did.²³ A distinct lack of interest in providing shared assets and troops was present among member states during the Force Generation phase of EUFOR TChad/RCA. However, when the mission was operational,

¹⁷ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1778(2007).

¹⁸ European Union, COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2007/677/CFSP of 15 October 2007 on the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic.

¹⁹ EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic (EUFOR TChad/RCA). (2008). Brussels. Consillium Europa. Fact Sheet.

²⁰ Council of the European Union. (2009). Council conclusions on operation EUFOR TChad/RCA. Brussels. Council Conclusions Document.

²¹ Vogel, Toby. (2008). *The EU's lack of airlift capabilities*. European Voice. Brussels. Article.

²² Seibert, B. H. (2010). Operation EUFOR TChad/RCA and the European Union's Common security and Defence Policy. Strategic Studied Institute. Pennsylvania. Research Study.

²³ Berg, P. (2009). EUFOR TChad/RCA, The EU Serving French Interests. Berlin. German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Research Study. P. 64

Pooling and Sharing by the member states who actually contributed was obviously occurring. As Alexander Mattelaer explains the mission proved to be a huge logistical challenge, and while the countries involved each provided troops and assets to essentially be Pooled and Shared, France provided the majority of logistical support for the mission²⁴

Pooling and Sharing has also been observable as an ongoing activity amongst member states before the Ghent initiative in the form the EU Battlegroups. The EU Battlegroup concept was established in response to a perceived necessity for the EU to have its own rapid military reaction capability.²⁵ The Battlegroup concept was pushed by France and the UK and essentially centres on the maintenance of a 1500 strong Battlegroup made up of EU member state troop and asset contributions, with responsibility rotating between states. EU Battlegroups are to be ready for deployment at short notice in order to provide military support for EU led humanitarian actions.²⁶ The first Battlegroup was operationally ready for deployment in 2005²⁷ three years before the publication of the Ghent Initiative. A Battlegroup made up of multiple national contributors could simply not exist without the presence of Pooling and Sharing in both assets and capabilities.

7.2 Political Will and Genuine Interest?

As mentioned the EDA is a major driver behind Pooling and Sharing efforts in the EU. After the publishing of the EDA's 'Code of Conduct on Pooling and Sharing' the EDA set out some specific Pooling and Sharing projects based on operational necessities for the EU.²⁸ These projects appear to have garnered some level of interest and involvement from member states. A large amount of interest in engagement with Pooling and Sharing is evident in the fields maritime

²⁴ Mattelaer, A. (2008). The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations. Institute for European Studies. Brussels. Working Paper. Pp. 23 - 25

²⁵ Lindstrom, G. (2007). Enter the EU Battlegroups. Chaillot Paper No. 97. Paris. Institute for Security Studies. Article. P. 9

²⁶ Ibid. Pp. 10 - 14

²⁷ Ibid. P. 14

²⁸ EDA's Pooling and Sharing. (2008). Brussels. European Defence Agency. Fact Sheet. P. 1

security, the sharing of maritime intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities, and other projects such as the Helicopter Training Programme.²⁹ Member states themselves take lead roles in the development of Pooling and Sharing in specific project areas. But two years after Ghent in 2012 a lack of interest in some Pooling and Sharing projects could be noticed. For example, Finland took the lead in 2012 on the development of a Maritime Surveillance Network, but no member state had at that stage stood up to the mark to take a lead on the over all Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Pooling and Sharing project, which the Maritime Surveillance Network project was part of.³⁰

Individual states still appear to be self interested in some cases. Dr. M. H. A. Larivé brings up a very relevant point in his book ‘Debating European Security and Defense Policy: Understanding the Complexity’. He explains that countries continue to work on defence projects that essentially match those being carried out by other member states. For example, France and Sweden both worked on and are working on their own fighter jet programmes, the Rafael in the case of France, the Gripen in the case of Sweden. While the UK and other member states such as Germany are simultaneously working on the Eurofighter joint effort.³¹ This shows what is known as a “*duplication*”³² of efforts by EU member states on defence projects. It’s result is that various member states are pumping their own resources into meeting their own capability goals and competing with each other, instead of Pooling and Sharing resources both capability-wise and financially to achieve their common and shared goals.

7.3 The General Expectation

There appears to be a general positive feeling towards Pooling and Sharing amongst the researchers who have already published and spoken on the matter. A mix of opinions exist, and of course the already mentioned challenges to Pooling and Sharing as a solution to

²⁹ Ibid. Pp. 1 – 3

³⁰ Ibid. Pp. 2 – 3

³¹ Larivé, M. H. A, (2014). Debating European Security and Defense Policy: Understanding the Complexity. 1st Edition. Ashgate. 2014. Pp. 95 - 96

³² Ibid. Pp. 96

Europe's capability shortfalls are widely known and reflected in the research that already exists on the matter.

However as highlighted already and brought up by the research that this essay is presenting, some large issues still stand in the way of the success of Pooling and Sharing. Again and again national interests and political will have cropped up as contentious issues that pose a challenge to Pooling and Sharing. States at times simply are cautious about genuine Pooling and Sharing of resources and capabilities because of an apparent fear for what could happen when they themselves are not in direct control of their assets and troops.³³ We have seen that even before Pooling and Sharing was set out as an actual goal or concept this attitude was apparent and visible during the Force Generation phase for EUFOR TChad/RCA.

But it is also noteworthy that Pooling and Sharing, when actually engaged with by the states involved in EUFOR TChad/RCA proved successful in bridging some of the operational capability gaps faced by the operation. A potent example of this is the magnitude of the logistical challenge overcome by the EU in establishing EUFOR TChad/RCA. From Cameroon where equipment had to be transported from to Abeche in Chad, a total distance of 2400 km had to be covered, only 900km of which was covered by rail.³⁴ Combined with genuine engagement and political will, Pooling and Sharing could indeed offer itself as an answer to the capability shortfalls the EU and of individual member states.

The real challenge for Pooling and Sharing though that lays ahead is whether it can be engaged with at the macro level of EU defence or not. At this level Pooling and Sharing could be focused on sharing of much more significant military assets such as aircraft carriers and world wide strike capabilities in order to make the EU a real competitor and player on the field of international military capabilities. In order for Pooling and Sharing to provide itself as a solution for EU capability shortfalls it would need to extend much farther than helicopter

³³ Mölling, C. (2012). Pooling and Sharing in the EU and NATO. German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Berlin. Research Study. P. 3

³⁴ Seibert, B. H. (2008). EUFOR Chad/CAR: A Logistical Litmus Test. Commentary on Royal United Services Website. <https://rusi.org/commentary/eufor-chadcar-logistical-litmus-test> [27-04-16].

training programmes and the sharing of intelligence. The UK is currently working on two large aircraft carriers which are due for operational readiness by 2025, along with F35 fighter aircraft onboard.³⁵ Further questions rise around developments like this. How willing to Pool and Share large and incredibly significant assets and capabilities like those will countries like the UK be? It is these questions that are yet to be answered.

8 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

It is evident that Pooling and Sharing is in ways a complex and multifaceted approach for the European Union to tackle shortfalls in its operational capabilities. It's a solution dependent on so many different factors and occurrences to fall into place in order for it to work. Before Pooling and Sharing as a concept was something being pushed by the Union it could be seen that when EU countries needed to Pool and Share in order to achieve an operational goal that member states were reluctant to play their part and offer support. Much to France's disdain this could be seen in the lead up to Operation EUFOR TChad/RCA. As much of the research on the matter already shows, states are not fully playing their part as team players in the wider spectrum of European Common Security and Defence policy and Pooling and Sharing. The distrust that Mölling spoke of in 2012³⁶ can be blatantly seen in the continuing work on national level defence projects such as the fighter jet programmes mentioned in the previous chapter. States are seemingly so distrusting of each other that they are absolutely willing to pump resources and finance into their own projects, despite the fact that the work being done on these projects is being directly duplicated by some of their closest allies. Without a marked increase in trust between member states, Pooling and Sharing may only ever remain a lower level 'could have been' idea that is only engaged with by member states on an ad hoc basis, when suits their own national interests.

However, research also highlights that with the efforts of the EDA and some member states, Pooling and Sharing could indeed develop into being a plausible solution to the shortfalls of

³⁵ National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review. (2015). UK Government. London. Pp. 30 – 31

³⁶ Mölling, C. (2012). Pooling and Sharing in the EU and NATO. German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Berlin. Research Study. Pp. 3 – 4

Europe's military capabilities. Since the Pooling and Sharing concept became an actual endorsed paradigm of generating capabilities for EU forces, it is to be noted that many member states have showed genuine interest. It is indeed in the best interests of most states in Europe to engage with Pooling and Sharing.³⁷

Pooling and Sharing of military assets and capabilities is no new departure for European member states. It has been done long before the Ghent initiative and its endorsement as a concept by the EDA and the Union as a whole. Pooling and Sharing as a concept only represents the clinging onto previously used approaches, and essentially 'officialising' them and encouraging them by the European Union and its institutions.³⁸

8.1 Conclusion

The future of Pooling and Sharing is not known. How far states are willing to go with sharing of assets and capabilities is yet to be seen, as we have seen no major Pooling and Sharing attempts outside of small Peace Support Operations, Battlegroups, and small EDA endorsed projects. However, as a solution to Europe's capability short falls, Pooling and Sharing stands as a genuinely plausible option. If levels of trust between member states can increase over time as the Pooling and Sharing concept is engaged with more in the future, and if the EU and its institutions can continue encouraging and supporting it, Pooling and Sharing could within reason be a solution to Europe's capability shortfalls.³⁹

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EDA – European Defence Agency

EU – European Union

EUFOR – European Union Force

³⁷ Author's own opinion based on research findings.

³⁸ Author's own opinion based on research findings.

³⁹ Author's own conclusion based on research findings.

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

UK – United Kingdom

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The Role of the CSDP in the EU's Comprehensive Approach

ABSTRACT

This essay's focus is on the role of the CSDP in the EU's Comprehensive approach to Crisis Management. The research uses varying types of sources from books, to magazines to speeches. Both the CSDP and the Comprehensive Approach are complex items of discussion, but the objective of this essay is to clearly identify the role of the Common Security and Defence Policy in the Comprehensive Approach.

1 PREFACE

Due to the nature of the world in which we live in today, it is vital that the EU has a Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management. In this essay, I will not only examine the role of the CSDP in the EU's Comprehensive approach as the title suggests, I will also discuss the different meanings of the Comprehensive approach to different organisations, the difference between crisis management missions and crisis management operations and the problems which it faces. I will discuss this using examples from a number of previous and current missions. I feel as a member of the Irish Defence Forces that this essay topic is very relevant because of the fact that Ireland as a nation has been involved in a number of these crisis management missions with the EU, UN and NATO. I hope that this essay provides an insight into the role of the CSDP in the EU's Comprehensive Approach.

2 INTRODUCTION

The role of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) within the context of the EU's Comprehensive Approach continues to be scrutinised by political and military leaders, academics, government officials, supporters and detractors alike. Some would argue that the CSDP is a somewhat toothless element of the EU's Comprehensive Approach, that the Comprehensive Approach is 'Comprehensive' in name only and that the EU has a long way to go before it fully embraces the concept. In this paper I intend to examine the EU's efforts to embrace a Comprehensive Approach to crisis management and in particular I will look at how impactful the application of CSDP is in terms of enhancing the EU Comprehensive Approach in future crisis management deployments.

3 RESEARCH AND RESEARCH RESULTS

This chapter will examine the main findings of the research and what is to be deduced from it. Research focuses mainly on EU Crisis Management, the CSDP, the Comprehensive Approach, and highlights some issues with the Comprehensive Approach itself.

3.1 EU Crisis Management

It is generally recognised by Global leaders and in particular by the political and military heads of the European Union (EU) that when it comes to crisis management, there is a need for flexible institutions, decision making processes and command structures that are able to respond quickly so that EU missions serve their intended purpose in a world that remains in a constant state of unrest.

Lehne (2013) suggests that in response to the challenges of the 21st Century, a successful actor on the international stage is required to incorporate numerous instruments of foreign policy¹ into coordinated external action in a comprehensive manner.

In a 2009 interview with Signal² magazine the then EU Secretary General / High Representative for ESDP³, Javier Solana stated that the need for the EU's CFSP and ESDP was stronger than ever. *"No country in Europe can deal on its own with the challenges and threats of today's turbulent world. The current economic crisis is a sharp reminder of this. The EU is an active global player looking after its regional and global interests and shouldering its responsibilities. It is working with the world's other major actors to tackle the conflicts, collapse of state*

¹ EU foreign policy has 3 main components: The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), member state individual foreign policy which operates in parallel to that state's commitment to CFSP and the external action led by the European Commission (Lehne, 2013). CFSP is the organised, agreed foreign policy of the European Union for mainly security and defence, diplomacy and actions. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is a major element of the EU's CFSP and enables the EU to take a leading role in peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention and in the strengthening of international security

² The Official Magazine of RACO – Representative Association of Commissioned Officers of the Irish defence Forces

³ The Lisbon Treaty (2009) changed the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in an attempt to develop more coherence in crisis management (Hynek, 2011:81)

institutions, instability, flows of migrants, human rights abuse, terrorist attacks, disputes over natural resources and humanitarian disasters that do not stop at borders. Solana further stated that global interdependence means that others increasingly ask the EU for help. And the EU is responding. It is the world's largest donor of humanitarian aid. It is leading the international efforts to fight poverty in Africa. Since 2003, the EU has launched 23 crisis-management operations under ESDP. It is active all over the world deploying judges, police officers, border guards, customs officials and other experts from EU Member States in nearly a dozen missions, helping to keep the peace in the Balkans, monitoring the ceasefire in Georgia, training the Afghan, Iraqi and Palestinian police forces and helping to reduce pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia.

The success of ESDP is reflected in the increasing demand for it. Its unique and distinctive civil-military approach to crisis management was considered ahead of its time when it was first conceived. It has proved its validity and has been adopted widely by others. However, to continue making a meaningful contribution, we must continue to make our security and defence policy more comprehensive in nature and more cohesive and we must ensure that our ESDP actions are firmly anchored in political strategies” (Signal, 2009)

3.2 Common Security and Defence Policy

Our world continues to change rapidly. Since the Solana interview we have witnessed the disintegration of Libya, bloody civil conflict in Syria, war games in Crimea and Ukraine and, as previously mentioned, a migrant crisis of monumental proportions right on the EU's doorstep. The EU is continuously faced with security challenges both in its immediate neighbourhood and further afield. To date, the EU has initiated some 30 peace missions and operations contributing to stabilisation and security in Europe and beyond. CSDP enables the Union to take a leading role in peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention and in the strengthening of international security. It is an integral part of the EU's comprehensive approach towards crisis management. However, it is interesting to note that of the 30 EU peace missions launched, only six are military operations. This statistic has prompted some commentators to question if the European Union's reaction capability is developing at a rate that should be expected from a politico-economic union of 28 member states with the largest economy in the world. Conversely you could argue that in a time of limited resources Europe also needs

to do better with less. The CSDP allows EU Member States to pool their resources and to build stronger defence capabilities enabling them to act rapidly and effectively.

As previously mentioned, since the launch of ESDP in 1999, EU crisis management has covered a multitude of different operations ranging from peacekeeping and peace building, to police training (Iraq, Afghanistan), legal advisory (Georgia) disarmament and demobilisation (Aceh) and security sector reform (Guinea-Bissau) (Hynek, 2011). CSDP (and prior to 2009, ESDP) has been in existence for 17 years.

In his interview Solana states that the purpose of ESDP is not territorial defence, but rather it is a crisis management policy that forms just one part of a much broader EU foreign and security policy. *“It uses the full range of resources available from diplomats and development workers to judges and police, and – but only when necessary – soldiers”* (Signal, 2009).

Solana clearly positions ESDP (now CSDP) within the context of the EU Comprehensive Approach. I think it is significant that he places emphasis on the requirement for ESDP actions to be *“firmly anchored in political strategies”* and that he uses the words *“only when necessary – soldiers”*. While CSDP is very much an integral part of the overall EU approach to Crisis Management, it naturally remains subordinated to CFSP.

When you consider the number of crises globally and in particular the predicament closer to home of mass human migration and civil conflict along its borders, Javier Solana’s words are as prophetic today and there is now a significant imperative on the EU. I will now examine, in the context of its approach to crisis management operations in the 21st Century, the role of the Common Security and Defence Policy and in particular how far the EU has come in terms of applying a fully ‘Comprehensive Approach’.

3.3 The Comprehensive Approach

The Comprehensive Approach can mean different things to different organisations, governments and political alliances. The Comprehensive Approach is an integrated approach to Crisis Management which incorporates the use of multiple supporting pillars such as Political, Security, Developmental, Rule of Law, Humanitarian and Human Rights. The

Comprehensive Approach is a platform for inclusive cooperation by all of the supporting pillars thereby leading to the acquirement of security, stability and governance in the conflicted area.

In 2010 the then NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen (Denmark) recognised the inherent difficulties of converting the theory of the Comprehensive Approach concept into practice when he said *“the logic of the Comprehensive Approach is compelling, but its implementation remains difficult, each player operates within its own stovepipe, and with its own working methods. The combined impact of our efforts remains much less than what it could be.”*

(Rasmussen, 2010)

This is an interesting observation by Rasmussen and can certainly be applied to NATO's implementation of the Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan which could make for an interesting discussion if one was to compare the EU interpretation of the Comprehensive Approach with that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper. I would however like to examine the European Union efforts to undertake a Comprehensive Approach to crisis management in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen (2011) note that EU leaders often boast about the distinctiveness of the EU Comprehensive Approach from those of the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), although some commentators, Lehne (2013) included would suggest that the EU is finding it difficult to live up to its ambition even despite the establishment of the European External Action Service⁴ (EEAS) by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.

Kuhn (2009) states that in relation to EU crisis management it is necessary to differentiate between two types of action. The first are crisis management operations (CMO), which usually

⁴ The European External Action Service (EEAS) is a EU department that was established following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. It was formally launched on 1st December 2010 and serves as a foreign ministry and diplomatic corps for the EU. The EEAS manages the EU's response to crises, implementing the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and other areas of the EU's external representation.

have a military element. The second are crisis management missions (CMM) which are usually of a civilian nature.

CMO have involved the rapid deployment of military forces in support of the UN, such as Operation Artemis⁵ in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), or more complex military support, such as European Force (EUFOR) Tchad RCA⁶. CMM often involve the EU deploying civilian or police personnel to manage the long term security sector reform (SSR) of a State after another organisation such as UN or NATO have created stability, for example the EU Police Mission (EUPM)⁷ in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Gowan 2012). Both CMO and CMM can be combined, resulting in complex crisis management operations that are not limited to either a military or civilian component, such as the anti - piracy mission Operation Atalanta⁷ off the coast of Somalia (Kuhn, 2009). Drent (2011:5) states that the majority of actions undertaken by the EU have been civilian or a mix of civilian and military in nature.

A basic fundamental of the Comprehensive Approach is that the “scope of the crisis faced by the international community is often of such a scale that no single agency, government or international organisation can manage them alone (DeConing and Friis, 2011:245). The EU (EU 2013a:2) reaffirmed its commitment to a Comprehensive Approach “in its external relations policies and action”. (DeConing and Friis 2008) offer several reasons for developing a comprehensive approach, such as efficiency, consistency, urgency, security, politics and legitimacy. The clearest justification for a Comprehensive Approach is best illustrated by the collective actions of the EU in the Balkans where, regardless of success, the commitment to a

⁵ Operation Artemis (May – Sept 2003) was a short term military mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo during the Ituri conflict. The deployment of EUFOR troops quickly decreased the conflict’s intensity. It marked the first autonomous EU military mission outside Europe and was an important milestone in the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

⁶ European Union Force Tchad / RCA was the EU mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) authorised by the UN and approved by the Council of the EU on 15th Oct 2007. Its mandate included protection of civilians in eastern Chad, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and ensure the safety of UN personnel. ⁷ Since 1st January 2003 the EU police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was tasked with creating a new stable police force for Bosnia and Herzegovina

⁷ Operation Atalanta is a counter piracy military operation off the Horn of Africa. First launched in 2008 with a focus on protecting Somalia bound vessels and shipments belonging to the World Food Programme (WFP) amongst others.

comprehensive programme including five (5) CSDP operations and the allocation of financial funding and technical assistance “would have been difficult, if not impossible, for individual member states to undertake” (Kirchner, 2013:50).

There are different styles to the Comprehensive Approach. For instance, the UN is primarily concerned with the security-development nexus (DeConing and Friis, 2008) while, by contrast, NATO emphasises its relationship with all actors engaged in the same theatre (DeConig and Friis, 2011).

Despite these different approaches, there is “no single theoretical academic field dedicated to the comprehensive approach” (Wendling, 2010:13). Considering its multifaceted nature and drawing as it does from the fields of human and societal security, links between civilian and military actors, peace building and peacekeeping, nation building and stabilisation (Wendling, 2010), it can be difficult to precisely define the Comprehensive Approach. This has led some to claim that there are as many definitions as actors involved (Johannsen, 2011). In terms of the EU approach (and within the scope of this paper), the Comprehensive Approach is defined as a “process aimed at facilitating system-wide coherence across the security, governance, development and political dimensions of international peace and stability operations” (DeConing and Friis, 2011:245)

3.4 Problems with the EU’s Comprehensive Approach

“Given the broad range of instruments it has at its disposal, it appears that the EU is virtually meant to act comprehensively” (Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011:222) and yet there is much criticism of its ability to act comprehensively (Drent, 2011). De Coning and Friis (2008) list obstacles to the Comprehensive Approach as conflicting mandates, cultures, mindset, prejudices, bureaucratic rigidity, funding, differing strategic priorities and leadership. Many commentators suggest that problems exist in terms of capability (both military and civilian), support and commitment of member states and the overarching issue of coordination. For instance, the deployment of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA Mission in 2008 was delayed by a number of weeks due to the lack of support by member states to the Force Generation process.

The EU does not have its own army or defence budget and as each member state retains full sovereignty of their armed forces they can choose to contribute or not, to a CSDP operation

(Grevi and Keohane, 2009:69). Despite this the EU has placed much of its focus on establishing military institutions and generating military capability, albeit with mixed results (Drent, 2011). Operation Artemis in 2003 illustrated that quick decisions could be made by the politicomilitary structures of the EU. By contrast as mentioned earlier, EUFOR Tchad/RCA in 2008 was delayed because sufficient helicopter assets could not be found among member states. According to Kirchener (2013) the primary lesson that the EU drew from the Balkans crisis in the 1990's was that peacekeeping or peace building operations alone are insufficient to promote stability and democratic reform. Drent (2001:7) suggests that a significant difficulty for the EU Comprehensive Approach is the fact that the civilian element was 'separated at birth' and is a 'counter-balancing afterthought' to the establishment of CSDP.

When ESDP was launched in 1999 civilian missions were not a consideration, but the requirement to find consensus among member states, particularly the neutral states of Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland has led to considerable civilianisation of the EU's security and defence policies (Drent 2011). Capability has also been a problem for civilian missions, particularly providing the required civilian skill sets in appropriate numbers. For example, EULEX, the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo required 3000 personnel at peak strength (Kirchner, 2013:30).

According to Lehne (2013) the Lisbon Treaty's ambition to achieve a closer alignment between EU and member state policies remains unfulfilled. For example, France, Germany and Sweden are all focussed on enhancing CSDP and agree on the added value of the EU's Comprehensive Approach, but lack a common view on where and when to apply it, while the United Kingdom are reluctant about any attempt to further develop CSDP at all, preferring to focus on traditional NATO capabilities and roles (Strategic Comments, 2013).

The primary difficulty for an EU Comprehensive Approach has been one of coordination, which has resulted in inter-agency rivalry, duplication of effort and sub-optimal economies of scale (DeConing and Friis, 2011). There are also obstacles for effective civilian – military integration, for example missions being funded through different financial mechanisms and, as Wendling (2010) states, simply adding civilian or military competencies to a mission or operation is not coordination.

The common costs of EU Military Operations are financed by the Athena mechanism⁸, the funding of which must come from member states. Civilian missions on the other hand are funded from the European Communities budget and delays in funding have been a familiar and contentious feature (Grevi and Keohane, 2009).

With the establishment of the EEAS, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security (HR/VP), also the Vice-President of the Commission is now tasked with overall political coordination of the EU's external action through the financial instruments available, such as the CFSP budget. In terms of funding therefore, the coordination required for a Comprehensive Approach "remains a challenge in terms of mechanisms and funds" (Pirozzi, 2013:10)

The lack of coordination between the military and political structures is perhaps best illustrated by the absence of a CSDP operation in response to the crisis of the Arab Spring in Libya, less than eighteen months after the Lisbon Treaty came into force (Perthes, 2011). It has been argued that this inactivity in the face of a crisis with clear security implications for member states has led to anguished soul searching in the EU (Menon, 2011).

4 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

This chapter discusses the outlook for the CSDP and the Comprehensive Approach, and offers a general conclusion on the topic.

4.1 CSDP and the Future of the Comprehensive Approach

Despite the barrage of negative criticism as referred to previously, I believe it is inaccurate to paint too bleak a picture. The HR/VP and EEAS have recognised the limitations of the EU Comprehensive Approach and have identified the way forward in their Joint Communication of the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises (2013a). This initiative reiterates the EU's commitment to the concept and is designed to increase the potential and

⁸ The Athena mechanism usually covers only around 10% of total costs, meaning that the majority are covered by contributing member states on a "costs lie where they fall" basis (Grevi and Keohane, 2009:76) which is a considerable burden for contributing member states.

ambition of the EU Comprehensive Approach in order to “make its external action more consistent, more effective, and more strategic” (EU, 2013a:2).

The EEAS has improved the EU’s ability to ensure the services responsible for political crisis management, military security, humanitarian assistance and development are all engaged from the initial response to a crisis. Crucially the EU Delegations will become the focal point of the EU in crisis countries, providing a degree of coordination that has been missing previously. From an institutional perspective the establishment of the Crisis Response System (CRS) within the EEAS is a direct response to the requirement to translate the Comprehensive Approach as envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty into concrete, functioning entities (Pirozzi, 2013).

The conduct of strategic reviews of crisis management procedures in the operations and missions that the EU has conducted has also been driven by the desire to enable a Comprehensive Approach (Pirozzi, 2013). This provides the greatest hope for the continued development of an EU Comprehensive Approach as seen by the new CSDP deployments during 2012. What is most significant regarding these more recent deployments is that they form part of a broader EU strategy that assigns a Comprehensive Approach to a region. For example, EUCAP Sahel⁹ complements the EU Training Mission in Mali ¹⁰ in a Comprehensive Approach to the Sahel Region (EU Fact Sheet, 2013a) while EUCAP Nestor¹¹ compliments EUTM Somalia¹² and Operation Atalanta (EUNAVFOR) in the fight against piracy off the Horn of Africa (EU Fact Sheet, 2013b).

⁹ EUCAP Sahel is the capacity building mission run by the EEAS, which extends across the Sahel region of Africa and includes such nations as Niger and Mali

¹⁰ EUTM Mali is a multinational military training mission, headquartered in Bamako, Mali, which is training and advising the Malian military

¹¹ EUCAP Nestor is a civilian mission which assists host countries in developing a self- sustainable capacity for continued enhancement of maritime security. The mission is mandated to work across the Horn of Africa and western Indian Ocean

¹² EUTM Somalia is a multinational military training mission, headquartered in Mogadishu, Somalia which is training and advising the Somali National Army

4.2 Conclusion

“European defence cooperation is a frustrating and difficult topic for policy makers and observers alike” (Strategic Comments, 2013:2). The EU is clearly committed to a Comprehensive Approach and its contribution to crisis management in the 21st Century has broadly involved security forces acting as a platform for democratisation processes to prevent post-conflict countries returning to violence (Gowan, 2012). However, the EU must bring its various instruments and assets together in a more coherent fashion (Lehne, 2013)

There has been success when one considers the EU Supporting Actions to the African Union Missions in Sudan and Somalia between 2005 and 2007. And the more recent EU response to piracy off the Horn of Africa are a clear indicator of a successful CSDP supported Comprehensive Approach. Of particular importance however, is the willingness of the EU to learn, illustrated by the improvements in the Joint Communication on a Comprehensive Approach issued in late 2013. While some commentators remain critical of the EU’s apparent inability to implement a “culture of coordination” (Hanssen, 2010:53), I feel that it is unfair to scrutinise EU institutions. And shifting the focus from the national source of the EU’s difficulty in embracing a Comprehensive Approach “encourages member states to blame European – level institutional structures for their own failings” Menon (2011:77). While there will always be conflicts of interests between the various stakeholders, ensuring that the role of CSDP remains as an intrinsic part in the EU’s Comprehensive Approach will be ultimately decided by member state support. And ultimately it is this member state support that will determine if the 21st Century vision of the EU’s Comprehensive Approach will be more than just comprehensive in name.

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Operational Capability of the EU Battlegroups

ABSTRACT

The security situation today in Europe and globally is ever evolving. Europe as a key player in international security and humanitarian relief must be able to contribute an effective solution to any possible crisis. In response to these demands, the European Union Battlegroups concept was developed to act as *“the minimum militarily effective a credible and coherent, rapidly deployable force package capable of stand-alone operations or for the initial phase of larger operations”*¹.

This paper will look at the operational capabilities of the European Union Battlegroups (EUBG). The focus will be on areas such as:

- What exactly is an EUBG, highlighting its characteristics and make up,
- History and Development of the EUBGs,
- How deployable is an EUBG in its current form?
- Possible future operations of the EUBGs,
- Contributing countries involved and their sacrifices,
- Challenges facing the interoperability of different nations, and
- Political will in regards to the EUBGs.

Keywords: EU Battlegroups, Pooling and Sharing, CSDP, CFSP, Multinational Forces.

1 INTRODUCTION

EU Battlegroups are an essential part of the European Union’s means for furthering its Common Security & Defence Policy (CSDP) interests in relation to global security and for strengthening its own defence capabilities. In light of recent events in Europe such as the Terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 and the Belgian atrocities in March 2016, the role of CSDP and collectively the EUBGs is more relevant now than ever before. Europe no longer has the option of isolating itself from the problems of the world, as Geoff Hoon, the British Defence Secretary stated in 2004 *“European countries need to make more of a contribution in*

¹ European Union External Action (2009). CSDP & EU Battlegroups. Consilium.europa.eu. Factsheet on EU Battlegroups.

terms of defence capabilities. It is not fair to keep turning to our ally in the United States to contribute military forces to problems which involve our own security."

In this paper I will look at the European Battlegroups (EUBGs) and their operational capabilities. I will begin by looking at what exactly a EUBG is, highlighting its characteristics and make up. In turn I will discuss how EUBGs came into being and how they have grown into the readily deployable EU asset we know today. In the area of being deployed I will move on to discuss possible future operations of the EUBGs, focusing on the countries involved, their contributions and the challenges facing the interoperability of different nations under the umbrella of a multinational force. An area outside of the military sphere that I will discuss also will be the political will when it comes to utilising and deploying the EUBGs, are we too cautious or not cautious enough?

Finally, I will present my conclusions in relation to the operational capabilities of the EUBGs looking at the successes and failures to date.

2 CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH

During my research for this paper I have found a great disparity in the type's information available. The majority of information available in relation to the EUBGs and their operational capabilities is from EU 'Think Tanks' such as Carnegie Europe and the EU institute for Security Studies. The amount of empirical journal sources though is not as freely available. From my research I have noticed some general themes when it comes to the operational capabilities of the EUBGs.

Non Deployment of EUBGs

A consistent theme throughout my research was the lack of political will or cohesion to deploy the EUBGs. This was aptly presented in an article by Judy Dempsey of Carnegie Europe where she looks at the reasons surrounding the lack of utilisation of the Battlegroup, stating "*Despite the instability of its neighbourhoods, most European leaders have no political ambition to think and act strategically. That myopia will be very costly.*"²

² Homepage of Carnegie Europe. Page on The Depressing Saga of Europe's Battlegroups.
URL: <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope>. [04-05-16]

Sharing of costs and responsibility

The topic of sharing of costs in relation to training and deployment of EUBGs is hotly discussed in various sources, highlighting a large difference in opinion on the matter. In regard to ‘burden sharing’ of the costs associated with the EUBGs, I found that the majority of costs “falls entirely on troop-contributing nations”³. For the larger contributing nations with large defence budgets this is not as much of a problem, but for the smaller contributing nations such as Ireland, they “*simply cannot afford to participate in the initiative*”⁴ for an extended of time.

Pooling of resources

In the area of pooling of resources, it became very evident that there were some very obvious gaps in the EUBGs resources, especially in regard to air lift and transport capabilities⁵. It was expressed though that the “*Battlegroups have helped to fuel efforts to overcome gaps in equipment and skills*”⁶ through pooling and sharing in conjunction with the European Defence Agency (EDA).

Full Operational Capability

Although it is known that the “*On 1 January 2007, the EU Battle Group Concept reached full operational capacity*”⁷ there is a raft of research refuting this claim. The main argument that the EUBGs are not fully capable is based around the fact that “*they have never been deployed since, raising serious doubts about the viability of the overall initiative and its future usefulness*”⁸.

³ Barcikowska, A. (2013). EU Battlegroups – ready to go? European Union Institute for Security Studies. Brief Issue Document, P. 3.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Major, C., Molling C. (2011). The EU Battlegroups: What contribution to European Defence? German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Research Study.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Homepage of European External Action Service. Page about CSDP - Military Headline Goals. URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/military_headline_goals. [25-04-16]

⁸ Barcikowska, A. (2013). Op. cit. P. 2.

3 RESEARCH GAP

From my research on the operational capabilities of the EUBGs, I have noticed several gaps in the information available. The information available, although wide ranging tends to focus on the main popular topics, as outlined above. This leaves a whole area not being investigated, such as:

- Just how capable are the EUBGs of dealing with a potential tasking, such as those laid down in the Petersburg tasks?
- If there is no political will to deploy the EUBGs, then why?
- What can be done to improve this?
- What is the future of the EUBGs?
- Could there be alternative taskings for the EUBGs when not deployed and on standby?

Overall though, throughout my research I found a lack of peer reviewed academic sources on the topic which has left a large void of empirical evidence on the topic that could in the future, help with the strategic development of the operational capabilities of the EUBGs.

4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The questions which I will pose in this paper will be:

- What is the EUBGs capability to meet the tasks as laid out in the Petersburg declaration?⁹
- Why is there a lack of political will on behalf of individual governments and the European council to deploy the EUBGs?¹⁰ What is the future possibilities for the EUBGs, when on standby and on deployment?

⁹ Western European Union, Council of Ministers. (1992) Petersburg Declaration. Document on WEU and EU Security

¹⁰ Dutch Delegation to the CFSP/CSDP Conference (2015) How to use EU Battlegroups. Executive Summary

I will draw conclusions on how to answer these questions from the information which I will display in this paper, giving examples of current research and empirical evidence where applicable.

5 METHODOLOGY

I have used a wide range of sources in compiling the information required for this paper. The information ranges from Academic journals, EU factsheets, articles, governmental and nongovernmental sources to Internet based information. My approach to research for this paper is both qualitative and quantitative whereby I have attempted in the most part to back up any statements or arguments with both sources and figures. I knew before beginning my research that there would be a shortage of peer reviewed academic sources for information, so to curb any ambivalence in the information provided I compiled information from several differing sources in order to gain a truer picture of the situation. Potential limitations in my research may be due to the lack of academic research into the Operational capabilities of the EUBGs, but it does not limit the overall scope of this paper in answering the research questions posed above.

6 RESEARCH AND RESULTS OF RESEARCH

6.1 What is a European Battle Group?

A EUBG is a Battlegroup size military element of approximately 1,500 personnel in its basic form. A EUBG can be supplemented with *“combat-support and combat service-support elements”*¹¹ when required. The Battlegroup’s purpose it to be *“the minimum militarily effective a credible and coherent, rapidly deployable force package capable of stand-alone operations or for the initial phase of larger operations”*¹². The Battlegroup operates on a standby rotational basis, whereby at any point there will always be a minimum of two Battlegroups ready to deploy. When on standby, the Battlegroup must be able to deploy within ten days of a European Council decision to deploy and it must be able to sustain itself

¹¹ European Union External Action (2009). Op. cit. P. 2.

¹² Ibid. P. 2.

for up to 30 days without a resupply. The Battlegroup can be tasked to operate in theatres up to 6,000km from Brussels and must deploy with its own Force Headquarters function in place.¹³ Overall the EUBGs concept allows the EU to further its responsibilities for global security and stability within the framework of the CSDP. The tasks that can be applied to the EUBGs is clearly laid out in Article 43(1) of the Treaty of European Union and the Petersburg tasks. They are as follows:

- joint disarmament operations,
- humanitarian and rescue tasks,
- military advice and assistance tasks,
- conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks,
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management,
including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation.
- supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.¹⁴

The Battlegroups are made up by contributing nations who provide personnel and materiel. There are currently 18 Battlegroups formed throughout Europe, with two of these groups on standby, ready to be deployed. Some countries such as France and Britain are capable of leading and fielding their own Battlegroup in its entirety but the majority of Battlegroups are made up on a 'Lead Nation' system. Under this system a nation will lead the Operational Headquarters of the Battlegroup and contribute a percentage of troops and assets to the Battlegroup. The shortfall then will be then made up by other smaller contributing nations.¹⁵ This is the case with Ireland for instance where we operate as part of the Nordic Battlegroup. The Nordic Battlegroups is made up of troops and equipment provided by Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.¹⁶

¹³ Ibid. P. 3.

¹⁴ Treaty on European Union (2007). Section 2: Article 43(1). Version as of 04-04-16.

¹⁵ Dr. Quille, G. (2006) The EU Battlegroups. Directorate General for External Policies of the Union European Parliament. Parliamentary Paper.

¹⁶ Homepage of the Defence Forces, Ireland. Page EU Battlegroups.
<http://www.military.ie/overseas/eu-battle-group>. [02-04-16].

6.2 Development/History EUBG

With the implementation of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) following the Lisbon treaty in 2009, the EU has sought to “take a leading role in peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention and in the strengthening of the international security”¹⁷. To further this aim militarily the Battlegroup concept was designed. The EU Battlegroups (EUBGs) concept was first put forward following Operation Atremis, an EU Military mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in 2003. The mission came about following a bitter conflict in the Ituri province of the country which saw a rapid escalation in violence. The operation included the sending of an Interim Multinational Emergency Force numbering 1,400 to reinforce the already established UN mission there, to protect vital installations and protect Internally Displaced person (IDP) camps.¹⁸ The mission achieved its aim and it saw a sharp de-escalation in violence in the province.

Following the success of this mission, the virtues of a rapidly deployable force at short notice to trouble spots was taken very seriously by the EU. In response the Battlegroup concept gained interest and was approved by all members of the Military Capability Commitment Conference in November 2004¹⁹. Since then 21 countries have pledged personnel, expertise and assets to the EUBG’s and 18 Battlegroups have mobilised.

6.3 CSDP & EUBG

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which is the framework document within which the EUBGs function, lays out the operational capacity of the Battlegroups. This policy document covers both civilian and military operations conducted by the EU. It also lays out who has overarching control of any CSDP assets such as the EUBGs. The CSDP covers the security and defence policy for the European Union and it is part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). How the CSDP really affects the operational capabilities of the EUBGs

¹⁷ Homepage of European External Action Service. Page About CSDP - Military Headline Goals. URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/military_headline_goals. [25-04-16]

¹⁸ Homan, K. (2007). Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo-Faster and more united. European Commission. PP.151-55.

¹⁹ Military Capability Commitment Conference (2004) Declaration on European Military Capabilities. Council of the European Union. Declaration Document.

though is in how it enshrines the promises of co-operation and interoperability between contributing nations. This area of interoperability or “Pooling and Sharing”²⁰ of resources is controlled by a body known as the European Defence Agency (EDA). The EDAs primary role is to “foster European defence cooperation”²¹ focuses on the following aspect:

- setting common objectives for EU countries in terms of military capacity;
- introducing and the managing programmes in order to achieve set objectives;
- harmonising EU countries' operational needs through the notion of ‘pooling and sharing’ military capabilities;
- managing defence technology research activities (22 priority areas including electronics hardware, counter-landmine systems, and physical protection);
- strengthening the defence sector’s industrial and technological base; and
- making military expenditure more effective.²²

6.4 Operations

An area that the EUBGs have yet to fulfil is in relation to being deployed on actual operations. To date, the EUBG has never been deployed, despite reaching “*Full Operational Capability on 1 January 2007*”²³. Positively, this has given the EUBGs an extended period in which to train and work together without the pressures of an impending mobilisation, allowing them to iron out any eventualities that may occur on any live operations. Negatively, it has raised questions as to whether the EUBGs concept is fit for purpose. Without the experience of being actually deployed to one of the possible tasking that the EUBG is capable of responding to, it is hard to know whether they will be competent in that role. The main reasons behind the EUBG not being deployed will be discussed in detail further on in this paper but they are mainly down to Interoperability, Political will, cost and suitability. The EU currently operates various civilian and military missions around the world contributing troops to a range of tasks such as training

²⁰ Barcikowska, A. (2013). Op. cit. P. 4.

²¹ Homepage of the European Defence Agency. Page About EDA Mission.
URL: <https://www.eda.europa.eu>. [02-04-16]

²² Treaty on European Union (2007). Section 2: Article 43(1). Version as of 04-04-16.

²³ Barcikowska, A. (2013). Op. cit. P. 2.

in Mali (EU Training Mission Mali) and EUFOR Libya, all under the framework of CSDP. It is right then to pose the question, could the EUBGs, if not in their entirety, be mobilised in the same manner?

6.5 Countries involved

The countries involved in the EUBGs, encompass the majority of the countries of the EU. The only exceptions are Denmark, who have opted out of the CSDP of the EU and Malta who abstained due to their nations view on neutrality.²⁴ There are also two non-EU member states who contribute to the EUBGs, Turkey and Norway, as it is beneficial for them to contribute. The countries who contribute and are on standby, must be willing to foot the bill for the troops, expertise and equipment provided, which can make the burden of contribution very difficult.²⁵

6.6 Challenges of Multinational forces

With contributions to the EUBGs coming from various countries with differing cultures, views on security, defence budgets, self interests and levels of professionalism, the possibility of problems occurring is almost inevitable. For the countries such as the United Kingdom, France and Italy who can field entire Battlegroups themselves, they do not have such problems as they work within their own cohesive militaries. In the case of the 'Lead Nation' Battlegroups such as the Nordic Battlegroup, where there are five contributing nations (Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Norway and Croatia), the interoperability and pooling & sharing of resources has to be closely managed. This is currently overseen by the EDA and outlined in their document "Code of Conduct on Pooling and Sharing". This document is *"aimed at mainstreaming, Pooling & Sharing in Member States' planning and decision making processes"*²⁶. Despite this document being accepted and ratified by European Defence Minister in 2012, adherence to this code of conduct is still on a voluntary basis. So still, despite the new code of conduct the

²⁴ Dr. Quille, G. (2006) Op. cit. P. 9.

²⁵ Barcikowska, A. (2013). Op. cit. P. 2.

²⁶ European Defence Agency (2012) Code of Conduct on Pooling and Sharing. (2012). EDA Policy Document.

EDA is at the mercy of the contributing nations, and due to *“the topic of sovereignty, Member States want to remain autonomous in their military decisions”*²⁷, including where their defence budgets are spent.

6.7 Political Will

In regard to the EUBGs there are questions surrounding the political will of the contributing countries, such as:

- to what extent are they truly committed to the CSDP of the EU?
- are they willing to see the EUBGs deployed when they are needed? and
- are they willing to absorb the costs associated with their Battlegroup being deployed?

Although contributing nations have ‘promised’ to uphold their end of the bargain, the true test of their resolve can only be determined when the EUBGs is mobilised for real on a live operation. If the EUBG were to be mobilised, would *“it fit the interests and political will of the Member States whose forces happen to be on stand-by?”*²⁸ The only logical way to counteract any possible shirking of responsibility by contributing nations, would be to remove the question of doubt over the political will behind the EUBGs. A solution would be to allow the European Council to have complete control over when and how the EUBGs should be deployed, giving the Council *“command authority over the Battlegroups on stand-by”*.²⁹

7 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND PERSONAL CONCLUSIONS

From my research on the Operational capabilities of the EUBG I have noticed some recurring themes and problems that need to be addressed. The Battlegroup size (1,500 troops) for a EUBG in theory is ideal to deal with any task assigned to it in a rapid and effective way, allowing

²⁷ Parent, R. (2015). Pooling & sharing: Member States’ engagement and the support by the EU. Directorate-General for External Policies. Policy Document.

²⁸ Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria (2015). Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations. Published by Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria.

²⁹ Ibid.

it to make a radical difference in any theatre. Unfortunately, as they have never been deployed in any capacity other than training exercises this cannot be verified.

Another problem with the Battlegroups occurs when there is a 'Lead Nation' Battlegroup, whereby the contributions are made up by multiple nations. In this scenario there is a disparity in the level of contribution to the Battlegroup, where smaller nations with minute defence budgets such as Ireland where our Defence budget is only 0.5% of GDP³⁰ have to endure a very harsh financial burden.

Throughout the development of the EUBGs concept from the days of Operation Atremsis, there has been an overall acceptance of contributing states that there is a need to have a rapidly deployable force that furthers the CSDP interests of Europe. This support though comes at a price and some countries have been bearing that more than others. The European Union has attempted to make contributions to European military endeavours fairer and more appealing to countries through the Athena Mechanism. The Athena mechanism which *"handles the financing of common costs relating to EU military operations"*³¹ came into being in 2004 but it still does not cover the costs associated with financing the training and possible deployment of the EUBGs. This is not to say that in the very near future it won't cover EUBG operating costs, as the European Parliament is currently looking at proposals for its inclusion.

Another area of interest is in relation to Pooling and Sharing of resources. This has been a major stumbling block for the EUBG especially in regard to strategic sea and air lift capabilities as *"all participating countries suffer a certain shortfall regarding the means of deployment"*.³² As I have mentioned previously in the paper, the EDA is responsible for monitoring the pooling and sharing of resources amongst militaries in Europe. Their document, 'Code of Conduct on Pooling and Sharing' is a great first step in the direction of forming a European wide pool of resources which the EUBGs could draw from for future

³⁰ Homepage of Department of Defence, Ireland. Page on Press Releases.
URL: http://www.defence.ie/website/press_releases

³¹ Council of the European Union (2016) Athena-Financing Security and Defence military Operations. Reference Document. P. 4.

³² Šmaguc B. (2013) The EU Battlegroups (EUBGs) – a success story or a paper tiger? Croatian Ministry of Defence. Research Study. P. 111.

training and operations. This will only be a utopian ideal though until the EDA is given powers in which to ensure that countries are meeting their contribution quotas, as it is only currently run on a voluntary basis.

The political will surrounding the EUBGs is another matter of concern to be taken into consideration. From my research it has become apparent that the main reasons behind the lack of political enthusiasm towards deploying and financing the EUBGs stems from the matters just mentioned and also the EUBGs lack of flexibility. It is safe to assume that if the matters of financing, pooling and sharing and burden sharing are corrected, political will behind the EUBGs would definitely strengthen. As for the EUBGs flexibility, major review of the Battlegroup structure will have to be conducted. If the EUBG could be reconstituted into smaller autonomous forces, capable of dealing with missions such as the EU Training mission in Mali (EUTM), it might be more readily deployed, as such *“flexibility facilitates the EUBG Force Generation and enables a broader spectrum of capabilities”*³³

7.1 Conclusion

To conclude, the EUBGs in their current form are more than capable of dealing with any of their assigned tasking, theoretically, but until they are actually deployed, we can only assume. As long as the Battlegroups stay inactive political will, which is already in question, will continue to wane. The Battlegroup needs to be reorganised so as to become useful in some way until the day they are called to mobilise for their intended taskings.

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List of Abbreviations

CFSP	-	Common Foreign & Security Policy
CSDP	-	Common Security & Defence Policy
EDA	-	European Defence Agency
EU	-	European Union
EUBG	-	European Union Battlegroup

³³ Šmaguc B. (2013) Op. cit. P. 99.

EUTM	-	European Union Training Mission
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
UN	-	United Nations
UNIFIL	-	United Nations Interim Force Lebanon
UNDOF		United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

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Operational capability of the EU Battlegroups

ABSTRACT

The international scenario is changing and the new threats oblige the EU to transform its Regional Strategy into a Global Strategy with a more effective and coherent internal and external policy. At Helsinki European Council of 1999, the EU Member States decided to establish a Rapid Response force, the EU Battlegroups, capable to be deployed at 6000 km from Brussels in few days. EU Battlegroups are a militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package that EU can use to prevent the escalation of pre-crisis situations. For its operational capabilities, the EU Battlegroups can play a major role in this changing process, but they need a strong political will to be used because of the unanimity required to launch an EU military operation. EU Battlegroups have never been used so far because of the lack of a common EU political will, the costs that the Member States that provide the force must face according to the 'costs lie where they fall principle', the defence budget restrictions and the different decision making procedures of every Member State, but this trend must change if EU wants to demonstrate its political weight abroad. It is possible to speculate many different scenarios for the future of EU Battlegroups, but the most relevant four are enough to represent well all the range of possibilities. From the most likely to the most unpleasant they are: *Permanent Structured Cooperation with preclearance*, *Training model with possibility of enhanced cooperation and certification*, *Continuation of current practice* and *Termination of EU Battlegroups*.

In conclusion, a long-term EU policy requires more cooperation and integration in order to achieve common objectives. The Battlegroups are an essential element for the EU Global Strategy and they must be more valued because they can be the major engine of transformation of national armed forces into common European Armed Forces.

Keywords: Battlegroups – CSDP – Rapid response – Operational capability – Global Strategy

1 PREFACE

The fate of the European Union is in the balance, as citizens it is our duty to do everything possible for a better future. The European Union must learn how to adjust its foreign policy to the new global challenges. The international scenario in which we live in is constantly changing

and new global actors are rising, for this reason our change is inevitable. New fronts are opening because of the new Russian foreign policy, the precarious political situation in Middle East and the problems related to failed States. The EU must face also new global threats like immigration and climate change, but the different interests and capabilities of the respective Member States act as an obstacle to a coordinated and collective action, EU must overcome them. Member States should clearly define common problems in which EU can make the difference even if it is difficult to come out, because of the European Council division on major issues. The hardest goal to achieve is to be able to pay less attention to those interests that are purely national and try to contribute by all means to solve problems of common interest with a long-term political commitment and with an integrated approach. We must realize that to address global problems effectively the resources of a single State are not enough, thus it is necessary a greater collaboration on major problems. We need leaders able to restore a strong European identity and the determination in facing together this common global challenge. We need empathy, pragmatism and solidarity; these three values should characterize our internal and external policy and, above all, us like European citizens.

2 INTRODUCTION (EU NEEDS A GLOBAL STRATEGY)

"Our global environment is changing rapidly. That is why the European Union's Heads of State and Government decided to assess the challenges and opportunities that come with these shifts. EU leaders asked the European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini to prepare an EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy to guide the European Union's global actions in the future. The Global Strategy, will be developed in close cooperation with Member States, as well as with EU Institutions and the broader foreign policy community."

EU needs a new strategy, a global one, because the regional policy is not enough anymore. Even the biggest Member States are not strong enough to face global problems alone if they want permanent results. Our world is becoming every day more unpredictable and it's necessary an European collective answer which should give the right weight to Member States and EU institution. It is obvious that it will take a while to reach a fully integrated common

policy and we will see results in a long time period, but we all know that "Roma uno die aedificata non est" (Rome was not built in a single day).

"Our world today is more connected, contested and complex. This makes our global environment more unpredictable, creating instability and ambiguity, but also leads to new opportunities. In the European Union's neighbourhood a set of concurrent and heightened crises create an arc of instability. This will have implications for the Union and the wider world for many years to come. The European Union needs to take a fresh look at this uncertain environment, in which opportunities and challenges coexist. An EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy will enable the Union to identify a clear set of objectives and priorities for now and the future. On this basis the European Union can align its tools and instruments to ensure that they have the greatest possible impact. This will help promote the European Union's interests globally, and ensure our security at home and abroad."

3 EU BATTLEGROUPS, FEATURES AND HISTORY

3.1 What is a Battlegroup?

"The Battlegroup is the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations. It is based on a combined arms, battalion-sized force and reinforced with combat support and combat service support elements." In fact, a Battlegroup is a small rapid response force who has the task and the responsibility to raise the capability of the European Union to stop the escalation of crises, for this reason it is so important its flexibility and its speed of deployment. The EU Battlegroup's composition is normally about 1500-2000 personnel strong, but it depends also on the mission and it can vary in its specific contents depending on the State that provides the force.

Based on the principle of multinationality a Battlegroup is a joint and combined formation, which means that he is normally made up of not only a single armed service and it is most of the time formed by a multinational coalition of Member States, even though mono-national Battlegroups have already been established. It is readily understandable that the most important criteria to evaluate the Battlegroup are interoperability and military effectiveness. Every Battlegroup must be associated with a deployable force headquarter and with

operational and strategic enablers, with the purpose to provide its deployment and its logistics. In addition, Member States may provide specialized capabilities and specific elements, which can add value to the Battlegroup. The Council of the EU is responsible to decide, according to the EU Battlegroup concept, of the start of an operation using EU Battlegroups. It has, from the approval of the Crisis Management Concept, only 5 days to decide so as to make the deployment as fast as possible and reach the battlefield in less than 5 -10 days. Consequently, every Battlegroup must be composed of forces with a high level of readiness and capable of this effort.

The Battlegroup remains on standby in its country for a duration of six months, whereas once deployed on the ground it is at first bearable for 30 days, while if resupplied this period of time can be lengthened to 120 days, but after this time it is necessary that a follow-up mission take over Battlegroup tasks if the operation is not still accomplished.

The Battlegroups are capable of carrying out key tasks in the international scenario, as those listed in Article 17.2 of the TEU and those in the European Security Strategy, but their small composition is something to bear in mind constantly.

"Based on the Headline Goal 2010, which places the emphasis on rapid response and deployability, the EU has progressed well in further developing its military capability. Battlegroups will be employable across the full range of tasks listed in Article 17.2 of the Treaty on European Union and those identified in the European Security Strategy. They are combat-trained, so their full potential would be best realised in tasks of combat forces in crisis management, bearing in mind their limited size. Battlegroups operations would as a rule be conducted under a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR), although operations could be envisaged where a UNSCR would not be necessary (e.g. evacuation of EU citizens)."

3.2 EU Battlegroups birth

Rapid Response was identified as a very important aspect of EU crisis management at the Helsinki European Council in 1999, for this reason the EU decided to establish a rapid response force, whose deployment could protect against the escalation of crises at an early stage. The Helsinki Headline Goal 2003 assigned to Member States the objective of being able to give rapid response elements available and deployable at a very high level of readiness in order to

require a closer defence cooperation between EU Members. This rapid response force was planned to encourage Member States to convert their national armed forces into a more useful tool and it would make possible the EU to carry out crisis management operations separately from NATO. In 2002, the EU Framework Nation Concept started to fill the existing gap in the Rapid Response capabilities of different EU Member States and the first EU Military Rapid Response was agreed the next year. In order to better understand the relevance of this step it is necessary to make clear the Rapid Response Concept by expliciting the difference between Standard and Rapid Military Response. *"Standard Military Response is the ability to be able to deploy up to 60.000 troops within 60 days. This requirement was confirmed in the EU Civilian and Military Capability Development beyond 2010, as a part of the EU multidimensional response."*

"Rapid Response is a process that, in a particular crisis, delivers the required effects quicker than a standard response (within 30 days or whichever timelines set by the political authorities, depending on the EU level of ambition). "

"Military Rapid Response is the acceleration of the overall military approach which encompasses all interrelated measures and actions in the field of Intelligence collection, decision-making, planning, force generation and deployment, together with the availability of assets and capabilities, and potential Command and Control (C2) options, in order to enable a decisive military response to a crisis within 30 days, as a part of the EU multidimensional response."

In June 2003, the Operation Artemis was launched; it proved the EU's talent to operate with a modest in scale force at a significant distance (more than 6,000 km) from Brussels. The need for a development of Rapid Response capabilities of the EU has been emphasized and this operation became an ideal to follow for the bringing into being of a battlegroup-sized Rapid Response force in EU hands. The next year Member States committed themselves to the *Headline Goal 2010* to be capable of responding across the whole spectrum of crisis management operations insured by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) with rapid, decisive and coherent actions. In order to reach this objective the first EU Battlegroups Concept was agreed the same year.

"The Battlegroup Concept gives to the EU a specific tool in the range of rapid response capabilities, which contributes to making the EU more coherent, more active and more capable. This concept enables the EU to respond rapidly to emerging crises with military means, taking into account the size and capabilities of the battlegroups on standby. The Battlegroup Concept also has the potential to be a driver for capability development and for making the armed forces of Member States more capable of undertaking rapid long-range deployments. Significantly, the need for additional strategic lift capabilities is underlined by the Battlegroup Concept. Furthermore, the concept emphasises the need for accelerated decision-making. Not only do the EU bodies need to be ready but the national decision-making processes need to be synchronised to meet the demanding timelines. Setting up a battlegroup package is an opportunity for enhanced military co-operation between Member States. This improves mutual knowledge of each other's capabilities with regard to military means and political decision-making. Finally, the Battlegroup Concept reinforces the EU's military identity in a concrete manner. "

In 2007, also EU Maritime Rapid Response Concept and EU Air Rapid Response Concept were agreed so as to achieve full operational capability.

Full Operational Capability 2007.

The European Union is a global actor, ready to undertake its share of responsibility for global security. With the introduction of the Battlegroup Concept, the Union formed another military instrument at its disposal for early and rapid responses when necessary. On 1 January 2007 the EU Battlegroup Concept reached Full Operational Capability. Since that date the EU is able to undertake if so decided by the Council two concurrent single battlegroup-sized rapid response operations, including the ability to launch both such operations nearly simultaneously.

Member States decided to go on in civil-military cooperation, with the intention to plan and conduct military operations and civil missions simultaneously. Their intention took shape with the *EU Civilian and Military Capability Development beyond 2010*. Even if from 1999 EU has made great progress in the field of military cooperation and Member States have demonstrated their interest in cooperation and integration, the renewed threats, as terrorism

inside EU, showed us that probably it is the right moment to use Battlegroups in order to highlight our intention to react collectively against violence.

4 EU BATTLEGROUPS USE AND FAILURE TO USE

4.1 Importance of Battlegroups in EU Global Strategy

The EU Battlegroup Concept is a key pillar for the EU Global Strategy. If used, the Battlegroup could be one of the best instruments at our disposal to reach military and political common objectives. Consequently is an obligation to mention at least the three key reasons why it is so desirable to develop this not used and underestimated tool. Firstly, the Battlegroup can be used as a spearhead of the European Union political will in order to show our firmness in foreign affairs by intervening abroad with a military force when it is necessary. If used properly the Battlegroup can be an irreplaceable tool in the hand of European policy. Secondly, the international scenario is changing very rapidly and it is each day more unpredictable. The EU needs a flexible and fast tool capable even of stand-alone operations to face the new international challenges, because, nowadays, traditional armed forces are not suitable for this particular task. Its deployment speed and ability to operate in distant theatres make it the perfect key to unlock difficult international crisis before they become unmanageable. At last, the most important reason is that the Battlegroups, in particular those with a strong multinational connotation, can be a model to follow in order to increase integration and they can be the major engine of transformation to create the future European Armed Forces that we all need.

4.2 EU Battlegroups till now

Despite their high level of readiness, no one of the EU Battlegroups has effectively been deployed up to this point.

It is possible to identify four main reasons that impeded their use, they are:

1) Varying security and defence strategies / lack of political will on a European level

The first reason that make so difficult for Battlegroups to be used is that the decision to launch an EU operation must be taken unanimously by the Council of the EU and unanimity could be an impassable obstacle when Member States have different political and military objectives.

Even if there is a common Security Strategy and the Member States of EU cooperate in the CSDP, every State can decide its priorities in security and defence field and it can decide to nip in the bud the decisions of the Council.

2) Shrinking defence budgets and shifts in focus

As a result of the economic crisis the majority of EU Member States are facing a difficult period for defence budget, so they are obliged to cut and reform their national defence in relation to their priorities and they must increase “pooling and sharing” in order to lower costs, but doing so they shift their focus from the EU to the bilateral or multilateral level.

3) Divergent national decision-making procedures

As known, the political decision-making procedures could be different from State to State. The Battlegroup's deployment, that depends on the approval by the national decision making authorities of the Member States that provide military forces to the Battlegroup, may be hindered or delayed from a possible involvement of Parliament when the Government is not entitled to decide alone.

4) Financial burden

An essential element that have to be considered are operational costs in the deployment of Battlegroups. The "costs lie where they fall" principle applies to participation in CFSP operations, only a limited part of ‘common costs’ is financed by the member states (according to the ‘Athena mechanism’) or by the CSDP budget of the EU and member states need to fund almost all the operational costs of the deployment and equipment of their armed forces.

4.3 EU Battlegroups now on

In relation to the EU's will of using military tools, the intensity of the multinational cooperation or the level of readiness reached by the Battlegroup it is possible to speculate a lot of different scenarios on the future of EU Battlegroups. It is impossible to analyse them all, but it is necessary to say something at least about those that are the most representatives. The most relevant four scenarios concerning the future of EU Battlegroups, analysed later, have been identified depending on the level of cooperation reached by EU Member States.

These scenarios are:

"Permanent Structured Cooperation with preclearance"

In this scenario, EU member states can, on a voluntary basis, declare their actual readiness to deploy armed forces in case of urgency and upon decision by the Council of the EU. These member states already give general preclearance to deployment before an international emergency occurs or a European mission proposal is submitted. The level of cooperation and integration on a long-term basis between these member states will increase considerably. National and internal procedures might be adjusted or harmonised to speed up the formal deployment decision-making process. If the Council decides to launch an operation, procedures can be concluded more swiftly. In addition, deployment does not depend on the willingness of all EU member states any more. In fact, the feature of Permanent Structured Cooperation in military matters, as introduced in article 42(6) of the (new) Treaty on the European Union, might be suitable to facilitate this aim. Moreover, a Solidarity Fund, covering the operational costs, might be taken into account in order to share and lower the financial burden for individual Member States that are willing to deploy the EU Battlegroups.

"Training model with possibility of enhanced cooperation and certification"

According to this scenario, the current EU Battlegroups are remodelled into training and certification pools; the main focus is on joint training and experimentation of operational capabilities. Furthermore, joint training costs – e.g. planning, logistical services and equipment – are reduced by better coordination and pooling of demand. Standardisation and certification of EU Battlegroups by an independent organisation (such as the European Defence Agency) would ensure consistent quality on a long term. Decision-making procedures concerning deployment remain nevertheless the sole responsibility of the participating EU member states. However, from these training and certification pools, a 'coalition of the able and willing' can be assembled at the moment an international crisis occurs. Those member states would enhance readiness in order to deploy their operational units to perform the required tasks they have already trained for.

"Continuation of current practice"

By this scenario, the current de facto functioning of the EU Battlegroups is merely continued. The EU member states explicitly settle for training capacities with no intention to actual deployment. Basically, the objectives of the EU Battlegroups are lowered and adjusted to the current practice.

"Termination of EU Battlegroups"

The fourth and least demanding option is termination of the EU Battlegroups. The rapid response forces of the European Union, as conceived in 1999 and realised in 2007, will be abolished and disbanded, without having been deployed. The EU henceforth leans upon the general (more time-consuming) procedures on CSDP missions and the commitments to these missions by member states. For rapid response forces, the EU and its member states will from now on be dependent on other international organisations, such as NATO.

As we saw before these four possibilities are only examples, it is possible to imagine others, but they can well represent the whole range of EU options from the most desirable to the most unpleasant.

5 CONCLUSIONS

Despite the initial political success of the BG Concept, Member States' commitment to Battlegroups seems to be currently experiencing a downturn.

As we know, Battlegroups are an essential pillar for the new Global Strategy, even if nowadays they seem to be less important than they really are. When Battlegroups started, the political long-term will was the transformation of national armed forces and the creation of a rapid response force in order to act rapidly and decisively to prevent the escalation of crisis. It is possible to say that, in the transformation of national armed forces, they achieve some result, but it is more difficult to say this in the escalation prevention field because they have never been deployed and they did not have the possibility to play a significant role for the EU.

To wait for the perfect moment in which use them could be seen like a political and military failure and it could transform Battlegroups in a not valued tool.

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Operational Capabilities of EU Battlegroups

ABSTRACT

In the final decade of the last millennium, the whole of the world's geopolitical context suffered a drastical change, altering the paradigms of war. Thus, a transformation in warfare appeared. In order to stay current with these changes, countries needed to place aside the idea of a massive standing army and had to specialize in different contexts of warfare. Specifically a need for rapid reaction forces began to arise as a response to the new threats. Europe's solution? The EU Battlegroups. The principal CSDP tool for quick response for all of the Petersberg tasks spectrum. The problem? Not once where they used. Since reaching Full Operational Capability, in 2007, never were the Battlegroups called to take action in a real operation. The causes? Political willingness, financial difficulties and the strategic airlift needed to reach foreign theatre of operations. The answer? Altering the way the conception on which the Battlegroup is built upon and fitting it to a more realistic and feasible standard to achieve, while considering the European Union Member States' difficulties and strengths. By analysing the whole idea of the Battlegroups from an outside perspective, we see that in wanting to have a single answer to respond to a huge diversity of situations, a dire state was reached in which the controversy behind the usage of the Battlegroups calls for a change in the way they are built or to discharge the notion into the abyss.

Keywords: Battlegroups, Rapid Response, CSDP, Modularity, EU ambitions

1 PREFACE

In order to understand and to discuss the concept of the European Union's Battlegroups and its Operational Capability, an understanding of its roots and framework is needed before tackling the question at hand. So this essay tries to analyse the importance of said BGs and also to question the way they are built and supposedly put to use.

The author wrote this essay with the purpose of questioning the paradigms of the BGs and the challenges posed by wanting to have a standby quick reaction force as a crisis management tool poses. This topic was chosen from a pool of 10 topics in which all of them relate to the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. The main reason for the choice of this topic was the importance that the author places in the EU being able to find a better way to react to threats that need a military approach. The subject approached throughout the essay

is of a great importance since not once were the BGs deployed, there being no point in having a tool that we cannot or will not use. Thus it is important to understand this and to discover whether there is another course of action or methods to achieve a more practical solution.

When looking at the genesis of the BGs we see a clear path for them to be built and used, there is always a BG ready to be deployed, it merges forces from different countries, EU-members or not, it is roughly composed of 1500 personnel, it can be either a stand-alone force or part of a larger operation and it is best put to the full array of its capabilities in crisis management operations. Bearing this in mind, it is hard to understand why, since the 1st BG reached Initial Operational Capability on January 2005, not a single time was a BG deployed or put to use. The first question that comes to mind is that no suitable crisis has appeared since 2005 that needed a resolution from the European Union, but there are many examples in the last 11 years of crisis, whether being political, humanitarian or due to natural disasters, in which a BG could have been deployed. Thus a more realistic question appears: why are the BGs not being put to use? Does the problem lie in politics, economics or EU-members own interests?

In this essay the text will follow a logical structure, where firstly a study on the genesis of the BGs is carried out, followed by an in-depth analysis of the framework on which the BGs sit upon and its challenges, then a review of what has happened since 2004, finishing with a possible theoretical approach that could lead to some changes in the paradigm that is the BG.

2 INTRODUCTION

The author developed this essay for it to be submitted for the CSDP Olympiad, which will take place in Slovakia in October 2016. The title of the essay is “Operational Capability of the EU Battlegroups”.

Taking in consideration the current geopolitical context and the global financial crisis, the EU needs to be able to find the best solution to react to the threats that emerge and be ready to undertake its share of responsibility for global security, on the premise of collective defence and to take advantage of each of its members’ capabilities. Bearing this in mind this issue is of the utmost importance to the EU’s CSDP and to MS governments since having a “working”

tool of rapid response to threats is critical when it comes to being able to maintain security inside our borders and in our areas of interest.

This paper should be of interest to analysts and academics interested in European Security and Defence Policy – in particular those concerned with the progression and status of EU Rapid Response elements such as the BGs.

The subject being related with the EU's BGs, the object of this study will be the framework of the BGs and its challenges, the events that led to this point of stagnation that the EU finds itself in, "a use it or lose it" point, as well as a possible theory that could serve as an improvement or alternative to the matter at hand.

In order to limit the essay in time and space, the topic will be confined within its genesis, the late 1990s, until the current days. Since the EU is an organization with global interests a limitation of the space of the object of study will not be made.

3 CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH

Since the BG concept only appeared in the 21st century, it has not thoroughly been researched by neither the military nor scholars. Also the ever-changing warfare context and with new threats appearing in the last years, finding common ground in achieving a "perfect" standard for what a BG should be has been quite difficult. It is also hard to carry out research on this subject due to the fact that trying to achieve some practical results can only be made by MS and it would implicate meddling in politics and big financial budgets.

4 RESEARCH GAP

A part of the research that is still in its infant stage is the understanding of the real purpose that the EU wants for the BGs. This is because while the BGs are very appealing in theory, the reality is that the EU is in a state of conformism; despite knowing that the current paradigm for the BGs is not working, they seem to let the problem stay and do not make enough efforts to solve it.

5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Considering the subject at hand, two main questions led the author while doing the essay. The Research Questions (RQ) are the following.

RQ1: Is the current concept of the EU's Battlegroups viable?

RQ2: Is there a need for a more ad-hoc approach to a rapid response force as a tool of ESDP Crisis Management?

After devising these research questions, some hypotheses (H) originated as possible answers:

H1: The current concept of the way BGs are used does not contemplate the difficulties and responsibilities of the Member States and does not make proper use of the full capabilities of the BG.

H2: Using the concept of modularity could be a better way to have a rapid response force that could give an answer to the whole spectrum of tasks in which the EU can respond

Thus, with the initial layout posed it is feasible to start the research on the Operational Capability of the EU's Battlegroups.

6 METHODOLOGY

The investigation plan, in Social Sciences, advises an initial reflection about the issue (defining it), allowing the author to launch an initial question which he will try to answer. So, in the context of the present analysis, the author applied the methodology implemented by Raymond Quivy and Luc Van Campenhoudt in their "Handbook of Research in Social Sciences". The present paper is divided into four main parts. The first concerns the introduction of the problem. The second focuses on the literature review that addresses the "state of the art" of the problem being analysed. The third part includes an explanation of the techniques and methods used and the results obtained through the interviews and the personal inputs from the author. Finally, a conclusion is presented. In a schematic manner (see table 1), is presented the "analysis model" as proposed by Raymond Quivy and Luc Van Campenhoudt, applied in an evolutionary way.

7 RESEARCH AND RESULTS OF RESEARCH

7.1 Background

The roots to a future Battlegroup framework were outlined in the European Council Summit meeting that took place in Helsinki on the 10th and 11th of the final month of the last millennium. While not being the main purpose of the summit it was noted that a special attention would be assigned to a rapid reaction capability in the establishment of the Headline Goal 2003. Within its obligations, it is stated that EU MS should ensure the availability, deployment and high levels of promptness of smaller rapid reaction elements¹.

The birth of the BGs arises with the Summit Declaration of the Franco-British meeting held at *Le Touquet* on 4th February 2003. This Declaration underlined the urge to further improve the capabilities of the EU in the planning and deployment of forces (land, sea and air) in a short span of time (from 5 to 10 days). It also highlighted that the rapid response capacity is to be considered a European priority.²

This idea of a rapid response mechanism was put to test with Operation Artemis, which was the first autonomous military operation led by the EU under UN mandate that was launched in June 2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This mission's purpose was to "stabilize the security conditions and improve the humanitarian situation in Bunia". The feedback from Artemis showed that the EU had the means to successfully manage an operation with a multinational force in a distant theatre. So on February 2004, French and British leaders supported by Germany, as part of the new 2010 Headline Goal advanced the BG Concept proposition, showing greater emphasis on the EU being able to rapidly deploy forces, sustaining them in distant theatres and Interoperating³.

¹ European Parliament. (n.d.). Helsinki European Council 10 - 11. 12. 1999: Conclusions of the Presidency. Retrieved March 2, 2016, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel2_en.htm

² Missiroli, A. (2003). From Copenhagen to Brussels - European defence : core documents. Chaillot Paper, IV(67).

³ Barcikowska, A. (2013). EU Battlegroups – ready to go? Retrieved March 5, 2016, from http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_40_EU_Battlegroups.pdf.

7.2 Concept

What are the basis defined for the EU's Battlegroups? According to the EU Council Secretariat⁴, the BG is "the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package" that can be used for stand-alone operations or it can be the entry force for larger operations. "It is based on a combined arms, battalion-sized force and reinforced with combat support and combat service support elements." The number of troops can differ depending on the mission specifics but the BG composition is roughly 1 500 personnel strong. The main principle for the BGs is that it relies on personnel from different MS, hence interoperability and military effectiveness are key components of a BG. Based on this principle of multinationalism it can be formed by a framework nation or by a multinational coalition of MS⁵. (See table 2 for the MS commitments for the BGs)

A BG has an initial sustainability of 30 days that can be extendable to 120 days if it's appropriately resupplied. A BG is also assembled with a deployable force headquarters and operational and strategic enablers, such as Air, Sea, Logistics, and Special Forces, which are pre-identified. Special niche capabilities, like amphibious capabilities can also be contributed by MS, to provide certain elements with increased value for BGs. A standard BG is likely to be composed of three infantry companies, and corresponding support personnel. The arrangement of these different personnel allows for the BGs to take on an array of tasks. BGs are usually on standby periods of six months⁶.

After having achieved a political decision to set a mission, the BG has 5 to 10 days for its forces to start implementing the mission on the ground. The BG-package doesn't need to always have the same constitution, since it is tailored by the Operation Commander with the packages available and by the contributions of the MS⁷.

⁴ EU Council Secretariat. (2007). Factsheet: EU Battlegroups. Retrieved March 8, 2016, from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/070709FACTSHEETJuly07REV1.pdf>

⁵ European Union External Action. (2013). Eu Battlegroups, 32(October 2006), 1–4. Retrieved from <http://www.pana.ie/download/eubattlegroups.pdf>

⁶ EU Council Secretariat Factsheet (2007), op. cit.

⁷ EU Council Secretariat. (2006). Factsheet: EU Battlegroups. Retrieved March 8, 2016, from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/91611.pdf

The Article 43.1 of the Treaty on European Union and the European Security Strategy states that the tasks in which the EU can operate, “shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories”, also known as Petersberg Tasks⁸.

When speaking of rapid response to threats, the pace of assessment, political support from the MS, decision making from the EU Council, planning, force generation, MS force contributions and deployment needs to be as quick as possible to assure a smooth operation with no delays. This means that there is a need for the whole process, the planning and the deployment, to be as swift as possible. Having said this, once there is the approval from the Crisis Management Concept, the EU Council needs to be able to take the decision to launch the operation within 5 days. When it comes to the deployment of forces, the objective is for the forces to implement their mission on the theatre of operations, no later than 10 days after the EU Council decision to launch the operation. In this deployment, the naval and air capabilities needed for the operation would also be included in the 10-day span.⁹

Before Full Operational Capability, only one BG was on standby at any time during the year. Upon reaching Full Operational Capability on January 2007, the EU shoulders the burden of having at least 2 BGs on standby at any given time, and so it fulfils the ambition of having the capacity to undertake and launch two nearly simultaneously single battlegroup-sized rapid response operations¹⁰.

Assuring the fulfilment of the agreed level of ambition of having two EU BGs on stand-by at any one time, requires a great pool of resources and a great number of MS to be involved if

⁸ European Union. (2012). CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION. Official Journal of the European Union, (326). Retrieved from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN>

⁹ European Union. (2014). GEN - 2010 Headline Goal. Retrieved March 8, 2016, from [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010 Headline Goal.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf)

¹⁰ EU Council Secretariat Factsheet (2007), op. cit.

applying the usual 6-months stand-by period, so there is the possibility for a Framework Nation or a Member State to have a standby period of 12 months¹¹.

7.3 Challenges to the Battlegroups

Having a European rapid response multinational force ready to be deployed to long distance theatres brings its own particular set of difficulties¹²¹³¹⁴. From the challenges identified, the author chose to speak about the three set of challenges that are the ones that need to be tackled first:

- Deployability;
- Employability;
- Financing the operations.

A) Deployability

EU BG planners face a great deal of challenges when planning an operation. To determine the logistics need to run the operation, they have to take into consideration all the factors such as destination, distance, deployment demand that includes all the equipment needed and duration.¹⁵

Inside the deployability, the greatest hurdle that needs to be addressed is the strategic lift of the troops and equipment. The European Armed Forces simply do not have the capabilities to assure a fast deployment of the entire BG within the expected time span. In response to the latter, some MS explored, through Pooling and Sharing, the acquisition of three C-17 aircraft. Other MS agreed on the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution, where MS lease hours of a fleet of Antonov An-124. With a constant decrease in defence budgets across many European

¹¹ Ibid

¹² Lindstrom, G. (2007). Enter the European Battlegroups. Chaillot Paper (Vol. n° 97). Retrieved from <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp097.pdf>

¹³ Barcikowska, A. (2013), op. cit.

¹⁴ Chappel, L. (2009). Deploying the EU Battlegroups: Mission Impossible? Retrieved March 5, 2016, from http://www.eu-consent.net/library/FORNET/CFSP-Forum_vol7_no6.pdf

¹⁵ Based on Author's notes

countries, there is a need for a greater pooling and resource sharing. This lack of independence when it comes to strategic lifting is supposed to diminish once the Airbus A-400M program is completed.¹⁶

B) Employability

The most concerning question of the EU BGs is if it will be deployed. The factors that weigh in consideration when it comes to the deployment of a BG are the international security situation, the political considerations and perception of risks on the ground. The final saying in which the BG is deployed or not belongs to the MS and the FN. To date of this essay, not once was a BG deployed. The issue gains a certain controversy when there have been forces from MS that have been deployed instead of the BG.¹⁷

C) Financing the Operations

The Finance for the BGs is made by the Athena mechanism that administers the common costs of the operation, and by the MS that cover the rest of the costs individually based on what they spend, which means that, the more personnel and equipment a participating country contributes, the higher the costs will probably be. The Athena Mechanism will usually cover roughly 10% of the costs of the operation. This brings concerns for smaller or poorer countries that probably can't cover the costs of an operation.¹⁸ In March 2015 an agreement was reached that allowed the Athena Mechanism to cover also the strategic costs of deploying the BGs as well.¹⁹ Bearing this in mind, the other problem associated with the funding of a BG operation is that since the costs "lie where they fall", countries which make large contributions to the BGs will need to pay even more for the costs associated with the mission.²⁰

¹⁶ Lindstrom, G. (2007), op. cit.

¹⁷ Based on Author's notes

¹⁸ Chappel, L. (2009), op. cit.

¹⁹ Carmen Cristina Cîrlig. (2016). Financing of CSDP missions and operations. Retrieved March 6, 2015, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/577958/EPRS_ATA%282016%29577958_EN.pdf

²⁰ Author's notes

D) Failure to deploy

As stated before, not once was any BG deployed. The causes for its failure to deploy do not stand on whether there was an opportunity to deploy but always stood on the side of the MS that compose the BG. Either because the countries lack political willingness or because they just cannot afford the costs associated with the operation. Proof of this lack of political willingness or the financial burden is the case of the Central African Republic, where, in 2013, no BG was deployed because the United Kingdom failed to justify to its population the need to go there. In the following year, Greece just could not cope with the costs of the deployment of a BG²¹. Since 2005, the EU has sent troops to several theatres (Chad, Congo and Mali, for example), and on each occasion the force was formed from scratch.²² Another hurdle in the deployment of the BG is the existence of domestic laws, regarding force generation and its foreign deployment, in most of MS that requires an approval of the Superior Council of National Defence, which would delay the already time-sensitive deadline.²³

E) Modularity

A possible alternative to augment flexibility of the rapid reaction force is to implement a modular approach, where the modules are capability-based. Instead of just assigning troops, BGs would be formed by contributions made from MS according to the capabilities that countries want to offer and the ones that the BG needs. So the BG would be built with modules needed for the tasks that the operation in order to answer a particular crisis.²⁴

²¹ Novaky, N. (2014). EU battlegroups after the Central African Republic crisis: quo vadis? - European Geostrategy. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from <http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2014/04/eu-battlegroups-central-african-republic-crisis-quo-vadis/>

²² Onyskiewicz, J. (2015). Finding a use for the European Union Battle Groups. Retrieved March 9, 2016, from <http://europesworld.org/2015/10/28/finding-use-european-union-battle-groups-2/#.VykfWEdSlaY>

²³ Major, C., & Mölling, C. (2011). EU Battlegroups: What Contribution to European Defence? SWP Research Paper, 8(June). Retrieved from <http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:EU+Battlegroups:+What+Contribution+to+European+Defence?#5>

²⁴ European External Action Service. (2014). Military Rapid Reaction Concept. Retrieved March 7, 2016, from <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/dec/eu-council-eeas-military-rapid-response-concept-17036-14.pdf>

According to the Lithuanian Minister of National Defence, *“by increasing the modularity of the Battlegroups we could be able to tailor them to a specific crisis. In practice this could mean employing only a part of the Battlegroup or reinforce it with additional elements.”*²⁵

8 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND PERSONAL CONCLUSIONS

From the research done, it is possible to understand that the main problems that the BGs face are related to political willingness and economic struggles.

So until date, the BGs are not battle proven and the prospects for the future are not too pleasant. In fact the EU finds itself in a prolonged impasse gridlock regarding the future of the BGs. From the author’s perspective, there are three possible outcomes:

- The BGs serve as an instrument of training, to act as a test subject to assess possible scenarios and to give proper feedback to be used in real operations.
- The EU needs to reduce the ambition for the BGs by assigning different or fewer tasks to the BG spectrum of operation.
- The BGs are reformulated to adequately allow for a better planning and funding, through the better use of modularity and the Athena mechanism.

By looking at these possible paradigms for the BG some assumptions can be made. Regarding the utilisation of the BGs as a training tool the EU gets certain advantages. It promotes interoperability and serves as a tool of transformation for EU MS armed forces. It can also test and assess multiple scenarios that have a low probability of happening but are still considered very dangerous, and provides operational feedback of the whole process of an employment and use of an EU quick reaction force. However this attitude toward the BGs has a high monetary cost and as such should not be considered as a first choice.

Reducing the level of ambition and providing a more realistic approach to the BG concept and the probability of an actual employment fails to correspond with the notion that the EU is not committed to acting as a global security player for it will diminish the ability to project and

²⁵ KAM. (2013). The future of EU Battlegroups addressed in London | Press Releases | News | Lithuanian Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2013. Retrieved March 8, 2016, from http://www.eu2013.lt/en/news/the-future-of-eu-battlegroups-addressed-in-london_1

employ in the whole spectrum of operations assigned to the EU. Also there is the need to consider the capability of initial entry force as the core capability of the BGs so they can be more involved in the planning of an operation, thus improving the probability of deployment.

Analysing the last possibility for modularity to work, it needs to be done so in a way that enhances it with a reform on how the costs are funded by the Athena mechanism and the MS. By having separate modules of forces scattered throughout the Member States and ready to be deployed, the BG can be perfectly tailored for the Operation and allows for a better use and planning of the resources available. The downside is that it needs a constant contribution from a wider pool of MS at the same time instead of just counting on the usual framework of 2 to 4 or 5 countries.

The author finishes with a proposal for the BGs concept, by adopting modularity and revising the Athena mechanism of funding operations. The proposal focus on only having one BG on standby instead of two with the whole pool of MS coordinating on a yearly basis what kind of modules they will have on standby for the period of 12 months. Also, during the standby period there should be at least 3 months of overlap with the next BG to ease the launch of an operation so that no mission is not launched because the BG would then be overextending its standby time. The author also adds that despite the fact that the BGs were never deployed, the process that leads to the generation of forces and the training and certification of the BG serve as a great school to improve current procedures and to promote interoperability between MS.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

List of Abbreviations

BG - Battlegroup

CSDP – Common Security and Defence Policy

EU – European Union

MS – Member

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


Table 1: “analysis model” as proposed by Raymond Quivy and Luc Van Campenhoudt²⁶

²⁶ Table created by the author

	Semester	MS (& TS)	BG POC	preferred OHQ
Detailed commitments	2015-1	SE, EE, FI, IE, LT, LV, NO	SE	FR
		vacant		
	2015-2	FR, BE	FR	FR
		vacant		
	2016-1	PL, CZ, HU, SK, UA	PL	PL
		EL, BG, CY, RO, UA	EL	EL
	2016-2	UK, FI, IE*, LT, LV, SE*	UK	UK
		DE, AT, CZ, IE, HR, LU, NL	DE	DE
BG Package Commitments	2017-1	IT, AT, HR, HU, SI	IT	IT
		FR, BE*	FR	FR
	2017-2	ES, PT, IT	ES	
		vacant		
	2018-1	EL, BG, CY, RO	EL	EL
		NL, AT, BE, LU	BENELUX	UK*
	2018-2	vacant		
		NL, AT, BE, DE, LU	BENELUX	UK*
Initial offer	2019-1	UK*	UK	UK
		FR	FR	FR
	2019-2	PL, CZ, HU*, SK*	PL	
		ES	ES	
	2020-1	EL, BG, CY, RO*	EL	EL
		IT*	IT	IT
	2020-2	DE, AT, CZ, HR, NL*	DE	
		IT, ES*	IT	IT
	2021-1	vacant		
		vacant		

Table 2: EU BATTLEGROUP OFFERS AND COMMITMENTS as of 21st of April 2015²⁷²⁷ European Union Military Staff. (2015). EU BATTLEGROUP OFFERS AND COMMITMENT.

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RESULTS OF THE ESSAY PRESENTATIONS

NAME	Nationality	Score paper	Jury 1	Jury 2	Jury 3	Jury 4	Jury 5	Jury 6	Jury 7	Average Jury	Final score
John Michael NEVIN	IRL	83	100	97	90	87	97	95	88	93,4	88,2
Anna HELLER	DEU	81,5	100	91	90	94	90	89	91	91,2	86,35
Cintia Asoum AL-AGHA	HUN	90	80	82	84	87	79	80	83	81,8	85,9
Sergio SANCHEZ VILLA	ESP	81	92	86	95	88	90	85	89	89	85
Brian CLARKE	IRL	77,5	97	93	92	88	93	88	83	90,8	84,15
João MENDES	PRT	89	86	66	68	76	81	63	67	71,6	80,3
Marlin MEDIZZA	ITA	82,5	70	79	65	76	80	53	63	70,6	76,55
Petros VARNAVA	CYP	80,5	76	70	61	67	76	68	79	71,4	75,95
Bence GÖBLYÖS	HUN	81	77	74	74	72	61	51	71	70,4	75,7
Ross CLEARY	IRL	77,5	66	69	69	67	53	61	57	64	70,75

WINNER OF THE ESSAY PRESENTATION COMPETITION:**John Michael NEVIN (IRELAND)**

4 TEAM KNOWLEDGE QUIZ COMPETITION



RESULTS OF THE TEAM KNOWLEDGE QUIZ COMPETITION

Question	Team 1		Team 2		Team 3		Team 4		Team 5	
	HÖFER (AT)	BALCHEVA (BG)	HARRO (EE)	POŁAWSKI (PL)	HELLER (DE)	KOLIOS (GR)	PETROV (BG)	VARNAVA (CY)	SKENTO (GR)	NEVIN (IE)
	DIMITRIADIS (CY)	MÍČA (CZ)	APARÍCIO (PT)	ENACHE (RO)	GÉCZI (HU)	CLEARY (IE)	LYKOS (GR)	GÖBLYÖS (HU)	PILOTTO (IT)	ROSIŃSKI (PL)
	ANGELAKIS (GR)	AL-AGHA (HU)	BOTOŠ (SK)	PÉREZ (ES)	MEDIZZA (IT)	CABANAS (PT)	McENTEE (IE)	PALAGI (IT)	MENDES (PT)	POHONTU (RO)
	CLARKE (IE)	BONALDO (IT)	MONOV (BG)	KARAVIAS (CY)	ROŠ (SK)	SÁNCHEZ VILLA (ES)	FERREIRA (PT)	SÝKOROVÁ (SK)	ŠIMON (SK)	VIÑUELA PRIETO (ES)
Score	28		64		50		60		50	

WINNER OF THE TEAM KNOWLEDGE QUIZ COMPETITION – TEAM 2:

Haldo-Rait HARRO (ESTONIA)

Daniel POŁAWSKI (POLAND)

Marcelo APARÍCIO (PORTUGAL)

Sebastian-Ionut ENACHE (ROMANIA)

Alexander BOTOŠ (SLOVAKIA)

Joaquin Alfaro PÉREZ (SPAIN)

Alexander Ivanov MONOV (BULGARIA)

Georgios KARAVIAS (CYPRUS)

5 INDIVIDUAL KNOWLEDGE QUIZ COMPETITION



RESULTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL KNOWLEDGE QUIZ COMPETITION

Question	JOAQUÍN ALFARO PÉREZ	MARCELO APARÍCIO	ALEXANDER BOTOŠ	IONUȚ-SEBASTIAN ENACHE	HALDO-RAIT HARRO	GEORGIOS KARAVIAS	ALEXANDER IVANOV MONOV	JOHN MICHAEL NEVIN	DANIEL POPLAWSKI
									
	SPAIN	PORTUGAL	SLOVAKIA	ROMANIA	ESTONIA	CYPRUS	BULGARIA	IRELAND	POLAND
Score	42	28	0	14	34	28	16	38	26


WINNER OF THE 3RD CSDP OLYMPIAD:

Joaquin Alfaro PÉREZ (SPAIN)

6 COVER PAGE DESIGN COMPETITION



Winner of Cover Page Design Competition



Sebastian IONUȚ ENACHE
(ROMANIA)

7 CLOSING CEREMONY



WINNER OF THE TEAM KNOWLEDGE QUIZ COMPETITION – TEAM 2



WINNER OF THE TEAM KNOWLEDGE QUIZ COMPETITION – TEAM 2, WINNER of the 3rd CSDP OLYMPIAD
- Joaquin Alfaro PÉREZ, WINNER of the Best Essay Presentation Competition – John Michael NEVIN



WINNER of the 3rd CSDP OLYMPIAD - Joaquin Alfaro PÉREZ (Spain)
From the left: Ján BLCHÁČ, Harald GELL, Joaquin Alfaro PÉREZ, Jozef PUTTERA



**Winner of the Best Essay Presentation Competition
– John Michael NEVIN (Ireland)**



**Students of the Armed Forces Academy in a discussion
with State Secretary of Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic**

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**WE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPERTUNITY TO ONCE AGAIN
THANK EVERYONE FOR THEIR SUPPORT AND FOR MAKING THE
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2	João	MENDES	PRT	5. Operational capability of the EU Battle groups
3	John Michael	NEVIN	IRL	5. Operational capability of the EU Battle groups
4	Marlin	MEDIZZA	ITA	5. Operational capability of the EU Battle groups
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